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Abstract 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) among the United States 
and 11 Asia-Pacific countries. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has described it as a 
“comprehensive and high standard” agreement, designed to eliminate and reduce trade barriers and to 
establish and extend the rules and disciplines of the trading system among the parties to the agreement 
(see Figure 1). If implemented, it would be the largest plurilateral FTA by value of trade, encompassing 
roughly 40% of world GDP, and could serve further to integrate the United States in the dynamic Asia-
Pacific region. As a “living agreement,” it has the potential to negotiate new rules and expand its 
membership. It could also mark a shift to the negotiation of “mega-regional” trade liberalization 
agreements in lieu of bilateral FTAs and broader multilateral trade liberalization in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
The 12 countries concluded the TPP negotiations and released the text of the agreement in late 2015. 
Trade ministers from the TPP countries signed the final agreement text on February 4, 2016, and several 
countries are seeking to ratify the agreement this year. TPP draws congressional interest on a number of 
fronts, and Congress must approve implementing legislation for U.S. commitments under the agreement 
to enter into force. The TPP would be eligible to receive expedited legislative consideration under Trade 
Promotion Authority (TPA), P.L. 114-26, unless Congress determines the Administration has failed to 
advance TPA negotiating objectives, or has not met various notification and consultation requirements. 
Furthermore, the TPP may affect a range of sectors and regions of the U.S. economy and could influence 
the shape and path of U.S. trade policy for the foreseeable future. It may also serve strategic goals of the 
United States by strengthening regional alliances and extending U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region. 
This report examines the key provisions of the proposed TPP, related policy and economic contexts, and 
issues of potential interest to Congress. 
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Summary 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) among 12 Asia-
Pacific countries, with both economic and strategic significance for the United States. The 
proposed agreement is perhaps the most ambitious FTA undertaken by the United States in terms 
of its size, the breadth and depth of its commitments, its potential evolution, and its geo-political 
significance. Signed on February 4, 2016, after several years of negotiations, if implemented, TPP 
would be the largest FTA in which the United States participates, and would eliminate trade 
barriers and establish new trade rules and disciplines on a range of issues among TPP partners not 
found in previous U.S. FTAs or the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, the TPP is 
designed to better integrate the United States into the growing Asia-Pacific region and has 
become the economic centerpiece of the Administration’s “rebalance” to the region. Congress 
would need to enact implementing legislation for the agreement to enter into force for the United 
States. Such legislation would be considered under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) procedures, 
unless Congress determines the Administration has not met TPA requirements.  
TPP Members 
Currently, the TPP includes Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam, which together comprise 40% of the 
world’s GDP. TPP is envisioned as a “living agreement,” potentially addressing new issues and 
open to future members, including as a possible vehicle to advance a wider Asia-Pacific free trade 
area. The United States currently has FTAs with six TPP partner countries. Japan is the largest 
economy and trading partner without an existing U.S. FTA. Malaysia and Vietnam also stand out 
among TPP countries without existing U.S. FTAs, given the rapid growth in U.S. trade with the 
two nations over the past three decades and their generally higher level of trade restrictions. 
Potential Outcomes of TPP  
The TPP would provide several principal trade liberalization and rules-based outcomes for the 
United States. These include the following: 
 lower tariff and nontariff barriers on U.S. goods through eventual elimination of 
all tariffs on industrial products and most tariffs and quotas on agricultural 
products; 
 greater service sector liberalization with enhanced disciplines, such as 
nondiscriminatory and minimum standard of treatment, along with certain 
exceptions;  
 additional intellectual property rights protections in patent, copyrights, 
trademarks, and trade secrets; first specific data protection provisions for biologic 
drugs and new criminal penalties for cybertheft of trade secrets; 
 investment protections that guarantee nondiscriminatory treatment, minimum 
standard of treatment and other provisions to protect foreign investment, 
balanced by provisions to protect a state’s right to regulate in the public interest; 
 enforceable provisions designed to provide minimum standards of labor and 
environmental protection in TPP countries;  
 commitments, without an enforcement mechanism, to avoid currency 
manipulation, provide transparency and reporting concerning monetary policy, 
and engage in regulatory dialogue among TPP parties; 
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 digital trade commitments to promote the free flow of data and to prevent data 
localization, except for data localization in financial services, alongside 
commitments on privacy and exceptions for legitimate public policy purposes; 
 enhanced regulatory transparency and due process provisions in standards-
setting; and 
 the most expansive disciplines on state-owned enterprises ever in a U.S. FTA or 
the WTO, albeit with exceptions, to advance fair competition with private firms 
based on commercial considerations. 
The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) has estimated that the TPP would bring 
modest overall benefits to the U.S. economy once implemented, slightly increasing both output 
(0.15%) and employment (0.07%) above a baseline scenario without the agreement. According to 
the USITC study, most agriculture and services sectors would see expansions, while some 
manufacturing and natural resources sectors would be expected to contract relative to baseline 
projections as resources shifted within the U.S. economy. 
TPP Debate 
Views on the likely effects of the agreement vary. Proponents argue that the TPP is in the national 
interest and has the potential to boost economic growth and jobs through expanded trade and 
investment opportunities in what many see as the world’s most economically vibrant region. 
Opponents of TPP voice concerns over possible job loss and competition in import-sensitive 
industries. Other concerns include how a TPP agreement might limit the government’s ability to 
regulate in areas such as health, food safety, and the environment. The Obama Administration and 
others have argued that the strategic value of a TPP agreement parallels its economic value, while 
others argue that past trade pacts have had a limited impact on broad foreign policy dynamics. In 
analyzing the agreement and its implementing legislation, Congress may consider the agreement 
from several of these perspectives, as well as how the TPP promotes progress on U.S. trade 
negotiating objectives. 
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Introduction 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) among the United 
States and 11 Asia-Pacific countries. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has described it as a 
“comprehensive and high standard” agreement, designed to eliminate and reduce trade barriers 
and to establish and extend the rules and disciplines of the trading system among the parties to the 
agreement (see Figure 1).1 If implemented, it would be the largest plurilateral FTA by value of 
trade, encompassing roughly 40% of world GDP, and could serve further to integrate the United 
States in the dynamic Asia-Pacific region. As a “living agreement,” it has the potential to 
negotiate new rules and expand its membership. It could also mark a shift to the negotiation of 
“mega-regional” trade liberalization agreements in lieu of bilateral FTAs and broader multilateral 
trade liberalization in the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The 12 countries concluded the TPP negotiations and released the text of the agreement in late 
2015. Trade ministers from the TPP countries signed the final agreement text on February 4, 
2016, and several countries are seeking to ratify the agreement this year. TPP draws congressional 
interest on a number of fronts, and Congress must approve implementing legislation for U.S. 
commitments under the agreement to enter into force. The TPP would be eligible to receive 
expedited legislative consideration under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), P.L. 114-26, unless 
Congress determines the Administration has failed to advance TPA negotiating objectives, or has 
not met various notification and consultation requirements.2 Furthermore, the TPP may affect a 
range of sectors and regions of the U.S. economy and could influence the shape and path of U.S. 
trade policy for the foreseeable future. It may also serve strategic goals of the United States by 
strengthening regional alliances and extending U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region. This 
report examines the key provisions of the proposed TPP, related policy and economic contexts, 
and issues of potential interest to Congress.  
Background 
The precursor to the TPP was the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (P-4). It was 
conceived in 2003 by Singapore, New Zealand, and Chile as a path to trade liberalization in the 
Asia-Pacific region—Brunei joined in 2005—and the P-4 agreement was concluded in 2006. U.S. 
trade policymakers took notice of the P-4’s relative ambition as a possible template for a wider 
Asia-Pacific free trade agreement. President Bush notified Congress of his intention to negotiate 
with the existing P-4 members on September 22, 2008, along with Australia, Peru, and Vietnam, 
on December 30, 2008, as required under past and current TPA. President Obama recommitted to 
the TPP negotiations in November 2009 and renotified Congress of the Administration’s intention 
to negotiate the renamed Trans-Pacific Partnership. In October 2010, the TPP participants agreed 
by consensus to the inclusion of Malaysia as a negotiating partner. 
The negotiating partners announced a framework for the agreement at the sidelines of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministerial in Honolulu, HI, November 8-13, 2011. 
Thereafter, Canada, Mexico, and Japan consulted with the existing TPP partners on joining the 
                                                 
1 TPP negotiating parties include Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. 
2 For more information on TPA see CRS In Focus IF10297, TPP-Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Timeline, by Ian F. 
Fergusson; CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy, by Ian 
F. Fergusson; and CRS Report R43491, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions, by Ian F. 
Fergusson and Richard S. Beth.  
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negotiations. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partners—Canada and 
Mexico–acceded to the negotiations in December 2012, followed by Japan in July 2013.3 During 
the course of the negotiations, others countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines 
expressed varying degrees of interest in joining, but the parties decided to conclude the agreement 
before contemplating new members. The agreement must be ratified by all parties to enter into 
force in the first two years from its 2016 signing. Thereafter, it requires at least six countries 
representing 85% of the bloc’s 2013 gross domestic product (GDP) to accede to the agreement for 
it to take effect, thus requiring ratification by the United States and Japan for entry into force to 
occur. 
Congressional Consideration 
The Bipartisan Comprehensive Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-26), the 
current grant of TPA (TPA-2015), sets the procedures governing congressional consideration of 
the proposed TPP. TPA is the authority by which Congress, for specific periods of time, sets trade 
negotiating objectives, establishes notification and consultation requirements, and enables 
implementing legislation for reciprocal trade agreements to be considered under expedited 
procedures if it meets certain statutory requirements. TPA-2015 was enacted into law on June 29, 
2015, and expires in 2018, with a possible extension to 2021. 
Legislation to implement the TPP can be considered under the expedited procedures of TPA, 
since the TPP was signed during the time TPA has been effect. The TPP could be considered 
under expedited procedures during this Congress, the next Congress, or even after the present 
grant of TPA expires. TPP was signed and the final text of the agreement was released on 
February 4, 2016. Following signature, under TPA, implementing legislation can be introduced 30 
days after the release of the final text of the agreement on a day when both Houses are in session. 
That day was March 14,, 2016. The President notified Congress of the changes to U.S. law that 
TPP implementation would require on April 1, 2016. A TPA-required report by the U.S. 
International Trade Commission (USITC) on the potential economic effects of the agreement was 
released on May 18, 2016. Once the President submits the legislation for introduction, TPA sets a 
90-legislative-day deadline for congressional consideration with set periods for committee and 
floor consideration by the House and Senate.4 
                                                 
3 NAFTA is an FTA between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. For more information see CRS In Focus 
IF10047, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), by M. Angeles Villarreal.  
4 See CRS In Focus IF10297, TPP-Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Timeline, by Ian F. Fergusson and CRS Report 
R43491, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions, by Ian F. Fergusson and Richard S. Beth.  
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Figure 1. Trans-Pacific Partnership Countries 
(in billions of dollars) 
 
Source: Analysis by CRS. Population and GDP data from IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2015. Trade 
data from the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). 
Notes: Trade data only includes goods trade, and are from 2015. GDP and population data are from 2014. 
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TPP’s Strategic Context5 
The TPP could have significant implications beyond its direct economic impact, in what many 
term as broader “strategic” contexts. Obama Administration officials and other TPP proponents 
argue that these implications would be positive and felt in several ways, both geo-economic and 
geo-political. Though such implications are hard to define precisely, proponents of the TPP’s 
strategic importance suggest that the United States could use the agreement as a tool to exert 
influence in the region and beyond, in not only economic, but also broader political and security 
spheres. 
Administration officials regularly emphasize the TPP’s strategic value in arguing for its approval. 
USTR Ambassador Froman said in a 2014 speech: 
TPP is as important strategically as it is economically. Economically, TPP would bind 
together a group that represents 40 percent of global GDP and about a third of world 
trade. Strategically, TPP is the avenue through which the United States, working with 
nearly a dozen other countries (and another half dozen waiting in the wings), is playing a 
leading role in writing the [trade] rules of the road for a critical region in flux.
6 
 
Secretary of State John Kerry wrote in 2015: 
TPP also matters for reasons far beyond trade. The Asia-Pacific includes three of the 
globe’s four most populous countries and its three largest economies. Going forward, that 
region is going to have a big say in shaping international rules of the road on the Internet, 
financial regulation, maritime security, the environment, and many other areas of direct 
concern to the United States. Remember that, in our era, economic and security issues 
overlap; we can’t lead on one and lag on the other.7 
Overall, proponents maintain that through the TPP, the United States can further a wide range of 
goals, including the following: 
 liberalizing trade, encouraging market-oriented reforms, and driving economic 
growth; 
 establishing and updating regional trade rules and disciplines consistent with U.S. 
interests and modern commercial realities; 
 potentially strengthening the global trade architecture;  
 strengthening regional alliances and partnerships; 
 maintaining U.S. leadership and influence in the Asia-Pacific region; and 
 enhancing U.S. national security. 
In terms of economic influence, some observers argue the TPP may present an alternative to 
FTAs constructed by other countries, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Such agreements often 
exclude or have less extensive provisions on agriculture, services, investment, and intellectual 
property rights (IPR), which some see as among the most important FTA provisions for certain 
                                                 
5 This section written by Ben Dolven and Brock Williams. For more information on the strategic aspects of TPP see 
CRS Report R44361, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Strategic Implications, coordinated by Ben Dolven and 
Brock R. Williams. 
6 USTR, “Remarks by Ambassador Michael Froman at the Council on Foreign Relations: The Strategic Logic of 
Trade,” June 16, 2014, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2014/June/Remarks-USTR-
Froman-at-Council-Foreign-Relations-Strategic-Logic-of-Trade. 
7 State Department, “Secretary’s Remarks: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World,” October 17, 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/10/248302.htm. 
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U.S. sectors; moreover, these agreements generally have few if any binding protections for 
worker rights and the environment. The TPP could provide participating governments political 
cover to enact reforms relating to these and other provisions, presenting them as a tradeoff for 
greater access to the large U.S. market. While debate continues, both in the United States and 
abroad, over the appropriate scope of various TPP provisions and the degree to which they differ 
from other regional pacts, some policymakers argue that the TPP would provide the United States 
with leverage to help shape regional and, perhaps, broader multilateral economic norms.8 
In the geo-political realm, some analysts consider the TPP to be a litmus test for U.S. credibility 
in the Asia-Pacific region. Proponents argue the TPP signals the primacy of U.S. integration into 
Asia’s economic and diplomatic structures, suggesting that congressional inaction or rejection of 
the TPP would make the Administration’s rebalancing strategy look relatively weak and the 
United States look divided on how important it considers its leadership role in the region.9 
Similarly, many Asian policymakers—correctly or not—could interpret a failure of the TPP in the 
United States as a symbol of declining U.S. interest in the region and its inability to assert 
leadership.10 Some critics of the TPP assert that such arguments are overstated, and that the 
strength or weakness of broader bilateral political and security relationships depend more on 
countries’ assessment of their political and security interests than on whether they have a trade 
agreement with the United States.11 
China is not a TPP member, but its emergence as a regional economic power with active overseas 
trade and investment initiatives forms an important backdrop to the TPP’s consideration. Those 
championing the TPP, including President Obama, often cast it as a vehicle for maintaining U.S. 
leadership in Asia in the face of China’s rise, arguing that through the agreement, the United 
States can “write the rules” for regional trade and investment and help foster a broader, rules-
based regional order.12 Others contend that casting the TPP as an effort to “counter” Chinese 
initiatives is unproductive, and could create negative perceptions of U.S. intentions, both in China 
and elsewhere in the region. Some also argue that in many ways U.S. and Chinese goals for trade 
liberalization and rules and norms in the region could be mutually reinforcing, rather than 
competing, by promoting the goal of free trade in the Asia-Pacific region13 
Trade agreements, and trade policy in general, inevitably exist at the intersection of domestic and 
foreign policy and include both economic and political elements. This can create a tension in 
balancing various policy priorities, particularly for those policymakers who may support the TPP 
on some grounds but not others. Some opponents of the agreement argue that focusing on the 
strategic elements of the TPP distracts the debate from what they view should be its main criteria: 
the agreement’s potential impact on the U.S. economy. While both TPP critics and supporters cite 
different estimates of economic outcomes to support their positions, the broader strategic 
                                                 
8 Jonathan Soble, "Failure of Obama's Trans-Pacific Trade Deal Could Hurt U.S. Influence in Asia," New York Times, 
June 16, 2015. 
9 Jeffrey A. Bader and David Dollar, “Why the TPP Is the Linchpin of the Asia Rebalance,” Brookings.edu, July 28, 
2015. 
10 See, for instance, Prime Minister’s Office of Singapore, “Transcript of Keynote Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong at the Shangri-La Dialogue 29 May 2015.” http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/transcript-keynote-speech-
prime-minister-lee-hsien-loong-shangri-la-dialogue-29-may-2015. 
11 Daniel Slane and Michael Wessel, “The TPP: Why It Won’t Address Security Concerns with China,” Renewing 
America blog, Council on Foreign Relations, May 15, 2015. 
12 White House, “Statement by the President on the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” press release, October 5, 2015, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statement-president-trans-pacific-partnership. 
13 Simon Lester, Chinese Free Trade is No Threat to American Free Trade, Cato Institute, April 22, 2015. 
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implications are highlighted largely by proponents, and can be difficult to quantify despite their 
potential significance.14 
Economic Significance15 
Preferential multi-country trade agreements, such as the TPP, generally are expected to alter trade 
relations among the participants by lowering tariffs on traded goods and by reducing nontariff 
barriers within countries. Most economists agree that reducing trade barriers enhances 
productivity by allocating resources towards their most efficient uses, increases consumer choice 
and lowers costs, stimulates economic growth, and at the national level improves economic 
welfare. The Japanese government, for example, hopes to use increased international competition 
achieved by TPP to revitalize its less productive sectors, including agriculture and services, and 
lower costs for consumers.16 The gains of trade, however, are not necessarily distributed equally 
throughout an economy, and the resource reallocation that can lead to efficiency and job gains in 
some sectors may reduce production in other industries and can cause worker dislocation and job 
losses, a concern for policymakers and workers and firms in certain industries.17 
Removing formal barriers to trade, primarily tariffs and quotas, directly lowers the price of traded 
goods. For example, the 20% tariff on certain Vietnamese-made shoes imported into the United 
States would be eliminated, while U.S.-grown walnuts would receive a 10% tariff discount in 
Japan, once eliminated. In turn, lower prices may impact trade patterns by increasing the overall 
amount of trade that occurs (trade creation) and by shifting trade away from countries that are not 
party to the agreement to those that are in the agreement (trade diversion). At times, countries are 
motivated to participate in trade agreements to prevent this type of trade diversion.  
The magnitude of the trade creation and trade diversion effects that arise from TPP likely will be 
affected by a number of factors, including: the difference between pre-and post-agreement tariff 
rates, the speed with which tariff cuts are implemented, and a range of other external economic 
factors that affect global trade as a whole. For instance, the 2008-2010 global economic 
slowdown and the sharp drop in commodity prices and changes in exchange rates from 2014-
2016 arguably had a greater impact on the volume of global trade and trade flows between 
countries than any FTA trade liberalization measures that might have gone into effect during this 
period. In addition, the impact of tariff cuts under the TPP may be muted to some extent due to 
the multiplicity of trade agreements that already exist among the participants and the already low 
tariff rates that are characteristic of trade among a number of the participants. (See “Tariffs” 
section below for more detail.)  
In addition to the economic effects expected to result from cuts in tariffs, the TPP may offer long-
term benefits to bilateral and regional trade through changes in domestic nontariff barriers that 
form the structure under which trade is conducted. In broad terms, the TPP incorporates rules and 
disciplines for open, nondiscriminatory treatment for participants. These rules are expected to 
                                                 
14 For more information concerning the strategic aspects of TPP, CRS Report R44361, The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP): Strategic Implications, coordinated by Ben Dolven and Brock R. Williams. 
15 This section was written by James Jackson and Brock Williams, with assistance from Gabriel Nelson. For more 
information, see CRS Report R42344, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries: Comparative Trade and Economic 
Analysis, by Brock R. Williams.  
16 Sheila A. Smith, “Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal,” Council on Foreign Relations, event transcript, October 6, 
2015, at http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal/p37091. 
17 For more information on trade and employment, see CRS In Focus IF10161, International Trade Agreements and 
Job Estimates, by James K. Jackson. 
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reduce market-distorting activities that not only may reduce the overall level of trade, but also 
may create market distortions and inefficiencies. Analysts have indicated that some TPP 
participants, such as Vietnam, may use the rules and disciplines incorporated in the TPP to 
support a market-oriented reform agenda within their economies.18 To the extent that countries 
undertake such reforms, the TPP could provide long-term economic benefits to the countries 
themselves and to other TPP participants. Other rules such as aspects of IPR protections and 
certain labor and environmental commitments are, in effect, less about economic openness and 
more about ensuring economic activity meets certain requirements. As such, the rationale behind 
them (i.e., encouraging innovation, protecting worker rights, and safeguarding the environment) 
can differ from the traditional economic arguments for trade liberalization. 
TPP Economic Impact Predictions 
A critical aspect of the debate on the TPP is the agreement’s potential economic impact on countries both within and 
outside its current membership. The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) released a study on May 18, 2016, as 
required by TPA, to estimate the effect of the agreement on individual sectors in the U.S. economy.19 The study uses a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, working at the microeconomic level to estimate adjustments in 
consumption and production decisions in response to price changes. CGE models are a standard tool for estimating the 
impact of tariff changes. TPP commitments, however, include complex provisions that affect a broad array of issues going 
beyond just tariff schedules. While the USITC study also attempts to measure the impact of changes in non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs), precisely modeling such changes is a challenge, requiring estimations in order to quantify both the existing NTBs 
and the rate and degree of their removal. Economic models by their nature, require simplification from the actual 
economic activity they attempt to represent and should be interpreted with careful consideration of their underlying 
assumptions and methodology. Below we examine the estimates from the USITC and other recent studies on the TPP. 
USITC Study 
Like most CGE models, the USITC study uses the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database hosted by Purdue 
University for its baseline data and projections. The study compares a scenario with the TPP provisions in effect relative to 
a projected baseline with no TPP, focusing largely on 2032 when most commitments would be phased in. Overall the study 
predicts a small positive benefit for the U.S. economy from participation in TPP in 2032 relative to the baseline—a 0.15% 
increase in GDP ($42.7 billion) and a 0.07% increase in employment (128,200 full time equivalents). The study breaks down 
its analysis by sectors, with agriculture and services sectors predicted to grow both in output (0.5% and 0.1%, respectively) 
and employment (0.5% and 0.1%, respectively). Output and employment in the manufactured goods, natural resources, and 
energy sector is estimated to decline slightly from the baseline (-0.1% and -0.2%, respectively) as TPP is expected to shift 
resources towards services and agriculture production. 
Peterson Institute for International Economics Study 
This study by Peter Petri and Michael Plummer is notable partly for its attempt to model liberalization of nontariff barriers 
(including those applied to trade in services) using tariff-equivalency estimates. 20 These nontariff changes, which are the 
most difficult to model precisely, drive the results of the study, with changes in tariffs accounting for only 12% of the 
economic benefits of the agreement—a point critics emphasize when questioning the validity of the study’s results.21 The 
Peterson study also estimates modest net gains for the United States and other TPP partners. Small net losses are 
anticipated for some countries not participating in TPP including mainland China, India, South Korea, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Indonesia. By 2030, the authors project the United States will see real annual income gains of about $131 
billion above a baseline projection (or 0.5% above baseline GDP). These gains will not be spread uniformly throughout the 
economy, according to the model. The authors project some U.S. manufacturing industries to experience a drop in 
production from baseline, and the agriculture and any mining sectors to see a small increase. The service sector, however, 
                                                 
18 Ben Bland and Shawn Donnan, "Vietnam looks for reform and investment boost from TPP deal," Financial Times, 
October 6, 2015. 
19 USITC, TPP Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors, Publication 4607, 
May 2016. 
20 Peter Petri and Michael Plummer, “The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates,” 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2016, at http://piie.com/publications/wp/wp16-2.pdf. 
21 Dani Rodrik, “The Trade Numbers Game,” Project Syndicate, blog post, February 10, 2016, at https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/tpp-debate-economic-benefits-by-dani-rodrik-2016-02. 
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is projected to see large relative gains, offsetting the negative impact on manufacturing. The model assumes TPP will not 
affect the overall level of employment, but may result in shifts from one sector to another. A January 2016 World Bank 
CGE analysis, prepared together with Petri and Plummer and based on a similar model, arrives at similar conclusions.
 
22 A 
complementary study from the Peterson Institute estimates the resultant adjustment costs from TPP induced-employment 
shifts.23 Between 2017 and 2030, when the agreement is assumed phased in, the authors estimate total adjustment costs 
would be no more than 8% of TPP gains, providing ample means to compensate dislocated workers, potentially through an 
expanded Trade Adjustment Assistance program recommended by the authors. 
Tufts Global Development and Environment Institute Study 
Using nonstandard trade models, other researchers have produced studies suggesting the TPP will have overall negative 
effects on the U.S. and other economies. For example, a study published by the Global Development and Environment 
Institute at Tufts University projects the United States to experience a 0.54% reduction in GDP from baseline estimates by 
2025, as well as the loss of 448,000 jobs from a baseline employment level.24
 
In this study, all TPP participants are 
predicted to incur net employment losses due to the agreement, a result that runs counter to international trade theory, 
leading some economists to argue the methodology is ill-suited to examine a trade agreement.25 
TPP would be significant among U.S. trade agreements, due to its size and the commitments 
reached. TPP would be the largest U.S. FTA by the number of parties and trade flows, though the 
majority of that trade is with countries with an existing U.S. FTA (Figure 2). Japan's participation 
has greatly increased the potential economic significance of the agreement. Among the U.S. 
negotiating partners in the TPP, Japan is the largest economy and largest trading partner without 
an existing U.S. FTA (and hence, with greater scope for trade liberalization with the United 
States). In 2015, Japan was the United States’ fourth largest goods export ($63 billion) and import 
($131 billion) market. 
Malaysia and Vietnam also stand out among the TPP countries without existing U.S. FTAs, both 
in terms of their current trade and investment with the United States and their potential for future 
growth. Both countries have young, relatively large populations (above 30 million in Malaysia 
and 90 million in Vietnam) and their economies have experienced rapid growth in recent years.26 
Moreover, Malaysia's and Vietnam's average applied most-favored nation tariffs—the average 
tariff on imports—are 6.1% and 9.5%, respectively, two of the highest levels among TPP 
members. Removal of various nontariff barriers in both countries is also a primary U.S. goal. 
Both nations also have substantial state sectors, which may be affected by TPP outcomes.  
                                                 
22 World Bank Global Economic Prospects, “Potential Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” 
January 2016, at http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects/GEP-Jan-2016-Implications-
Trans-Pacific-Partnership. 
23 Robert Z. Lawrence and Tyler Moran, Adjustment and Income Distribution Impacts of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper WP 16-5, March 2016, at 
http://piie.com/publications/wp/wp16-5.pdf. 
24 Jeronim Capaldo and Alex Izurieta with Jomo Kwame Sundaram, “Trading Down: Unemployment, Inequality and 
Other Risks of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” Tufts University Global Development and Environment 
Institute, January 2016, at http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/16-01Capaldo-IzurietaTPP.pdf. 
25 Robert Z. Lawrence, “Studies of TPP: Which is Credible?”, Trade and Investment Policy Watch, Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, blog post, January 29, 2016, at blos.piie.com/trade/?p=553. 
26 According to the International Monetary Fund’s October 2015 World Economic Outlook, both countries had a GDP 
growth rate of 6% in 2014. For the ten years prior, growth averaged 5% annually in Malaysia, and 6.4% annually in 
Vietnam. 
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U.S.-TPP and FTA Trade Statistics 
 TPP countries collectively represent the largest U.S. trading partner, accounting for 41% of total U.S. goods trade 
in 2015 and 23% of total U.S. services trade in 2014; 27 
 U.S. FTAs already exist with 6 U.S. trading partners among TPP participants, which account for 81% of U.S. goods 
trade with TPP partners in 2015 and 69% of U.S.-TPP services trade in 2014; and 
 TPP countries together with all existing U.S. FTA partners, and the European Union, which is currently 
negotiating an FTA with the United States, account for 66% of U.S. goods trade. China accounts for nearly half of 
all U.S. goods trade with countries not currently negotiating or without an existing U.S. FTA. 
Figure 2. U.S.-World, TPP, and FTA Partner Merchandise Trade 
 
Source: CRS analysis. Data from the U.S. International Trade Commission. 
U.S.-TPP Trade and Investment28 
U.S. trade with TPP countries was more than $1.5 trillion in merchandise in 2015 and more than 
$276 billion in services in 2014, the most recent periods for which data are available (Table A-1 
and Table A-2, in Appendix). The flow of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) into TPP countries 
totaled $61 billion in 2014, while TPP countries invested nearly $59 billion in the United States 
(Table A-3). The TPP would become the largest U.S. FTA by trade flows (Figure 3). 
The TPP group of 12 countries is diverse in population, geographic location, and economic 
development, and U.S. trade relations with the countries reflect this diversity. The major U.S. 
merchandise exports are fairly similar to most TPP countries and include motor vehicles and 
parts; petroleum and coal products; computer equipment, semiconductors, and electronic 
                                                 
27 TPP accounts for a smaller share of U.S. services trade because of the large U.S.-EU services trade relationship. 
28 For more see CRS Report R42344, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries: Comparative Trade and Economic 
Analysis, by Brock R. Williams.  
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components; agriculture and construction machinery; and aircraft. However, the top U.S. 
merchandise imports vary greatly by country. Agriculture and natural resources products are key 
U.S. imports from Australia, Chile, New Zealand, and Peru, while apparel products are the main 
U.S. imports from Vietnam. Canada and Mexico are both major suppliers of crude oil to the 
United States, but they also supply manufactured products like motor vehicles and motor vehicle 
parts. U.S. imports from Malaysia and Singapore consist primarily of manufactured products such 
as computers, semiconductors, and electronic components. Motor vehicles and motor vehicle 
parts make up nearly 35% of U.S. goods imports from Japan. 
Figure 3. Largest U.S. FTAs 
 
Source: Analysis by CRS. Data from BEA and USITC. 
Notes: Services trade data not available for all FTA partners. T-TIP is the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership between the United States and European Union. CAFTA-DR is the U.S.-Central American-
Dominican Republic FTA including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
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In terms of value, Canada and Mexico are by far the largest U.S. trading partners among TPP 
countries in goods. Both countries share a long border with the United States and are among the 
oldest U.S. FTA partners. Japan is the third-largest U.S.-TPP goods trading partner, and second-
largest services trade and investment partner. Among the other eight TPP partners, Singapore and 
Australia are the top U.S. goods export markets and top overall services trade and investment 
partners with the United States, while Malaysia, Vietnam, and Singapore are the top sources of 
U.S. goods imports. 
Relationship to Existing Trade Organizations and Agreements 
TPP and the WTO 
Though designed as a regional trade agreement, the TPP could have a number of implications for 
the multilateral trading system represented by the WTO. Fundamentally, the proliferation of FTAs 
over the past two decades calls into question the multilateral system’s ability to negotiate and 
implement new trade disciplines and further international trade liberalization.  
Although WTO members agreed to a number of customs-related commitments as part of the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2013, the goal of concluding a major multilateral trade round 
remains elusive nearly 15 years after the launch of the Doha Development Agenda negotiations in 
November 2001. Persistent differences among members about the extent and balance of trade 
liberalization continue to stymie progress in this forum and major issues, such as services trade 
liberalization are being negotiated among a subset of WTO members outside the body. The 
United States has pushed for the Doha Round to end and to be replaced by a more attainable 
package, but at the most recent WTO Ministerial in Nairobi, trade ministers were unable to agree 
on declaring an end to the Doha agenda, since developing countries fear that abandoning the 
Doha agenda may result in agricultural issues receiving less priority. 
The last major round of global trade negotiations—the Uruguay Round—was concluded in 1994. 
Since then, global commerce has adapted to rapid advances in technology, with the result that 
current multilateral trade rules do not address some critical aspects of today’s trading 
environment, including digital trade and e-commerce. New trade patterns have emerged and new 
obstacles to the flow of goods and services have appeared. This has left countries, including the 
United States, to pursue new or advanced trade rules and further liberalization through bilateral 
and regional agreements like the TPP. 
Debate continues over whether or not bilateral and now “mega-regional” trade agreements help or 
hinder broader multilateral initiatives. On one hand, “mega-regionals,” such as the TPP or the 
Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) negotiations between the United States 
and the European Union, could serve as alternative venues for establishing new rules and 
disciplines for the trading regime, and their size and economic significance could help spur 
negotiations at the multilateral level, influencing their direction. Some argue, for example, that 
the conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), among the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico, effective since 1994, did in fact push the multilateral Uruguay Round 
negotiations to conclusion.29  
On the other hand, if the locus of trade negotiations primarily shifts to “mega-regional” 
agreements, it could limit the overall effectiveness of the multilateral system. If the rules of the 
                                                 
29 The Uruguay Round agreement was signed in April 1994, nearly seven years after it was launched but less than a 
year after legislation implementing NAFTA was signed by the U.S. Congress. 
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WTO no longer reflect the standards of trade policy to which much of the world has evolved, it 
could endanger the legitimacy of the organization in other aspects of its work, such as dispute 
settlement. A two-tier trading system, one working on more extensive rules and disciplines and 
one essentially dormant, could raise tensions by alienating those countries that feel they had no 
part in developing the new rules. Overlapping in membership with differing rules, these “mega-
regional” agreements and other trade agreements could also add to the complexity of engaging in 
international commerce, as opposed to rules established at the WTO, which are applicable to 
nearly all world trading partners. They could also reduce economic efficiency in the global 
trading system if trade is diverted into these trading blocs due to preferential tariff treatment. 
The TPP and Other Asia-Pacific Trade Agreements 
The current 12 TPP countries form part of a growing network of Asia-Pacific FTAs (Figure 4). 
All TPP countries have at least one FTA with a TPP partner country, although the extent of trade 
liberalization varies among them. The United States has FTAs with six TPP countries, including 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore. Four TPP countries—Brunei, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Vietnam—are part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
which has a free trade area among its membership as well as several external FTAs.30 
New FTAs involving key markets in the region have been concluded in recent years. For 
example, Australia recently implemented FTAs with China, Japan, and South Korea, and the 
European Union has concluded FTAs with Canada, and, most recently, Vietnam. As tariffs fall for 
the countries party to these agreements, it could put U.S. firms at a disadvantage in those markets 
without existing U.S. FTAs. This is the idea of “competitive liberalization” in practice, whereby 
new trade agreements spur other countries to enter into similar pacts in order to maintain their 
firms’ competiveness in foreign markets. If the TPP were to enter into force, such motivation 
would likely be a major factor in drawing other countries’ interest in joining the agreement. 
All 12 TPP partners are also members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, 
which does not negotiate FTAs but serves as a forum for dialogue on, and establishes nonbinding 
commitments toward, the goals of open trade and investment within the region.31 In the context of 
this forum for dialogue and nonbinding commitments, APEC Leaders have repeatedly agreed to 
push forward the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). 
Twelve countries in APEC, seven of which are also in TPP, are currently negotiating the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP). ASEAN leads the negotiations for this 
proposed FTA among its members and six ASEAN FTA partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, 
New Zealand, and South Korea).32 Both the RCEP and the TPP would encompass a significant 
share of regional economic activity, but each currently includes only one of the region’s two 
economic leaders, the United States and China. The breadth and depth of trade liberalization 
resulting from two potential agreements is likely to differ. In their 2015 Declaration, APEC 
Leaders recognized both the TPP and the RCEP, which includes China, but not the United States, 
as “ongoing regional undertakings” on which to eventually achieve an FTAAP.33 
                                                 
30 The 10 ASEAN members are Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
31 In addition to the 12 TPP countries, APEC includes China, Hong Kong (officially Hong Kong, China), Indonesia, 
Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan (officially, Chinese Taipei), and Thailand. 
32 For more information see CRS In Focus IF10342, What Is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership?, by 
Michael F. Martin et al.  
33 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 2015 Leaders’ Declaration, November 2015. 
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As noted above, the TPP could not enter into force without the United States and Japan. It is 
conceivable, however, that the other 11 countries, after spending five years negotiating an 
agreement not only with the United States, but among themselves as well, could conclude a 
replacement agreement without the United States. It would not have the economic heft of an 
agreement with the United States, but it still would contain the third-largest economy (Japan) and 
could serve as a vehicle for further Asian integration. 
Figure 4. Existing FTAs among TPP Countries 
 
Source: WTO FTA database and websites of TPP countries’ trade ministries. Trade data from IMF. 
Notes: Aggregate TPP goods trade, both imports and exports, as reported above. ASEAN also includes 
countries outside the TPP: Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, and Thailand. TPP 
goods trade covered by existing FTAs, as depicted above, reflects all goods trade between FTA partners. This 
measure slightly overstates trade covered under FTAs, as most FTAs exclude market access for some goods. 
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Core Provisions 
The text of the TPP agreement spans 30 chapters. The main goal as stated by the negotiating 
countries is “to establish a comprehensive, next-generation regional agreement that liberalizes 
trade and investment and addresses new and traditional trade issues and 21st-century 
challenges.”34 FTA provisions are often discussed in two different categories: (1) the market 
access component addressing tariff and nontariff barriers to trade in goods, services, and 
agriculture, and government procurement; and (2) the rules component covering the procedures, 
standards, and regulatory considerations that relate to international trade, including such issues as 
investment and intellectual property rights. Market access can be affected by the process by 
which trade is conducted, and, hence, the distinction between these two categories is not always 
clear. While tariff negotiations are perhaps the most well-known component of trade agreements 
and the easiest to measure and verify, U.S. firms are often most competitive in the international 
trade of services and products involving high levels of research and development. These 
industries face mostly nontariff, behind-the-border barriers, making rules commitments such as 
transparent regulatory procedures or IPR protection particularly important for U.S. access to and 
ability to compete in overseas markets. 
U.S. FTAs also attempt to ensure that U.S. FTA partners meet certain requirements. In particular, 
internationally-recognized and other core principles for the protection of worker rights and the 
environment have become a significant aspect of U.S. trade agreement negotiations. In addition, 
the TPP includes an entirely new chapter that seeks to establish disciplines on how state-owned 
enterprises engage in international trade, with a goal of limiting potential negative impacts on 
private actors from nonmarket practices. 
The 12 TPP countries have varying competitive advantages, sensitivities, and levels of economic 
development. As a result of these differences and the “give and take” of trade negotiations, 
achieving common TPP rules and disciplines also involves certain exceptions in different forms, 
and phase-in periods of varying lengths. When examining the specific commitments of the 
agreement it is important to examine these exceptions, as they may impact the agreement’s 
practical application. 
This section examines the major issues addressed in the TPP negotiations, beginning with the 
treatment of trade in merchandise goods. For each issue the report provides background 
information, a discussion of the provisions in the text, particularly as they relate to previous trade 
agreements, and a summary of the debate on the topic, including, where relevant, U.S. trade 
negotiating objectives.  
Stakeholders’ views on the TPP agreement vary. Some groups generally oppose or support trade 
liberalization; others’ positions hinge on specific provisions in the TPP text. Most business groups 
generally support the agreement, while most labor unions and certain nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) are generally opposed.35 The discussion that follows focuses on specific 
commitments in the agreement and debate over those measures. 
                                                 
34 “TPP Leaders Statement,” November 2, 2011, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2011/november/trans-pacific-partnership-leaders-statement. 
35 Business associations supporting the agreement include: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Association of 
Manufacturers, and the American Farm Bureau. Unions opposed to the agreement include: American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), United Steelworkers (USW), and Teamsters. NGO’s 
opposed to the agreement include: Doctors without Borders, Public Citizen, and Sierra Club. 
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Goods 
Although services are an increasingly important aspect of international trade, physical goods still 
account for the bulk of such activity. In 2015, merchandise trade accounted for over 75% of the 
nearly $5 trillion in U.S. trade. Expanding opportunities for trade in goods by reducing and 
eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers remains a top priority for U.S. trade negotiations, 
highlighted by Congress in its first principal negotiating objective in the TPA-2015. 
Tariffs36 
Background 
Like previous U.S. FTAs, TPP would eventually eliminate all industrial goods tariffs and most 
agriculture tariffs and quotas. These commitments would be phased in over varying periods. For 
some of the most sensitive agriculture products, tariff and quota protections would remain in 
place or only be partially removed. Each of the 12 TPP countries has its own unique tariff 
schedule laying out its product-specific tariff commitments.37 These schedules list each country’s 
individual tariff lines (i.e., a list of products described by Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) 
product codes at the 8-10 digit level of aggregation) and include the current tariff rate (base rate), 
the relevant staging category, and the post-TPP annual tariff rates.38  
The staging categories explain the speed and scope of tariff elimination for a specific product. For 
example, “entry-into-force” signifies a removal of that product’s tariff immediately when the 
agreement becomes effective. The categories may be simple, such as an annual equal decrease 
until the tariff is eliminated, or more complex, such as staying at current levels for a period of 
years before decreasing by varying amounts. The United States has 36 unique staging categories 
that apply to its tariff commitments, surpassed only by Japan, which has 60. The United States 
has the longest phase-out period of any TPP country, and longer than any previous U.S. FTA; it 
would delay the complete removal of tariffs on light trucks from Japan, for example, and certain 
dairy products from New Zealand for 30 years.39 
While most TPP countries negotiated a single TPP tariff schedule with their partners, the United 
States negotiated bilaterally such that for certain import-sensitive products, U.S. tariff and quota 
commitments differ by partners. As a result, U.S. tariffs on some products may be eliminated 
according to different staging categories for different countries. This bilateral approach to tariff 
commitments within a multi-party agreement stands in contrast to the most-favored nation (MFN) 
approach in the WTO, which achieves a single tariff schedule for all trading partners. U.S. 
negotiators argue that this bilateral approach allows for more complete liberalization overall, but 
some observers question this assertion and raise concerns over setting this precedent for multi-
party negotiations.40 
                                                 
36 This section was written by Brock Williams and Gabriel Nelson. 
37 Updated tariff schedules have been posted by New Zealand, the depository for the TPP, at 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaty-making-process/trans-pacific-partnership-tpp/text-of-the-
trans-pacific-partnership. 
38 HS codes become increasingly disaggregated with each additional digit and are uniform across countries only up to 6 
digits. Product descriptions in the TPP tariff schedules, which are at the 8-10 digit level, may vary by country.  
39 See U.S. staging categories, US17 and US24, in the U.S. General Notes to the Tariff Schedule in the TPP text. 
40 Caroline Freund, Tyler Moran, and Sarah Oliver, “Tariff Liberalization” in Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership: 
Market Access and Sectoral Issues, Peterson Institute for International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-1, February 2016, 
(continued...) 
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Key factors impacting the potential significance of TPP tariff commitments include the following: 
 Current Tariff Levels. Average MFN applied tariff rates among TPP countries 
currently range from 0.2% in Singapore to 9.5% in Vietnam (Appendix 1). Given 
the already low simple U.S. average tariff rate (3.5%), U.S. rates would change 
less through TPP than those for some other countries, especially Vietnam and 
Malaysia.  
 Existing Trade Agreements. Each TPP country has existing FTAs with at least 
four other TPP countries, and Chile has existing FTAs with all 11 other TPP 
countries. In 2014, 85% of goods trade among TPP parties occurred between 
partners with existing trade agreements.41 Depending on the degree of tariff 
liberalization in these existing agreements, the tariff commitments in TPP may 
not require a significant adjustment for some TPP parties. For example, under 
NAFTA, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have eliminated nearly all tariffs 
on trade between the three countries. In cases where existing agreements offer 
different tariff rates than the TPP, exporters would be able to choose which 
agreement to utilize as long as they also met the relevant rules of origin. 
 Product Mix. While tariffs are below 10% on average in all TPP countries, 
product-specific peaks can be much higher, above 100% on certain sensitive 
items. TPP tariff commitments may have a larger impact on countries that trade 
heavily in these high-tariff products. For example, U.S. imports from Vietnam are 
concentrated in high-tariff footwear and apparel products. U.S. exports facing 
relatively high tariffs in certain TPP markets include autos, agricultural products, 
and heavy machinery.  
 Effective Tariff Rates. Calculated by dividing collected duties by the value of 
imports, this measure effectively incorporates the factors discussed above to 
provide an indication of the average duty actually paid on imports from a 
particular country. Among TPP countries, U.S. effective duty rates in 2015 were 
highest on imports from Vietnam (Figure 5). Without readily available data on 
duties collected by other TPP countries, a similar calculation cannot be made for 
effective duty rates on U.S. exports. 
Table 1. TPP Country Tariff and Trade Agreement Statistics 
Country 
MFN Average 
Applied Tariff 
(%) 
Unique TPP 
Staging 
Categories 
Longest TPP 
Phase-Out 
Period (Years) 
Existing FTAs 
with TPP 
Partners 
TPP Trade with 
Existing FTA 
Partners (%)  
Australia 2.7 7 4 8 96.5 
Brunei 1.2 10 11 6 93.0 
Canada 4.2 7 12 4 95.0 
Chile 6 3* 8 11 100.0 
Japan 4.2 60 21 9 45.9 
Malaysia 6.1 6 16 7 76.8 
                                                                
(...continued) 
p. 31, http://www.iie.com/publications/briefings/piieb16-1.pdf. 
41 Based on 2014 trade data from IMF DOTS. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for Congress 
 
Congressional Research Service 17 
Country 
MFN Average 
Applied Tariff 
(%) 
Unique TPP 
Staging 
Categories 
Longest TPP 
Phase-Out 
Period (Years) 
Existing FTAs 
with TPP 
Partners 
TPP Trade with 
Existing FTA 
Partners (%)  
Mexico 7.5 20 16 5 97.9 
New Zealand 2.0 4 7 6 54.7 
Peru 3.4 6 16 6 96.4 
Singapore 0.2 1 0 9 97.5 
United States 3.5 36 30 6 82.0 
Vietnam 9.5 36 21 7 57.8 
Source: WTO Tariff Profiles, TPP tariff schedules, and IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 
Notes: (a) For a list of trade agreements among TPP countries see Appendix Table A-1 in CRS Report R42344, 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries: Comparative Trade and Economic Analysis, by Brock R. Williams. (b) The 
number of staging categories excludes agriculture products covered under TRQs. (*) Chile’s tariff schedule also 
includes 17 categories matching TPP commitments to commitments in its previous FTAs.  
Figure 5. U.S. Collected Duties and Effective Duty Rates 
(2015) 
 
Source: Analysis by CRS. Data from USITC. 
Notes: Effective duty rates calculated by dividing imports for consumption by collected duties. 
Key Provisions with Non-U.S. FTA Countries 
Given the existing U.S. FTAs with Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore, which 
include comprehensive tariff coverage, this section focuses only on TPP tariff commitments 
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between the United States and the five TPP countries without an existing U.S. FTA (Brunei, 
Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam).42 
Key aspects of TPP tariff commitments among these countries include (see Figure 6): 
 More than one-third of tariff lines are already duty-free in each country: U.S. 
(37%), Brunei (76%), Japan (39%), Malaysia (65%), New Zealand (58%), and 
Vietnam (32%). 
 Most tariff elimination would occur in the first years after the agreement’s entry 
into force, with more than 80% of tariff lines duty-free in each country after three 
years, rising to approximately 90% after ten years. 
 Eventually 95% or more tariff lines in each country would be duty-free. U.S. 
commitments would be phased in over the longest period, with tariff phase outs 
on two products up to 30 years after the agreement’s entry into force, although on 
average U.S. tariff commitments are similar to the other countries. 
 In terms of U.S. exports, more than 99% of tariff lines would eventually be duty-
free in Brunei, New Zealand and Malaysia. Japan and Vietnam would maintain 
some level of tariff protection on more than 2% of their tariff lines 
(approximately 200 lines in Vietnam, mostly agricultural products like sugar, as 
well as used autos, and more than 400 lines in Japan comprised mostly of 
agricultural products, including pork and dairy). 
 In terms of U.S. imports, more than 99% of tariff lines would eventually be duty-
free for all five countries. The United States would maintain tariffs on some 
products from each country, with the highest number of tariffs remaining on 
imports from New Zealand (approximately 100 tariff lines, mostly dairy 
products). 
 These rates of duty elimination are similar to previous U.S. FTAs, but with 
somewhat longer phase out periods and a slightly higher share of tariff lines 
excluded from liberalization. For example, in the KORUS FTA, both South 
Korea and the United States committed to eventually eliminate duties on more 
than 99% of tariff lines, with more than 92% of tariff lines duty-free within five 
years.43 
 
                                                 
42 CRS analysis focuses on the share of liberalized tariff lines. This metric allows for comparison across countries and 
previous trade agreements, but it has limitations. In particular, each country has a unique number of tariff lines, which 
it determines, making the share of liberalization achieved, in effect, endogenous (i.e., a country can affect its 
liberalization share by changing the number of total tariff lines in its tariff schedule). Unique tariff lines range from just 
above 7,500 in New Zealand to more than 10,000 in the United States. Japanese tariff commitments are particularly 
complex among the TPP countries, including some cases with multiple tariffs associated with the same HTS code. In 
these cases, the authors’ included only the least liberalized tariff in their calculations. Some HTS codes also appear to 
apply to only a subset of TPP countries. Those not applicable to the United States were excluded from the calculations. 
Finally, approximately 50 tariff lines in the Japanese schedule refer to non-originating goods, and were also excluded. 
43 USITC, U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy-wide and Selected Sectoral Effects, Publication 
3949, September 2007, p. 1-8. 
 CRS-19 
Figure 6. TPP Tariff Commitments between the U. S. and Non-FTA Countries 
 
Source: CRS analysis of TPP tariff schedules. 
Note: Japanese tariff commitments on more than 1% of tariff lines are of a complexity that required some judgement by the authors to determine whether they would 
be completely liberalized for U.S. products, including some cases with multiple tariffs associated with the same HTS code. In these cases, the authors’ included only the 
least liberalized tariff in their calculations. Some HTS codes in the Japanese tariff schedule also appear to apply to only a subset of TPP countries. Those not applicable to 
the United States were excluded from the calculations. Finally, approximately 50 tariff lines in the Japanese schedule refer to non-originating goods, and were also 
excluded—this updated methodology from an earlier version of the report increased the share of Japanese tariff lines eventually becoming duty free from 94.4% to 
95.0%. 
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TPP Product-Specific Tariff Commitments: Illustrative Examples 
U.S. Imports 
Shoes. HS Code (6404.11.90) Current Tariff (20%) 
In 2015, this type of athletic shoe was the top U.S. footwear import from TPP countries ($797 million). The current 
20% U.S. import tariff on this type of shoe would be immediately eliminated for all TPP countries. 
Light Trucks. HS Code (8704.31.00) Current Tariff (25%) 
In 2015, the U.S. imported $12.8 billion in light trucks from TPP countries. Currently these imports come almost 
exclusively from Mexico, an existing U.S. FTA partner. Through TPP, the 25% light truck tariff would be eliminated 
immediately for the 6 current U.S. FTA partners (as is already the case under the bilateral agreements), and after ten 
years with ten equal annual reductions for the non-FTA partners, except for Japan. For Japan this tariff would remain 
at 25% until eliminated in year 30 of the agreement. 
Luggage and Handbags. HS Code (4202) Current Tariff (0-20%) 
In 2015, the U.S. imported $1.2 billion of luggage and handbags from TPP countries, primarily from Vietnam and 
Mexico. Tariffs are already eliminated for Mexico under NAFTA. Most U.S. tariffs on these products for other 
countries, currently as high as 20%, would be immediately eliminated, and all such tariffs would be eliminated by year 
6 of the agreement. 
 
U.S. Exports 
Heavy Equipment - Malaysia. HS Code (8429) Current Tariff (5-25%) 
In 2015, the United States exported $3.1 billion of heavy machinery (e.g., scrapers, bulldozers, graders) to all TPP 
countries, including $11 million to Malaysia. Under TPP, Malaysia would eliminate all tariffs on such equipment, 
currently as high as 25%, by year six of the agreement’s entry into force. 
Nuts - Japan. HS Code (0802.32.00) Current Tariff (10%) 
In 2015, the United States exported $309 million of walnuts to TPP countries, including $116 million to Japan. Under 
TPP, Japan would immediately eliminate the 10% tariff on imports of walnuts from the United States. 
Motorcycles - Vietnam. HS Code (8711.50.20) Current Tariff (85%) 
In 2015, the United States exported less than $1million of large-engine motorcycles to Vietnam, but more than $461 
million to all TPP partners. Under TPP, Vietnam would eliminate the 85% tariff on these imports from the United 
States in eight annual stages. 
 
Sources: U.S. trade data from the Census Bureau accessed through the ITC’s trade dataweb. Tariff data from the 
official TPP tariff schedules. 
Rules of Origin (ROO)44 
Rules of origin (ROO) determine whether products “originate” within an FTA area and, therefore, 
are eligible to receive the benefits when imported into an FTA member state. Thus, they are used 
to ensure that the parties to an FTA receive the tariff liberalization benefits and to prevent 
transshipments. In practice, however, restrictive rules of origin can also be used to limit the 
impact of FTAs on import-sensitive sectors. In the TPP, as in other FTAs, rules of origin are laid 
out in detail in the agreement and would need to be approved by Congress as part of the 
implementing legislation. 
All FTAs and preference programs have distinctive ROO, but the ways that they are developed 
are similar. One ROO type requires that a product illustrate that it is “substantially transformed” 
(i.e., made into a “new and distinct” product) by showing a “tariff shift,” a change in its HTS 
tariff classification. The degree of change required varies by product. The “yarn forward” rule, a 
tariff-shift rule that is a guiding principle in TPP for textiles and apparel, requires that all 
                                                 
44 This section written by Vivian C. Jones, Specialist in International Trade and Finance. 
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qualifying products must be produced in the FTA region beginning with the yarn. Some product-
specific ROO in TPP and other FTAs require that a minimum ad valorem (value) percentage of 
the product must be produced in the FTA region. TPP uses regional value content rules for many 
products, including automobiles, appliances, and machine tools. Another kind of ROO specifies 
that the value of foreign content must not exceed a certain maximum percentage (i.e., a de 
minimis rule, which in TPP is 10%). Third, ROO for some products require that some kind of 
manufacturing or processing operation (e.g., a chemical reaction) must be completed in the 
region. 
TPP ROO allow for cumulation among TPP countries. This means a TPP country manufacturer 
can use unlimited inputs from other TPP partners and have the finished product qualify for TPP 
tariff benefits. This could provide an incentive for creation of new regional supply chains within 
the TPP area, and may encourage other countries to join the TPP to avoid being left out of supply 
chains. 
For the majority of goods, the ROO in most U.S. FTAs, including TPP, are quite similar in most 
areas. However, TPP ROO pertaining to certain import-sensitive manufacturing industries, 
especially in the textile, apparel, and footwear sectors and the automotive industry, have 
important distinctions from previous FTAs (see below). 
Textiles, Apparel, and Footwear45 
Background 
While the United States continues to produce certain yarns and fabrics, some of which are used in 
apparel production abroad, nearly all apparel sold in the United States is imported and most U.S.-
headquartered apparel companies have limited or no U.S. manufacturing capabilities.46 Instead, 
they rely on extensive global supply chains, which, in turn, depend on costs, lead times, and other 
considerations. As a result of these dynamics, the U.S. textile industry generally supported 
gradual TPP textile and apparel tariff reductions, but only if the imported products are assembled 
using yarn produced in a TPP country (i.e., the “yarn-forward” rule of origin). Meanwhile, trade 
organizations representing U.S. apparel companies and retailers generally supported the 
immediate elimination of textile and apparel tariffs upon implementation of the TPP agreement, 
opposing the yarn-forward rule of origin as too restrictive. 
As with apparel products, most footwear consumed in the United States is imported from abroad, 
with import penetration in the industry well above 90%.47 Over a decade ago, the U.S. footwear 
industry reached a general agreement supporting immediate elimination of nearly all footwear 
tariffs in future trade agreements, except for a number of sensitive items determined still to be 
manufactured in the United States.48  
                                                 
45 This section prepared by Michaela D. Platzer. 
46 American Apparel & Footwear Association (AAFA), “ApparelStats 2014 and ShoeStats 2014 Reports,” press 
release, January 9, 2015, https://www.wewear.org/apparelstats-2014-and-shoestats-2014-reports/. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Letter from Kevin M. Burke, President & Chief Executive Officer, AAFA, to Donald Evans, Secretary of 
Commerce, February 21, 2003. In the TPP, these footwear types include 18 items such as certain waterproof footwear 
with rubber or plastic soles that are glued together (Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) 6401.10.00) and sports and 
certain athletic footwear with outer soles of rubber or plastics, valued over $12 per pair (HTS 6402.91.990). The 
Footwear Distributors and Retailers of America (FDRA) describes the specific sensitive tariff lines in its TPP Footwear 
Duty Guidebook. 
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Vietnam has been a major focus of U.S. negotiations over TPP commitments on textile, apparel, 
and footwear. Vietnam accounted for 12% of apparel and 15% of footwear imported by the 
United States in 2015, and was the second-largest supplier of apparel and footwear to the United 
States after China.49 It is the only large apparel and footwear producer among TPP partners 
without an existing FTA with the United States. Currently, Vietnam’s apparel sector sources the 
overwhelming majority of its yarns and fabrics from non-TPP members, mainly China, Taiwan, 
and South Korea, and it purchases only a small amount of yarns and fabrics (about $100 million 
in 2015) from the United States.50  
Although associations representing the U.S. textile industry ultimately support the TPP, domestic 
industry raised concerns over the potential for Vietnamese-made apparel displacing garments 
manufactured with U.S. fabric in Western Hemisphere countries such as Mexico, El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua, where garment makers currently must use U.S. inputs to obtain duty-
free access to the U.S. market under NAFTA and the U.S.-Central America-Dominican Republic 
FTA (CAFTA-DR).51 They also raised concerns over Mexico and Peru, both TPP members, 
potentially shifting sourcing of textile inputs from the United States to Vietnam should it develop 
an industry that can produce large quantities of textiles.52 On the other hand, proponents of FTAs 
as a tool for economic development would argue that encouraging movement up the value chain, 
such as from apparel to textile production, in a developing country like Vietnam is a goal of U.S. 
FTAs. 
Textile, apparel, and footwear tariffs differ considerably among TPP countries.53 The TPP 
countries currently face U.S. tariff rates as high as 25% on textiles, 32% on apparel, and up to 
nearly 50% on footwear. Other TPP countries also maintain high tariffs, including Vietnam, 
whose apparel tariffs range from 5% to 20%. 
USITC Estimated Economic Impact 
The USITC, in its May 2016 report on the economic impact of TPP, estimated sector-specific 
outcomes for textiles and apparel, and footwear.54 Their study, which compares a TPP scenario in 
2032 against a non-TPP baseline, estimated that the apparel industry would see an increase in 
imports over the 2032 baseline of 1.4% or $1.9 billion, and a smaller increase in exports of 0.3% 
or $10 million. Vietnam would account for much of this import growth, while imports from China 
would be expected to decline. Textile imports and exports would also be expected to increase 
over the baseline, by 1.6% ($869 million) and 1.3% ($257 million), respectively. The study 
estimated output and employment slightly above the baseline for the apparel industry (an increase 
of 1.0% and 0.9%, respectively), and slightly below for textiles (a decrease of 0.4% for both 
output and employment). Regarding footwear, USITC estimated a slight overall rise in total U.S. 
                                                 
49 Import data are from the Department of Commerce’s Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA), accessed February 
22, 2016.  
50 OTEXA, Vietnam, U.S. Export Markets, February 22, 2016, http://otexa.trade.gov/exports/e5520.htm. 
51 The majority of yarns and fabrics exported from the United States are sold to Canada and Mexico (TPP partners), 
CAFTA-DR countries, and Peru and Colombia, South American FTA partners.  
52 CRS Report R42772, U.S. Textile Manufacturing and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations, by Michaela D. 
Platzer. 
53 The United States negotiated special rules for certain textile, apparel, and footwear products to account for different 
tariff rates and prevent circumvention of high tariffs in some TPP countries. See, U.S. Appendix C, Tariff Differentials, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-US-Appendix-C-Tariff-Differentials.pdf.  
54 USITC, TPP Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors, Publication 4607, 
May 2016, pp. 254, 273. 
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imports of 2.7% or $1.1 billion, but a major shift in sourcing toward TPP countries with imports 
from the region increasing by 23.4% or $1.6 billion. As most U.S. footwear is already imported, 
the agreement is not expected to have a significant impact on the U.S. industry, although the 
study estimated an increase above baseline in exports to Vietnam, mostly in intermediate 
components, and shows a slight (0.5%) increase in U.S. footwear output. 
Key Provisions 
Tariffs. All textile, apparel, and footwear tariffs will either be eliminated immediately or phased 
out in various stages over a decade or more following implementation of the TPP agreement. The 
United States has eight different tariff phase out schedules for textiles, apparel, and footwear. The 
longest phase out periods apply to the most sensitive products, such as certain men’s and boys’ 
overcoats, some women’s and girls’ blouses and skirts, men’s leather boots and work shoes, and 
women’s pumps. Tariffs on these products will be fully eliminated at the end of year 10 or 12, 
after an initial reduction of 50% or 55% when the pact enters into force. 
Safeguard. Like most U.S. FTAs, the TPP includes a textile and apparel safeguard that will allow 
the United States to reimpose tariffs if import surges cause or threaten to cause serious damage to 
domestic industry. This option will be available for five years after the agreement enters into 
force, and each safeguard action may last for two years with a possible two-year extension. In 
addition, the United States may unilaterally suspend future tariff phase outs after five years of 
implementation if it determines that Vietnam has failed to allow independent unions and grant 
them the right to strike by that time (see below section on labor provisions).55  
Rules of Origin. To qualify for favorable tariff treatment, textiles and apparel must meet a yarn-
forward rule of origin, which requires the use of U.S. or other TPP country yarns and fabrics, with 
only a few exceptions, in textile and apparel products traded within the TPP area.56 Footwear 
manufacturers can qualify their shoes as TPP-originated under (1) a tariff shift method, requiring 
that sufficient production occurred entirely within the TPP region to change the tariff 
classification of the goods, or (2) one of two different methods of measuring the share of a 
product’s value that was added within the TPP region.57 These ROO may give Vietnamese 
producers of footwear an advantage in the U.S. market over producers in other Asian countries 
that do not benefit from tariff preferences. 
Short Supply List. Like other U.S. FTAs with a yarn-forward rule of origin for textiles and 
apparel, the TPP provides an exception for products that are deemed to be in “short supply” 
within the TPP region. The TPP short supply list includes 187 fibers, yarns, and fabrics, such as 
cashmere, certain wool yarns for sweaters, and polyester/wool blend fabrics.58 The agreement 
would allow goods made within the TPP region using non-TPP inputs from the short supply list to 
qualify for privileged access when exported to other TPP countries.59 Other exceptions to the 
                                                 
55 See, Letter from Ambassador Michael B.G. Froman, United States Trade Representative, to Vu Huy Hoang, Minister 
of Trade and Industry, November 2015, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Labour-US-VN-Plan-for-
Enhancement-of-Trade-and-Labor-Relations.pdf. 
56 The yarn-forward rule of origin is included in most US FTAs, such as NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, and agreements with 
Australia, Chile, Colombia, Panama, Peru, and Singapore.  
57 The RVC test for footwear requires TPP content of 45% using the build-up rule or 55% using the build-down 
method. The calculation includes labor, material, and manufacturing costs. 
58 Eight of the 187 items will only be on the short supply list for 5 years after the agreement takes effect.  
59 OTEXA, The Transpacific Partnership (TPP): An Overview of the Rules of Origin and Market Access Commitments 
for Textiles and Apparel, February 2, 2016, pp. 15-16, 
http://otexa.trade.gov/PDFs/OTEXA_Webinar_TPP_Feb_2016.pdf. 
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textile and apparel ROO allow synthetic knit and woven baby clothes and brassieres cut and sewn 
in other TPP countries to be exported to the United States even if the yarn and fabric are not 
produced within the TPP region.  
Earned Import Allowance. The TPP pact includes a program called the Earned Import 
Allowance Program to encourage the use of American fabrics in Vietnamese-manufactured jeans 
and khaki pants. The provision exempts some U.S. apparel imports from Vietnam from the TPP 
yarn-forward rule provided Vietnam imports a specific quantity of U.S. fabrics. This would allow 
a limited amount of apparel cut, sewn, and assembled in Vietnam to enter the United States duty-
free even if the garments include fabric from non-TPP countries.60 
Importantly, because both the ROO and the Earned Import Allowance program are complex and 
have substantial compliance and reporting requirements, some manufacturers in previous FTAs 
have opted to simply pay import duties rather than prove a product meets the specified 
requirements.61  
Customs Enforcement and Implementation. The TPP includes specific customs procedures to 
enforce each TPP country’s commitments, such as visiting textile and apparel factories to conduct 
verification activities. A Committee on Textile and Apparel Matters is to be established under the 
TPP, where industry can raise concerns and issues can be resolved on trade in these products. 
Industry Views 
The Industry Trade Advisory Committee (ITAC) on Textiles and Clothing (ITAC 13) summarizes 
the industry’s divergent views.62 Committee members generally applauded the greater opening of 
global markets, but they differed sharply “over how that should be accomplished, whether that 
involves greater U.S. market access for foreign products, and what role consumer perspectives 
should play in this debate.”63 There were also strong differences over how the trade negotiations 
could best accommodate industry adjustments to additional competition. The National Council of 
Textile Organizations (NCTO), the industry group representing the domestic textile industry, 64 
the American Apparel and Footwear Association (AAFA), the national trade association of the 
apparel and nonrubber footwear industries, and the Footwear Distributors and Retailers of 
America65 have endorsed the TPP. In contrast, Patagonia, an apparel retailer, has stated its 
opposition to the TPP, as has New Balance, a footwear company that maintains some production 
in the United States.66 
                                                 
60 Similar programs are included in the CAFTA-DR FTA and Haiti Trade Preference Programs. The TPP program is 
detailed in Appendix E of the U.S. tariff schedule applicable to imports from TPP member states, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-US-Appendix-E-Earned-Import-Allowance-Program.pdf.  
61 Rachel Horowitz, Nicole Lorden, and Sophie Miyashiro, Best Practices Manual: How to Import Cotton Apparel 
Under the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), Fashion Institute 
of Technology, March 2013, p. 5. 
62 Industry Trade Advisory Committee (ITAC 13) on Textiles and Clothing on the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement, December 2, 2015, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ITAC-13-Textiles-and-Clothing.pdf. 
63 Ibid., p. 5. 
64 NCTO, “U.S. Textile Manufacturers Endorse Trans-Pacific Partnership,” press release, January 21, 2016, 
http://www.ncto.org/category/press-releases/. 
65 See, AAFA, “Apparel & Footwear Association Releases Statement of Support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” 
press release, February 1, 2016, and Footwear Distributors and Retailers of America (FDRA), “Pre-hearing Statement 
for the public hearing on the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry 
Sectors,” p. 10, December 21, 2015.  
66 See, Rose Marcario, “Patagonia Opposes TPP,” Patagonia, November 13, 2015, 
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Motor Vehicles67 
Background 
The United States and Japan are the second- and third-largest auto manufacturing nations, 
respectively, which made motor vehicle market access issues central to the TPP negotiations 
(Table 2). Other TPP signatories that produce motor vehicles are Canada, Mexico, Malaysia, and 
Vietnam. Japan, Mexico, the United States, and Canada all export large numbers of vehicles. As a 
result of market forces and the elimination of vehicle trade barriers in NAFTA, the North 
American auto industry has become highly integrated. The largest source of U.S. imports from 
outside the NAFTA region is Japan, which shipped over 1.5 million vehicles to the United States 
in 2014.68 
U.S. vehicle exports have steadily risen since the 2007-2009 recession and exports to other TPP 
countries could grow further as tariffs fall and nontariff barriers (NTBs) are reduced or 
eliminated.69 In 2014, U.S. vehicle exports exceeded two million units for the first time, having 
doubled since 2009. Nearly half of those exports were sold in Canada (870,025 units). Other TPP 
destinations for U.S. vehicle exports were Mexico (151,902), Australia (61,052), Japan (19,003), 
Chile (16,631), Peru (6,354), and New Zealand (5,013).70 However, while TPP markets accounted 
for 56% of U.S. vehicle exports to the world,71 most of those exports already benefit from duty-
free access under various regional and bilateral trade agreements. Japan is the only large vehicle 
market among TPP countries that is not covered by an FTA with the United States.  
Table 2. TPP Signatories with Vehicle Production 
2015 
Country Units Produced Units Sold Domestically 
United States 12,100,095 17,470,659 
Japan 9,278,238 5,562,887 
Mexico 3,565,469 1,351,648 
Canada 2,283,474 1,939,949 
Malaysia 614,671 666,674 
Vietnam 50,000 209,804 
Source: International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, www.oica.net. 
Notes: Vehicles include passenger cars and commercial vehicles.  
                                                                
(...continued) 
http://www.thecleanestline.com/2015/11/patagonia-opposes-tpp.html and “New Balance renews opposition to TPP,” by 
Matthew Korade, Politico Pro, April 12, 2015. 
67 This section prepared by Bill Canis. 
68 Automotive News, Data Center, U.S. Car and Light-Truck Sales by Make, 2014, January 5, 2015. 
69 Vehicles are exported from U.S. plants not only by General Motors, Ford, and Fiat-Chrysler, but also by Japanese, 
German, and Korean automakers. U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Transportation and Machinery, Trends in 
U.S. Vehicle Exports, August 2015, pp. 4 and 6. 
http://trade.gov/mas/manufacturing/OAAI/build/groups/public/@tg_oaai/documents/webcontent/tg_oaai_004086.pdf. 
70 Ibid., p. 9. 
71 Other major non-TPP export markets (in terms of units sold) for U.S. vehicles in 2014 were China (307,425), 
Germany (147,680), and Saudi Arabia (104,074). 
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TPA-2015 did not spell out specific TPP objectives for trade in motor vehicles. Rather, motor 
vehicle industry goals were subsumed under general objectives to reduce tariffs and NTBs and to 
refrain from foreign currency manipulation. TPP auto manufacturing countries sought the 
elimination or reduction of U.S. vehicle tariffs, which are currently 2.5% on passenger vehicles 
and 25% on pick-up trucks. A related goal was to develop rules of origin for TPP vehicle trade 
that would ensure parts supply chains could operate smoothly but with strong verification and 
enforcement procedures. Some of the rules for vehicle trade in NAFTA and the U.S.-South Korea 
FTA (KORUS) served as reference points for TPP negotiators. 
USITC Estimated Economic Impact 
The USITC study estimated impacts on the passenger vehicle industry over 30 years given the 
long phaseout period for tariffs in this sector.72 The study highlights three significant periods 
during this transition: (1) after year 6, Canada, the top U.S. export market, would eliminate tariffs 
on imports from Japan potentially increasing competition for U.S. auto producers in that market; 
(2) by year 13 Malaysia and Vietnam would eliminate auto import duties, making U.S. exports 
more competitive in those markets; and (3) by year 30 the United States would eliminate its 
import tariffs on Japanese autos potentially increasing competition in the U.S. market for U.S. 
producers. Ultimately, the study predicts an increase from the 2047 baseline in vehicle and parts 
exports of 2% ($2.9 billion) and 1.5% ($2.1 billion), respectively. Imports are expected to be 
above baseline by 1.1% ($4.3 billion) for vehicles and 1.5% ($4.5 billion) for parts. Relative to 
the baseline, output and employment are expected to increase slightly for autos (2% for each), 
and decline slightly for parts (-0.2% for output and -0.3% for employment). 
Key Provisions 
Tariffs. If the TPP agreement comes into force, member countries will eventually eliminate 
import tariffs on most vehicles and parts. U.S. tariff commitments, including for motor vehicles, 
are on a bilateral basis, so tariff reduction speeds differ with respect to each country.73 The longest 
tariff phaseouts are applied to vehicle shipments from Japan to the United States. In that case, the 
2.5% tariff on passenger cars will remain in place until year 15, after which it will be eliminated 
gradually through year 25 after the agreement’s entry into force. The 25% U.S. light truck tariff 
with Japan is not phased out, but eliminated only in year 30 of the TPP. The U.S. rationale for 
longer tariff phase outs on Japanese vehicles than on those from other countries is that a longer 
transition is necessary for Japan to remove its own NTBs and move toward a “more open 
automotive market.”74 The reduction in foreign barriers to U.S. vehicles is likely to be most 
significant in Malaysia and Vietnam, where current high tariff levels make imported vehicles 
costly. Malaysia’s vehicle tariffs are as much as 40%; Vietnam’s as much as 70%.  
Nontariff Barriers. NTBs in the vehicle industry fall into two categories: (1) suppression of 
imports through tax breaks for local vehicles and local content requirements for domestically 
                                                 
72 USITC, TPP Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors, Publication 4607, 
May 2016, pp. 232. 
73 For six TPP countries (Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore, with which the United States already 
has FTAs), the TPP vehicle duties are zero when the agreement takes effect. For Brunei, Malaysia, and New Zealand, 
vehicle duties are cut in half when the agreement takes effect with the remaining duty removed in year 13 of the 
agreement. Vietnam will also remove most auto tariffs by year 13 of the agreement, but tariffs on used vehicles 
(representing nearly one-third of Vietnam’s auto tariff lines) will remain in place. 
74 ITAC 2 Advisory Committee Report to the President, the Congress, and the United States Trade Representative on 
the Trans Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement, December 22, 2015, p. 5. 
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produced cars and parts; and (2) safety and environmental regulations that limit vehicle trade 
because the regulatory requirements differ among countries.75 Although Japan does not assess 
tariffs on vehicles, its consistently low level of vehicle imports has led to assertions that NTBs are 
used to restrict sale of foreign-made vehicles. Bilateral U.S-Japan side letters to the TPP 
agreement establish a special joint dispute resolution process and commit Japan to 
 adopt a more open automotive rulemaking process; 
 accept a limited number of U.S. motor vehicle safety regulations on an 
equivalency basis with similar Japanese standards; 
 reduce barriers to establishing vehicle distribution centers; and 
 apply financial incentives equally to imported as well as domestic vehicles.76  
Rules of Origin. The motor vehicle rules of origin, while focused to some extent on U.S.-Japan 
vehicle trade, are also of interest to Canada and Mexico, which seek to maintain their own large 
auto-making industries in the face of increased competition from Asian production. The NAFTA 
rules served as a model for the TPP. To receive reduced tariffs under NAFTA, 62.5% of a 
vehicle’s content must be manufactured in the United States, Canada, or Mexico. The NAFTA net 
cost method takes total vehicle manufacturing costs, then subtracts costs of promotion, marketing, 
shipping and other factors. The resulting figure is then divided into the value of regional 
content—determined by subtracting the value of all the parts originating outside of the NAFTA 
area from the net cost—to find the percentage of regional content. In its own bilateral trade 
agreements, however, Japan has used a different calculation, known as the build-down method, 
and it argued that this should be the basis of vehicle rules of origin in the TPP. The build-down 
method does not subtract shipping and marketing before making the regional content 
determination, so cars using this method would have higher regional content than if the net cost 
method were used. The formula in the TPP allows either approach, requiring vehicles to have 
45% TPP content using the net cost method or 55% using the build-down method to qualify for 
tariff preferences. The 45% net cost RVC in TPP is lower than the 62.5% level in NAFTA, but 
above the 35% level in KORUS. 
Vehicle and parts manufacturers producing and exporting within North America would be able to 
choose whether to use the NAFTA or TPP rules of origin. While the rules of origin differential 
between NAFTA and TPP may not impact vehicle trade, it may affect trade in auto parts. That is 
because the required TPP share of value for auto parts to receive preferential treatment is 
significantly lower than the threshold for vehicles, ranging from 35% to 45%, depending on the 
type of accounting used. While different regional value content standards for vehicles and parts 
were used in NAFTA—62.5% for vehicles and 60% for parts—the standards were closer than 
they are in TPP.77 Under TPP rules, some auto parts whose value was added mainly outside the 
TPP region may be able to enter the United States duty-free. This differential led ITAC 2 to note 
that its auto industry members “acknowledge the real concerns raised by some that the 
                                                 
75 Sarah Oliver, Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Auto Sector Liberalization, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-1, February 2016, p. 60, 
http://www.piie.com/publications/briefings/piieb16-1.pdf 
76 Motor Vehicle Trade Appendix between United States and Japan, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-
Final-Text-Japan-Appendix-D-Appendix-between-Japan-and-the-United-States-on-Motor-Vehicle-Trade.pdf; Also see 
U.S.-Japan letter exchange, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-US-JP-Letter-Exchange-on-Certain-
Auto-NTMs.pdf; and https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-JP-to-US-Letter-on-Motor-Vehicle-
Distribution-Survey.pdf. 
77 In the U.S.-Korea FTA several types of content calculations are allowed: for both vehicles and parts: 35% (net cost) 
or 55% (build down).  
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automotive origin RVC [regional value content] is not sufficiently strong, particularly for 
automotive parts.”78 
Industry Views  
The motor vehicle industry does not have a unified position on the TPP; some automakers 
support it,79 others have raised concerns,80 and one company opposes it.81 The United 
Autoworkers union (UAW) opposes it.82 Concerns include the following: 
 Currency Manipulation. Some automakers (as well as some other 
manufacturers) recommended that the TPP include an enforceable commitment 
to prohibit currency manipulation. Instead, the TPP establishes a Macroeconomic 
Policy Authority Forum (see below section on currency), which the International 
Trade Advisory Committee for autos (ITAC 2) says falls short of its 
recommendations, but which “could help mitigate the misuse of exchange rate 
policies and the adverse economic impact this policy practice has had on the 
United States....”83 
 U.S.-Japan Side Letters and Appendix. ITAC 2 considers Japan’s vehicle NTB 
commitments as marginal improvements, but expects that they “will not lead to a 
substantially larger U.S. presence in the Japanese motor vehicle market.”84 It 
contends that these commitments are not enforceable under the TPP’s dispute 
resolution provisions.85 
 Long Phase out of U.S. Tariffs on Imported Japanese Cars and Trucks. With 
up to 30 years before these tariffs are eliminated completely, some experts 
alleged that the TPP tends to emphasize protection over liberalization.86 ITAC 2 
sees the long phase out period as appropriate to provide Japan with a “sufficient 
transition period to a more open automotive market.”87 
                                                 
78 ITAC 2, p. 7.  
79 Supporters of the TPP agreement include: Toyota North America, Honda North America, Association of Global 
Automakers, and Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association.  
80 Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Automotive Equipment and Capital Goods, ITAC 2 Advisory Committee 
Report.  
81 Ford Motor Company has announced its opposition to TPP and also publicly announced in January 2016 that it was 
withdrawing from the Japanese (and Indonesian) markets, stating that in those markets it does not see a “path to 
profitability” and that “market dynamics prevent us from being competitive. Ford’s press release also singled out the 
TPP’s effect: “Japan is the most closed, developed auto economy in the world, with all imported brands accounting for 
less than 6% of Japan’s annual new car market. The overall industry in Japan is projected to decline in coming years, 
leaving even less opportunity for success. In addition, in its current form, the Trans Pacific Partnership will not 
materially improve our ability to compete effectively in the market.” Ford Motor Company, “Ford Announces Closure 
of Operations in Japan and Indonesia Later This Year,” press release, January 25, 2016, 
http://www.at.ford.com/news/cn/Pages/Important%20Announcement.aspx. 
82 See the UAW press release outlining its reasons for opposition. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace 
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) , “United Auto Workers Leadership Statement of Opposition 
to the TPP—Statement from UAW President Williams,” press release, December 3, 2015, http://uaw.org/united-auto-
workers-leadership-statement-of-opposition-to-the-tpp-statement-from-uaw-president-williams/. 
83 ITAC 2 report, p. 17. 
84 Ibid., p. 8. 
85 Ibid., p. 15. 
86 Sarah Oliver, Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Auto Sector Liberalization, p. 65. 
87 ITAC 2, p. 5.  
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 Slow Liberalization Schedule for Malaysia and Vietnam. These countries will 
complete their vehicle and parts tariff reductions in year 13 year of TPP’s 
implementation, although some of Vietnam’s restrictions will remain after full 
implementation.88 (Almost all auto parts from TPP countries will be able to enter 
the United States duty free as soon as the TPP takes effect, as long as they meet 
the rules of origin.) 
 Tracking and Enforcing Complicated Rules of Origin. TPP methods permit 
automakers to import vehicles and parts that contain some non-TPP content 
(from China or Thailand, for example). While supply chain sourcing is 
increasingly global, the impact on smaller U.S. parts manufacturers is not clear. 
ITAC 2 report calls for the U.S. government to monitor and enforce these rules to 
prevent non-TPP countries from benefiting from the preferential tariff benefits.89 
 Lack of Regulatory Harmonization. There are no obligations to require TPP 
countries to accept motor vehicle imports engineered to U.S. regulatory 
standards. This means that U.S. producers may need to modify their vehicles 
before selling them in other TPP member countries. This can be costly, especially 
in countries where the prospective demand for U.S.-made vehicles is small. ITAC 
2 calls the lack of recognition of U.S. standards a “retreat from the longstanding 
U.S. practice of securing concessions in new agreements that go beyond what 
had been achieved in prior pacts. As such, this represents a significant missed 
opportunity.”90 
Services91 
Background 
A major priority for the United States in its negotiations of bilateral and regional FTAs is 
increased market access for services providers.92 Congress identified expanded market 
opportunities in services trade as a principal negotiating objective in the TPA-2015. Cross-border 
trade in services represents slightly less than one-third of total U.S. trade, and is an area of focus 
for the United States due to U.S. firms’ competitiveness in these sectors. Services accounted for 
78% of U.S. private sector gross domestic product (GDP) and 87 million (82%) private sector 
employees in 2013. 93 The United States consistently runs a surplus in services trade; U.S. 
services exports surpassed imports by $233 billion in 2014. Some economists argue that the 
expanded commitments in international services may represent the greatest benefit for the United 
States in the TPP.94 
The United States sought to expand on previous commitments the 11 partner countries have made 
on trade in services, particularly with the five countries with whom the United States does not 
                                                 
88 CRS calculations based on the legally verified TPP Tariff Elimination Schedules.  
89 ITAC 2, p. 7. 
90 ITAC 2, p. 14. 
91 This section written by Rachel Fefer and Brock Williams. 
92 For more information see CRS Report R43291, U.S. Trade in Services: Trends and Policy Issues, by Rachel F. Fefer. 
93 Meredith M. Broadbent, Chairman, Recent Trends in U.S. Services Trade: 2015 Annual Report, United States 
International Trade Commission, May 2015, http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4526.pdf. 
94 David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "Why Obama's Key Trade Deal with Asia Would Actually be 
Good for American Workers," Washington Post, March 12, 2015. 
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have existing U.S. FTAs (Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam). For these 
countries, existing commitments with the United States are based on the multilateral WTO 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Another major U.S. objective was to address 
new services trade barriers not covered, or covered only partially, in previous trade agreements, 
and in doing so, potentially influence other ongoing U.S. services trade negotiations, including 
the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) with the EU and the plurilateral 
Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) on the sidelines of the WTO.95 Emerging issues in services 
trade include the prohibition of restrictions on data flows and data localization requirements and 
treatment of electronic payment card systems. 
Unlike tariff barriers, nontariff barriers (NTBs) on services trade that the TPP seeks to reduce and 
eliminate can take many different forms, making them difficult to quantify and compare across 
countries. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has created 
indices that provide some measure of services trade restrictiveness.96 These indices, available for 
OECD countries and some selected other countries across 18 different services sectors, show 
considerable variation in services trade restrictiveness among TPP OECD countries (Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and the United States) and hence the opportunity 
for liberalization through TPP negotiation efforts. For example, in telecommunications, the index, 
which takes a value from 0 to 1 (most restrictive), ranges from 0.12 for the United States to 0.30 
for Japan and 0.34 for Mexico. Such restrictions are likely even greater among some of the lesser 
developed TPP countries not included in the OECD database. Similar work by researchers at the 
World Bank, which covers more countries but in less detail, supports this hypothesis. Their index 
for overall services trade restrictiveness, which takes a value from 0 to 100, ranges from 11 for 
New Zealand to 41.5 for Vietnam and 46.1 for Malaysia, although the middle income country of 
Peru (16.4) scores lower than the United States (17.7).97 
Due to the complexity of services trade barriers, TPP commitments in several chapters may affect 
services trade. Chapters with a focus on services-related commitments discussed in more detail 
below include: Cross Border Trade in Services (Chapter 10), Financial Services (Chapter 11), 
Temporary Entry (Chapter 12), and Telecommunications (Chapter 13). 
USITC Estimated Economic Impact 
The USITC predicts generally positive results for U.S. services industries from the TPP.98 The 
May 2016 study estimates that both services sector output and employment would see increases 
above a 2032 baseline as a result of the TPP. These gains are small in relative terms (0.1%), but 
large in absolute terms ($42.3 billion increase in output) given the scale of the U.S. services 
sector. Both exports and imports are expected to increase above the baseline ($4.8 billion and 
$7.0 billion, respectively) but the estimated larger growth in imports would lead to an overall 
decline in net U.S. exports of services. The authors attribute this to a few factors: increased 
                                                 
95 For more information see CRS Report R43387, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) 
Negotiations, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Vivian C. Jones, and Renée Johnson; and CRS In Focus IF10311, Trade in 
Services Agreement (TiSA) Negotiations, by Rachel F. Fefer. 
96 OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index available at http://www.oecd.org/tad/services-trade/services-trade-
restrictiveness-index.htm. 
97 Ingo Borchert, Batshur Gootiiz, and Aaditya Mattoo, Policy Barriers to International Trade in Services: New 
Empirical Evidence, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (WPS6109), 2012, http://iresearch.worldbank.org/
servicetrade/home.htm. 
98 USITC, TPP Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors, Publication 4607, 
May 2016, pp. 319. 
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expenditures on tourism abroad (a U.S. services import), due to higher U.S. incomes post TPP; a 
shift in U.S. productive resources to sectors experiencing greater liberalization in foreign markets, 
including food and agriculture; and increasing U.S. demand for services imports given output 
capacity constraints and greater demand for U.S. services exports in TPP countries. The increase 
in U.S. services exports is estimated to go largely to TPP countries without an existing FTA while 
the increase in U.S. services imports would come from non-TPP countries, particularly the EU. 
Examples of TPP Services Liberalization 
A key component of services trade commitments in TPP is liberalization of specific industries. Most U.S. service 
sectors are already open to international competition and the United States made few commitments that went 
beyond existing trade agreement obligations. Longstanding restrictions on maritime shipping services, for example, 
would not be affected by the TPP. Other TPP countries, particularly the five countries without existing U.S. FTAs, 
opened additional services sectors to U.S. competition. Examples include 
 Japan would remove preconditions to provide express delivery and insurance services, and allow competing 
insurance providers access to the distribution network of Japan Post, the Japanese postal provider. 
 Malaysia would eliminate its foreign capital cap in telecommunications services and all joint venture and 
performance requirements for 12 service sectors in the upstream oil and gas industry, including drilling services, 
turbine repair and maintenance, and seismic data acquisition. 
 Vietnam would remove foreign equity restrictions on freight agency, warehousing, and customs clearance, and 
eliminate joint venture requirements for freight brokerage and related cargo logistics services. 
Cross-Border Trade in Services 
The TPP chapter on cross-border trade in services commits parties to provisions governing 
situations in which the buyer and seller are located in different territories. As with previous U.S. 
FTAs, the TPP employs the “negative list approach,” that is, the provisions are to apply to all 
types of services, unless specifically excluded by a partner country in the chapter annex on 
NCMs. This approach is generally considered more comprehensive than the “positive list 
approach” used in the GATS, which requires each covered service to be identified. The negative 
list approach also implies that any new type of service that is developed after the agreement 
enters into force is automatically covered unless it is specifically excluded. Key provisions 
include the following:  
 nondiscriminatory treatment of services from partner-country providers, 
including national treatment and MFN treatment;  
 no limitations on the number of service suppliers, the total value or volume of 
services provided, the number of persons employed, or the types of legal entities 
or joint ventures that a foreign service supplier may employ;  
 prohibition on locality requirements that a TPP-based service provider maintain a 
commercial presence in the country of the buyer; 
 support of mutual recognition of professional qualifications for certification of 
service providers; 
 transparency in the development and application of government regulations; and 
 allowance for payments and transfers of capital flows that relate to the provision 
of services, with permissible restrictions in some cases including bankruptcy and 
criminal offences.  
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Examples of TPP Services Nonconforming Measures (NCMs) 
Each TPP party, including the United States, has a list of specific industries or practices it would exempt from its TPP 
services trade obligations. Examples include 
 Accounting: An accountant in Japan is required to be qualified as a certified public tax accountant under the 
Japanese laws and regulations and establish an office within the district of the certified public tax accountant 
association to which the person belongs. 
 Audiovisual: In Vietnam, the ratio of screening Vietnamese films to total films must be at least 20 percent 
annually and cinemas should show at least one Vietnamese film between the hours of 18:00 and 22:00. 
 Financial: Malaysia maintains a “best interest” screening test for granting licenses or approvals for an 
investment in financial institutions with no specific threshold or established criteria. 
 Hospitality: To supply food or beverage catering services in Singapore, a foreign supplier must incorporate as 
a limited company, and apply for the food establishment license in its name. 
 Insurance: In Australia, approval of nonresident life insurers is restricted to subsidiaries incorporated under 
Australian law. 
 Legal: Only Chilean and foreign nationals with a residence in Chile, who have completed the totality of their 
legal studies in the country, are authorized to practice as lawyers, and only lawyers duly qualified to practice law 
are authorized to plead a case in Chilean courts, or file the first legal action or claim of each party. 
 Maritime: Only U.S.-flag vessels may carry cargo between U.S. ports and must be staffed by U.S. crew. 
 Printing: Foreign investors in Mexico are limited to 49 percent of the ownership interest in a business for 
printing or publication of daily newspapers written primarily for a Mexican audience and distributed in Mexico. 
Express Delivery 
The United States made market access of express delivery services a priority in the TPP 
negotiations, as it has in other recent FTAs, including KORUS. Covered in a chapter annex, the 
commitments on express delivery focus, in particular, on cases where a government-owned and 
operated postal system provides express delivery services competing with private sector 
providers. Japan Post, which also includes banking and insurance services, has been moving 
towards privatization with an initial public offering of a portion of its shares in 2015, but remains 
majority owned by the government. Even domestic Japanese competitors in express delivery have 
argued that the Japanese postal service receives a number of unique advantages. The TPP annex 
and a separate side letter between the United States and Japan attempt to eliminate those 
advantages.99  
TPP, like KORUS, stipulates that the postal system cannot use revenue generated from its 
monopoly power in providing postal services to cross-subsidize an express delivery service. 
Vietnam would be exempt from such a rule for 3 years. TPP, however, goes beyond KORUS in its 
express delivery commitments, and would also require independence between express delivery 
regulators and providers, prohibit the requirement of providing universal postal service as a 
prerequisite for express delivery, and prohibit fees on express delivery providers for the purpose 
of funding other such providers. Unlike KORUS, TPP lacks a specific threshold for the customs 
de minimis, a critical commitment for express delivery providers as shipments valued below the 
de minimis receive expedited customs treatment and pay no duties or taxes. Industry sought a 
$200 de minimis, like that in KORUS, and has noted that TPP parties agreed to periodically 
review their respective thresholds.100 
                                                 
99 Leo Lewis, "Yamato Launches Rare Japan Post Broadside," Financial Times, November 12, 2015. 
100 Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Services and Finance Industries (ITAC 10), Advisory Committee Report to 
the President, the Congress and the U.S. Trade Representative on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement, 
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Financial Services 
Financial services, including insurance and insurance-related services, banking and related 
services, as well as auxiliary services of a financial nature, are addressed in a separate chapter as 
in previous FTAs. The financial services chapter adapts relevant provisions from the foreign 
investment chapter and the cross-border trade in services chapter. The prudential exception in 
TPP provides that nothing in the FTA would prevent a party to the agreement from imposing 
measures to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. TPP, like KORUS, 
distinguishes between financial services traded across borders and those sold by a provider with a 
commercial presence in the home country of the buyer. In the case of providers with a foreign 
commercial presence, TPP applies the negative list approach with commitments applying 
generally except where noted; in the case of cross-border trade, TPP limits coverage to specific 
banking and insurance services as defined by each country.101  
Some critics have noted the long list of NCMs. The United States, for example, excludes 
Government-Sponsored Enterprises such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae). One of Malaysia’s NCMs has received particular scrutiny from the business community, as 
it would require the Malaysian government’s approval for certain bank and insurance investments 
based on whether such investment is in “the best interest of Malaysia.” Services industry 
representatives have raised concerns over the potential breadth of this exemption given its lack of 
a threshold or specific definition or criteria.102 
Financial services are not covered under the e-commerce chapter and therefore not protected by 
that chapter’s new obligations such as the prohibition of localization requirements for data servers 
and computing facilities. The chapter does, however, have a separate provision prohibiting 
restrictions on cross-border data flows based on KORUS, which is similar to that found in the e-
commerce chapter. U.S. financial services firms and some Members of Congress are concerned 
about the distinct treatment of the sector because, like many other industries, financial services 
firms rely on cross-border data flows to ensure data security, create efficiencies and cost savings 
through economies of scale, and utilize internet cloud services that are often provided by U.S. 
technology firms.103 Localization requirements imposed by countries could require companies to 
have in-country servers and data centers to store data. These types of regulations can create 
additional costs and may serve as a deterrent for firms seeking to enter new markets or a 
disguised barrier to trade. Localization supporters, though, claim they increase local control and 
data security. 
In TPP, USTR negotiated for the position advocated by the U.S. Treasury Department and sought 
flexibility for financial regulators to impose localization requirements. While localization 
requirements are not currently in place in TPP countries, observers note that Malaysia and 
Vietnam are considering imposing such regulations. In addition, some stakeholders note concern 
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101 See TPP Annex 11-A for a complete listing of insurance, banking, and other financial services covered by the cross-
border trade in financial services disciplines. 
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about other countries, including potential future TPP parties such as South Korea and Indonesia, 
which have or are considering localization requirements. The Administration is working to 
address these concerns in future U.S. negotiations and potentially in the concluded TPP, but 
Treasury Secretary Lew has cautioned that options for altering the 12-country agreement are 
limited.104 
TPP, like KORUS, also addresses insurance sold by government postal entities. U.S. providers 
have argued that government-owned and operated insurance providers are not regulated as 
stringently and, therefore, have a competitive advantage over privately-owned counterparts. TPP 
would require that parties to the agreement ensure that postal insurance entities are not given 
advantages over private suppliers, specifically including through regulations, requirements to 
maintain a license, and access to distribution channels. In some ways, these measures go beyond 
what was included in KORUS. The separate U.S.-Japan letter on nontariff measures specifically 
addresses Japan Post’s insurance business with clarified and additional commitments by Japan.105 
For the first time in a U.S. FTA, the TPP also includes commitments on electronic payment card 
services. The TPP would require that each country in the agreement allow for the supply, by 
persons of other TPP countries, of electronic payment services for payment card transactions, 
defined by each country, and generally including credit and debit cards. The provisions on card 
services would, however, allow for certain preconditions of access, including requiring a 
representative or office within country.  
Temporary Entry for Business Persons 
While some services can be traded across borders, services are also traded by a person supplying 
the service traveling to the location where the service is consumed. This is known as mode 4 
delivery in the GATS. TPP, like some previous U.S. FTAs, includes commitments on temporary 
entry for business persons in order to facilitate such trade. As temporary entry has been a 
controversial issue in the context of previous trade agreements, the United States did not offer or 
seek commitments on additional visas for temporary entry, and only agreed to measures on 
regulatory transparency and predictability. According to the Administration, these rules would not 
require any change in U.S. immigration laws or regulations, and dispute settlement for this 
chapter is limited to very specific circumstances.106 Other TPP parties, however, have made 
additional access commitments on the temporary entry of business persons, including on length of 
stay and types of occupations, but these will only apply to the other countries making 
commitments in this area (i.e., not the United States). Australia, for example, provides categories 
defining “business visitors” and spells out the conditions and limitations for each category such as 
“service sellers” who are permitted an initial stay of 6 months up to a maximum of 12 months.107 
                                                 
104 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Financial Services and General 
Government, President Obama's Fiscal 2017 Budget Request for the Treasury Department, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., 
March 16, 2016. 
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https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Temporary-Entry-for-Business-Persons.pdf. 
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Telecommunications 
For the first time in a U.S. FTA, the telecommunications chapter covers mobile service providers. 
Television or radio broadcast or cable suppliers, though, are not covered. Overall, the chapter 
applies a market driven approach, enshrining competition and consumer choice in the sector, and 
promotes the independence of regulators from the regulated. According to the Administration and 
the industry advisory committee, given current competition in the U.S. mobile market, the United 
States would not have new obligations resulting from the TPP commitments, but U.S. mobile 
carriers would gain greater access to markets abroad.108 The chapter’s provisions would require 
regulatory transparency; that providers can interconnect with one another; that there is reasonable 
and nondiscriminatory access to networks, infrastructure, government-controlled resources like 
spectrum bandwidth, for reasonable rates; and protection of the supplier’s options for employing 
technology. The chapter would promote cooperation on charges for international roaming services 
and allow regulation for mobile roaming service rates. Other provisions aim to ensure that 
suppliers can resell and unbundle services. 
Stakeholder and Industry Views 
Services industries generally have reacted positively to the TPP provisions relating to U.S. trade 
in services, with some key exceptions. The International Trade Advisory Committee for services 
and finance industries (ITAC 10) reported that the agreement satisfies TPA negotiating objectives 
and “on balance promotes the economic interest of the United States.”109 Business groups note 
that for the five countries without existing U.S. FTAs, the provisions in TPP would provide 
meaningful additional market access.110 They also highlight new provisions in TPP, particularly 
those related to data flows and digital trade, as advancing U.S. service firms’ interests. Provisions 
on data flows also affect other (non-services) firms, such as manufacturers who rely on global 
supply chains and transmitting data across borders. The larger business community also sees 
additional advances in the TPP, include ensuring electronic payment card services and electronic 
signatures, as well as addressing mobile telecommunications carriers and international roaming 
rates.  
While business groups generally support the agreement and its impact on services, they have 
raised some concerns. There has been vocal opposition from some in the services sector, for 
example, over financial services firms’ exclusion from TPP’s e-commerce chapter and its 
provisions prohibiting localization requirements for computing facilities.111 The U.S. Treasury 
Department reportedly argued in favor of this exception to maintain regulatory flexibility for 
requiring local storage of financial firm data; opponents of the provision view it as unnecessary 
given the general prudential exception in the services chapter.112 Several Members of Congress 
have expressed their concerns over this exemption in a letter to USTR, urging the Administration 
to address the issue both in TPP and in ongoing negotiations.113 Other issues of concern for 
                                                 
108 USTR, TPP Chapter Summary: Telecommunications, November 5, 2016, at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-
Chapter-Summary-Telecommunications.pdf; and Industry Trade Advisory Committee for Information and 
Communications Technologies, Services and Electronic Commerce (ITAC 8), Advisory Committee Report to the 
President, the Congress and the U.S. Trade Representative on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement, 
December 3, 2015. 
109 ITAC 10, op. cit. 
110 Allgeier, op. cit. 
111 Allgeier, op. cit. 
112 "Administration Engages with Financial Services Firms on TPP Objections," Inside U.S. Trade, December 4, 2015. 
113 Letter from Representative Mike Kelley, Member of Congress, et al. to Jacob J. Lew, Treasury Secretary, et al., 
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services industries include: the long list of nonconforming measures (NCMs) that limit the level 
of liberalization achieved; what some view as a narrow definition of SOEs, limiting these 
disciplines’ applicability; and the U.S. decision not to negotiate additional commitments on 
temporary entry for business persons in TPP.114 
The Communications Workers of America (CWA), a union representing workers in a number of 
service industries, opposes TPP. They argue that increased access to the U.S. services market and 
various provisions throughout the agreement, including on government procurement, investment, 
and data transfers, could have negative impacts on service workers including in jobs such as call 
centers and data processing.115 Other groups also oppose TPP, in part, due to certain services 
provisions, particularly those on financial services. They argue that TPP commitments will 
restrict the U.S. government’s ability to regulate the financial services industry.116 
Agriculture117 
Background 
Exports make a vital contribution to U.S. agriculture, absorbing about 20% of total agricultural 
production, while representing a far larger share of the production of certain commodities, 
including wheat, rice, soybeans, cotton, almonds, pecans, pistachios, and walnuts, to name a few. 
As such, foreign demand for U.S. food and fiber contributes materially to higher commodity 
prices and farm income. The positive ripple effects from farm trade extend beyond farmers and 
ranchers to rural communities to include: farm input industries that provide seed, fertilizer, and 
machinery; and commodity processors and food manufacturers with a stake in foreign markets. 
Exports also can contribute to higher input prices for food to the extent that additional foreign 
demand is not met by an increase in domestic supplies, although commodity costs amount to a 
fraction of overall retail food prices. Rising farm productivity, market-oriented U.S. farm policies, 
and the prospect of competing on more favorable terms for a larger share of the faster-growing 
food markets in many developing countries are among the reasons that negotiations aimed at 
liberalizing agricultural trade among TPP countries has elicited a high level of interest and broad-
based engagement from U.S. agriculture and food industry interests. 
It appears the TPP agreement would improve market access for many U.S. food and agricultural 
products, thus enhancing U.S. competitiveness in a number of markets. At the same time, it also 
would provide TPP partners with greater access to U.S. markets, thus raising the level of 
competition from TPP partners.  
Three considerations around the TPP are particularly relevant for U.S. food and agriculture. A 
discussion of these issues and USITC estimates of TPP’s economic impact on U.S agriculture is 
followed by a partial snapshot of some of the higher-profile improvements in market access for 
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January 11, 2016; Letter from Senator Kelly Ayotte, Member of Congress, et al. to Jacob J. Lew, Treasury Secretary, et 
al., March 7, 2016. 
114 ITAC 10, op. cit. 
115 CWA, “10 Ways the TPP Would Hurt U.S. Working Families,” accessed April 22, 2016, at http://www.cwa-
union.org/pages/10_ways_the_tpp_would_hurt_cwa_represented_workers. 
116 Public Citizen, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Undermining Wall Street Reform,” April 22, 2016, at 
http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=6474. 
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agricultural products in the agreement, a summary of selected provisions beyond market access 
that are of interest to food and agriculture, and a review of industry reactions to the agreement.  
Key Considerations  
An overarching consideration is that among significant TPP markets, the United States lacks 
FTAs with five TPP countries—of which the most significant are Japan, Vietnam, and Malaysia. 
With a combined population of roughly 250 million, these three countries likely offer the greatest 
potential for boosting U.S. farm and food exports via lower tariffs, or expanded tariff rate quotas 
(TRQs).118 Significantly, all three countries impose much higher average applied MFN 
agricultural tariffs than the United States, which could work to the advantage of U.S. farm and 
food exports versus domestic suppliers and non-TPP export competitors as tariffs decline under 
the agreement. 119 In 2014, applied MFN tariffs on agriculture products averaged 5.1% in the 
United States, 9.3% in Malaysia, 14.3% in Japan and 16.3% in Vietnam.120 Moreover, existing 
tariff peaks are far higher for a number of product categories. Examples include dairy and poultry 
imports into Canada; bovine meat, rice and dairy products into Japan; and Vietnamese tariffs 
across a number of food categories. Japan is likely the leading agricultural market opportunity in 
the TPP due to its highly protected farm and food markets, large population, and high per capita 
gross domestic product. Vietnam, with the fourth largest population in the TPP and a fast growing 
economy, is generally viewed as a market that could hold significant future growth potential for 
U.S. farm and food products.  
Also significant is that potential key export expansion opportunities for U.S. food and agriculture 
interests, such as beef and pork to Japan and dairy products to Japan, Canada, and Vietnam, 
generally are to be phased in over a period of years, if not decades. For certain products in certain 
countries, including Japan for beef, pork, and whey powder, and the United States for some dairy 
products, safeguard measures allow for additional tariffs to be imposed if imports should exceed 
specified thresholds. Generally, the quantitative trigger level for invoking safeguard measures 
would increase over time, while the duties imposed under the safeguard are scheduled to be 
reduced or eliminated. At the same time, preferential access that U.S. food and agricultural 
interests have to markets in Canada and Mexico under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) would become available to a wider group of potential competitors over time as tariffs 
are lowered for TPP countries. 
If the United States chooses not to implement the TPP agreement, U.S. agricultural export 
competitors would have the potential opportunity to gain a competitive edge over U.S. exports of 
certain products to Japan and elsewhere. This could occur as a result of existing preferential tariff 
arrangements—such as Australia’s FTA with Japan—or by ratifying an agreement similar to TPP 
without U.S. participation. Also, while the European Union is not party to the TPP, it is 
negotiating FTAs with Japan, Malaysia, and Vietnam that could enhance its producers’ competitive 
position in those markets. 
                                                 
118 Under a TRQ, lower tariffs are applied to in-quota imports, while higher, often prohibitive tariffs are imposed on 
imports in excess of the quota amount.  
119 The MFN rate is the normal nondiscriminatory tariff charged on imports from WTO members, excluding 
preferential tariffs under free trade agreements and other schemes, or tariffs charged inside quota regimes.  
120 World Tariff Profiles 2015, World Trade Organization, at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/
tariff_profiles15_e.pdf. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for Congress 
 
Congressional Research Service 38 
USITC Estimated Economic Impact 
The USITC in its report on TPP of May 2016 concluded the agreement would provide significant 
benefits to U.S. agriculture.121 The model estimated TPP outcomes in 2032 for U.S. agriculture 
compared with a baseline scenario without TPP and reached the following conclusions: 
 Agricultural exports would be $7.2 billion higher (2.6%), while imports would 
increase by $2.7 billion (1.5%). Agricultural output would expand by $10 billion 
(0.5%), while employment in agriculture also would increase by 0.5%. 
 U.S. dairy product exports would increase by $1.85 billion (18%), while 
processed foods and beef would post gains of $1.54 billion (3.8%) and $876 
million (8.4%), respectively. Fresh fruit, vegetables and nuts would see an 
estimated increase of $575 million (2%), while pork and poultry meat products 
post increases of $219 million (1.9%) and $174 million (1.3%), respectively. 
Corn and rice exports are estimated to be marginally lower with TPP by 0.1% and 
0.3%, respectively.  
 As for U.S. imports, processed food would increase by $427 million (1.1%), 
while beef imports would expand by $419 million (5.7%) and dairy products 
would be $349 million higher (10.3%). 
 Export gains stem primarily from greater market access via lower tariffs and 
expanded TRQs, with the lion’s share of the total increase of $7.2 billion 
concentrated in Japan ($3.6 billion) and Vietnam ($3.3 billion).  
Specific Market Access Commitments 
A principal negotiating objective for agriculture in the TPA-2015 is to obtain competitive 
opportunities for U.S. exports of agricultural commodities that are substantially equivalent to 
those provided to foreign exports in U.S. markets. In part, this is to be achieved by reducing 
foreign tariffs on U.S. commodities, while providing a reasonable adjustment period for import-
sensitive U.S. products. Accordingly, the TPP agreement would affect market access for a broad 
range of agricultural commodities and food products. What follows is a selection of some of the 
notable changes included in the agreement. It is not meant to be comprehensive. 
 Beef: Japan ranks as the largest U.S. export market for beef and beef products, 
according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Under the TPP 
agreement, Japan would drop its current tariff on fresh, chilled, and frozen beef 
from 38.5% to 27.5% in year one, with subsequent annual reductions to 9% by 
year 16. Japan would lower tariffs on other beef products as well, while Vietnam 
would eliminate such tariffs, currently as high as 34%, over three to eight years. 
The United States, for its part, would eliminate tariffs on beef and beef products 
that range as high as 26.4% in no more than 15 years and in fewer than 10 years in 
most instances. 
 Pork: Japan, which also ranks as the leading market for U.S. pork and pork 
product exports, would immediately cut its tariff of 4.3% on fresh, chilled, and 
frozen pork cuts to 2.2%, phasing out the residual over nine years. A separate 
duty on pork cuts under Japan’s “gate price system,” which acts as a minimum 
import price, would be lowered immediately to 125 yen per kilogram, from 482 
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May 2016, pp. 111. 
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yen now. This duty would then be cut to 70 yen in year five and subsequently 
lowered each year thereafter to reach 50 yen in year 10. A special U.S.-specific 
safeguard would allow Japan to temporarily increase the duty during this 
transition period if imports were to exceed a trigger level. Vietnam would 
eliminate tariffs that are as high as 34% on pork and pork products within 10 
years, while the United States would immediately eliminate most such tariffs. 
 Poultry: Canada would allow incremental increases in access to its highly 
protected poultry and egg markets over five years via new duty-free, TPP-wide 
TRQs amounting to 2.3% of domestic production for eggs, 2.1% for chicken, 2% 
for turkey, and 1.5% for broiler hatching eggs. Thereafter, the quotas would be 
raised moderately each year, plateauing in year 19, at which point these TRQs 
would amount to 19 million dozen eggs, 26,745 metric tons of chicken, 3,983 
tons of turkey and 1.14 million dozen broiler hatching eggs and chicks. 
Vietnamese tariffs on poultry of up to 40% would be eliminated within 13 years. 
U.S. tariffs of up to 18.6% ad valorem equivalent would be eliminated within 10 
years. 
 Dairy: Opening dairy markets to greater import competition was among the most 
difficult agricultural issues to resolve during TPP negotiations. Under the 
agreement, Canada would allow incremental additional access to its highly 
protected dairy product markets amounting to 3.25% of its output for 2016 under 
TRQs that would be phased in over five years, with moderate annual increases 
thereafter. For perspective, this additional access would amount to about 0.3% of 
current U.S. milk production and would be open to all TPP countries. These Canadian 
TRQs for dairy products, such as fluid milk, butter, cheese, and yogurt, would 
increase between 14 and 19 years and then remain fixed. In-quota dairy products 
would enter Canada duty free. Canada also would eliminate its over-quota tariff 
of 208% on whey powder over 10 years. Japan would eliminate many tariffs it 
imposes on cheese imports within 16 years and on whey within 21 years. The 
United States would gradually phase out tariffs and establish TRQs for dairy 
products from Australia and New Zealand that would be increased annually. 
Existing preferential access for Australian dairy products under the U.S.-Australia 
FTA would be transferred to perpetual TRQs. New U.S. TRQs for Canadian dairy 
products would be raised gradually each year until year 19, at which point the 
quantities would remain level. 
 Rice: Japan, the second-largest overseas market for U.S. rice, would establish a 
new duty-free quota for U.S. rice of 50,000 tons initially, rising to 70,000 tons in 
year 13, but still well below the 165,000 tons the U.S. rice industry had sought. 
Japan also would allow a broader range of domestic entities to participate in 
tenders on this additional quota, as well as on 60,000 tons of rice under an 
existing quota. But Japanese officials indicate that the “minimum mark-up” Japan 
imposes on rice imports—equivalent to a 15-20% duty according to USA Rice—
would continue to be applied to all imports. U.S. tariffs on rice products of up to 
11.2% would be eliminated within 15 years. 
 Cotton: U.S. tariffs on cotton that range up to $0.314 per kg generally would be 
eliminated by 2022, and in some cases would be removed immediately. 
 Sugar: Access to the U.S. sugar market would be expanded incrementally by 
establishing new TRQs for sugar and sugar-containing products totaling 86,300 
tons annually, representing 2.4% of U.S. sugar imports in 2014/2015. Australia 
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and Canada would immediately receive new duty-free quotas totaling 65,000 tons 
and 19,200 tons per year, respectively. The residual would be split between Japan, 
Malaysia, and Vietnam. The Australian and Canadian TRQs  include the potential 
for expansion in years when additional U.S. sugar imports are required. The 
additional TRQ for sugar is not expected to threaten the budget neutral requirement of 
the U.S. sugar program. Japan would provide new TRQs that would expand access 
to its market for sugar and sweetener-related processed products on a duty-free or 
preferential-tariff-rate basis, including chewing gum, chocolates and products 
containing chocolate, confectionery goods and other such products, and would 
eliminate tariffs on various sweetener products over time. 
 Tobacco: U.S. tariffs on tobacco of up to 350% would be eliminated within 10 
years, while Japan would eliminate tariffs on smoking tobacco and cigars over 11 
years, and Malaysia would eliminate all tariffs on tobacco and tobacco products 
over 16 years. Vietnam would create a TRQ of 500 metric tons for unmanufactured 
tobacco imports that increases gradually for 20 years with no limit from year 21, 
while eliminating in-quota tariffs over 11 years and for all tobacco leaf after 20 
years. Vietnamese tariffs on blended tobacco, cigars, and other tobacco products 
would be eliminated over 16 years. A controversy has emerged over a provision in 
the Exceptions chapter of the agreement that allows countries to deny recourse to 
protections under the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) to tobacco product 
manufacturers for claims directed at tobacco control measures. This optional 
exclusion would not apply to leaf tobacco, although, to the extent that tobacco 
product sales could be blunted by this provision, it would appear to have the 
potential to affect sales of leaf tobacco.  
Table 3. Tariff Elimination Schedule for Selected Food and Agricultural Products in 
Selected TPP Countries 
Product Importing Country Tariff Elimination Timetable 
Frozen French fries Japan Within 6 years 
Peanuts and peanut products United States Within 10 years 
Grapes, avocados, strawberries Japan Immediate 
Fresh/chilled broccoli, tomatoes, 
lettuce, and garlic 
Japan Immediate 
Tree nuts, fresh/dried Japan Immediately for most 
Tree nuts, fresh/dried United States Mostly immediate, but within 5 years 
Wine Japan Within 11 years 
Source: TPP Agreement released November 2015. 
Notes: USDA has compiled summaries with additional detail on what the agreement contains in terms of market 
access for numerous farm commodities groups at http://www.fas.usda.gov/data/tpp-benefits- specific-agricultural-
commodities-and-products.  
Other Agriculture Provisions 
The agreement addresses a number of trade-related areas beyond tariffs and TRQs are import to 
exporters of food and agricultural products, among which are sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures (SPS), agricultural biotechnology and export programs. 
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Geographical Indications 
Geographic Indications (GIs) are geographical names that act to protect the quality and reputation 
of a distinctive product originating in a certain region.122 As such, GIs can be commercially 
valuable and, as intellectual property, can provide eligibility for relief from acts of infringement 
or unfair competition. GIs are most often, but not exclusively applied to wines, spirits and 
agricultural products. Examples of GIs include Parmesan cheese and Parma ham, Champagne, 
Florida oranges, Idaho potatoes, Washington State apples and Napa Valley wines. GIs have 
become a point of controversy in international trade because GIs that are considered by some to 
be protected intellectual property are considered by others to be generic or semi-generic names 
and thus not protected. For example, “feta” is considered a generic name for a type of cheese in 
the United States, but is a protected GI in the European Union (EU). As such, U.S.-produced 
“feta” cannot be sold under that name in the EU. This type of exclusivity can extend beyond the 
EU, for example, when a third country has agreed to recognize EU-approved GIs under a bilateral 
trade agreement. 
The TPP agreement obligates members that provide for recognition of GIs to make this process 
available and transparent to interested parties within the TPP, while also providing a process for 
canceling GI protection. Parties that recognize GIs also are to adopt a procedure by which 
interested parties may object to the provision of a GI. Among the reasons the agreement lists for 
opposing a GI are: the GI is likely to cause confusion with a trademark that is recognized within 
the country, a pre-existing application is pending, or the GI is the customary term for same item 
in the common language of the country. Specific to wines and spirits that are products of the vine, 
TPP members are not required to recognize a GI of another member if the GI is identical to the 
customary name of a grape variety existing in that party’s territory. Factors that are relevant in 
determining whether a term is the customary common name for a good include whether the term 
is used to identify the good in dictionaries, newspapers and websites, and whether the term is the 
name by which the good is marketed and referenced in trade in the country.  
Finally, with respect to other international agreements involving TPP members that provide for 
the protection of GIs, the TPP agreement states that members are to make available to interested 
parties information concerning the GIs involved and to allow them a reasonable opportunity to 
comment and to oppose the prospective recognition of the GIs. These obligations would not apply 
to international agreements that were concluded, agreed in principle, ratified, or that had entered 
into force prior to the entry into force of the TPP agreement. 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures  
As tariff rates have been lowered for food and agricultural products in recent decades, nontariff 
barriers have gained greater visibility as obstacles to trade. Among the nontariff measures the TPP 
seeks to address are SPS measures, which consist of actions that address issues of food safety, 
plant pests and animal diseases.123 Among SPS commitments the agreement addresses are: the 
establishment of an SPS committee composed of TPP member representatives; an obligation to 
base SPS measures either on international standards or on objective scientific evidence and to 
select risk management measures that are no more trade-distorting than necessary; a commitment 
to allow for public comment on the development of SPS measures; and the obligation to provide 
                                                 
122 For more information on GIs, see CRS In Focus IF10188, Geographical Indications (GIs) in U.S.-EU Trade 
Negotiations, by Renée Johnson.  
123 For more information on SPS, see CRS Report R43450, Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Related Non-Tariff 
Barriers to Agricultural Trade, by Renée Johnson. 
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rapid notification of shipments held on importation. Importantly, SPS disputes are to be addressed 
first in technical consultations among relevant governmental authorities under a procedural timeline 
established in the agreement. If the issue cannot be resolved through technical consultations, parties may 
turn to dispute settlement procedures in the agreement.  
TPP builds on the WTO’s SPS agreement with the introduction of a rapid notification requirement 
that obligates an importing country to provide notification within 7 days when an inbound 
shipment is restricted or prohibited. IT also establishes a new rapid response mechanism that 
allows parties to raise SPS concerns through recourse to Cooperative Technical Consultations by 
engaging national trade and regulatory agencies with the aim of resolving them within a defined 
procedural framework and timetable.  
Agricultural Biotechnology124  
As concerns agricultural products of modern biotechnology, the agreement commits the 
signatories to increase transparency and provide notification of national laws and regulations 
of biotech products. It also encourages information sharing on issues related to the 
occurrence of low-level presence (LLP) of biotech material in food and agricultural products. 
To minimize LLP occurrences and any disruptions to trade that may result from an LLP 
incident, both importers and exporters commit to exchange certain information, such as 
product risk assessments and new plant authorizations.  
The agreement also establishes a working group on agricultural biotechnology within the 
TPP Committee on Agricultural Trade. The working group is to function as a forum for 
exchanging information on issues such as national laws, regulations and policies affecting 
trade in biotech products. Finally, the agreement states that parties are under no obligation to 
adopt or modify existing laws, regulations or policies that apply to biotechnology.  
Export Disciplines 
On the topic of agricultural export programs, signatories to the agreement commit to 
eliminate the use of export subsidies, a type of incentive the United States does not employ 
in any case. The export subsidy ban is seen mainly as setting a standard for future reform on 
a multilateral basis. A commitment around export credits, credit guarantees, and insurance 
programs—which the United States does employ—is less ambitious: the agreement merely 
states the parties will cooperate to develop multilateral disciplines around these programs. 
The agreement also discourages restrictions on exports of food and agricultural products. To 
this end, it commits TPP countries to limit such restrictions to six months, and requires a 
country that imposes such restrictions for more than 12 months to consult with interested 
TPP importing countries. 
Stakeholder and Industry Views 
As of the beginning of 2016 numerous interest groups in the food and agricultural sector have 
passed judgment on the TPP agreement. Supporters include broad agricultural groups such as the 
American Farm Bureau Federation, as well as specific meat (beef, pork, and chicken) and 
commodity (wheat, corn, soybean, and peanut) associations. The Grocery Manufacturers 
                                                 
124 Modern biotechnology is defined in the TPP text as the application of: (a) in vitro nucleic acid techniques, including 
recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (rDNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles, or (b) fusion of 
cells beyond the taxonomic family. Such products are also sometimes referred to as genetically engineered, or more 
popularly, genetically modified organisms (GMOs). 
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Association, representing food, beverage and consumer product companies has also endorsed the 
agreement. More recently, a number of U.S. dairy groups, including the National Association of 
Milk Producers, have endorsed the agreement. 
The Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee for Trade on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (APAC), 
which is composed of a broad array of agricultural interests from producer groups to processing 
and exporting companies, expressed strong support for the agreement, reflecting the views of a 
“clear majority” of its members.125 APAC is one of a number of advisory committees charged 
with assessing whether the agreement promotes the economic interests of the United States and 
achieves the negotiating objectives that Congress established in TPA-2015. 
Support for the TPP agreement, however, is not universal within the food and agriculture 
sectors. The National Farmers Union (NFU) opposes the deal, contending benefits on the 
export side of the trade ledger will be overshadowed by greater competition from imports, 
leading to lower revenues for farmers and ranchers and to job losses. Also opposed to the 
agreement is the United Food and Commercial Workers Union International (UFCW), which 
represents workers in the grocery, retail, meat packing and food processing industries. The 
UFCW faults the agreement for the lack of an enforcement mechanism against currency 
manipulation, which it contends will nullify the benefits of tariff reductions, while 
contributing to the transfer of U.S. jobs to lower-wage markets overseas. The NFU and 
UFCW issued a dissenting minority report as members of APAC. 
APAC Representatives of tobacco leaf growers also oppose the agreement. They contend that 
allowing TPP countries to deny dispute settlement protections to tobacco product 
manufacturers could have negative ripple effects for U.S. tobacco farmers and could 
establish a precedent for future trade agreements. 
Certain NGOs also oppose the agreement, in part, due to concerns with provisions related to 
agriculture. These groups argue that the TPP will limit the U.S. government’s ability to 
regulate the country’s food supply, raising particular concern with seafood imports from 
Malaysia and Vietnam. 126 They also take issue with potential food labeling restrictions 
resulting from TPP commitments, noting that the Congress decided to change its country-of-
origin-labeling (COOL) requirements for meat products as a result of a trade dispute with 
Canada and Mexico in the WTO. 
Government Procurement 
Background 
The Government Procurement chapter sets 
standards and parameters for government 
purchases of goods and services among TPP 
countries. The U.S. trade negotiating objective 
for government procurement in TPA seeks 
“transparency in developing guidelines, rules, 
regulations, and laws for government 
procurement,” but does not address market access goals. The United States is a member of the 
                                                 
125 APAC report of December 1, 2015, at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-
partnership/advisory-group-reports-TPP. 
126 Public Citizen, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Undermining Food Safety,” accessed April 22, 2016, at 
http://www.citizen.org/tpp-food-safety-facts. 
Government Procurement Highlights 
 First ever reciprocal public procurement 
commitments from Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. 
 Similar to past U.S. FTAs, firms from Vietnam, 
Malaysia, and Brunei are waived from Buy American 
restrictions. 
 State and sub-federal procurements are largely 
excluded from TPP. 
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plurilateral WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) and has sought the inclusion of 
government procurement provisions in its FTAs. Among TPP partner countries, only Canada, 
Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore are members of the GPA. All U.S. FTAs—including those 
with TPP partners Australia, Peru, Chile, Singapore, and NAFTA—include chapters on 
government procurement. Similar to U.S. obligations in the GPA, although with different 
schedules of commitments for various government agencies, the FTA obligations provide 
opportunities for firms of each nation to bid on certain contracts over a set monetary threshold on 
a reciprocal basis. TPP contains first-ever reciprocal procurement commitments for Vietnam, 
Malaysia, and Brunei.  
Supporters of expanded procurement opportunities in FTAs argue that the reciprocal nature of the 
government procurement provisions in TPP will allow U.S. firms access to major government 
procurement market opportunities overseas. This market could be quite large. According to the 
WTO, government procurement typically accounts for 15-20% of a country’s GDP, and the size 
of the government procurement market among GPA members was valued at $1.6 trillion in 
2008.127 In addition, supporters claim open government procurement markets at home allow 
government entities to accept bids from partner country suppliers, potentially making more 
efficient use of public funds. 
However, others stakeholders contend that public procurement should primarily benefit domestic 
industries. The Buy American Act of 1933, as amended,128 limits the ability of foreign companies 
to bid on procurements of manufactured and construction products. Buy American provisions 
periodically are also proposed for legislation such as infrastructure projects requiring government 
purchases of iron, steel, and manufactured products.129 Such restrictions are waived for 
companies from countries with which the United States has FTAs or to countries belonging to the 
GPA.  
The United States negotiated only federal procurement, excluding additional state or local 
procurement commitments in the TPP negotiations. This may be due to resistance among U.S. 
states to providing access to their procurement markets. States must voluntarily opt in to 
government procurement commitments in FTAs, but the number of states doing so has dropped 
substantially from the 37 states that signed up to the GPA to 10 states that acceded to 
commitments under the most recent U.S. bilateral FTAs with South Korea, Panama, and 
Colombia.  
Key Provisions 
In negotiating government procurement agreements, countries set out schedules on: (1) the 
government entities that will accept bids from overseas companies; (2) the types of procurements 
that are eligible; (3) monetary thresholds; and (4) exceptions to these commitments. The TPP 
provides that for eligible procurement opportunities, countries will 
 extend national and nondiscriminatory treatment among TPP partners; 
                                                 
127 Briefing Note: Government Procurement Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min11_e/
brief_gpa_e.htm. 
128 For more information, see CRS Report R43140, The Buy American Act—Preferences for “Domestic” Supplies: In 
Brief, by Kate M. Manuel. 
129 U.S. manufactured products have been defined in regulation as containing at least 50% domestic content. 
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 adopt a negative goods coverage schedule (i.e., all goods are eligible unless 
explicitly excluded, such as defense procurement). Some countries also adopt a 
negative list for services; 
 promote transparency in the tendering process through online tender information 
and descriptions; 
 provide online application and documentation processes without cost to the 
applicant, and provide for publication of post-award explanations of procurement 
decisions; 
 broaden covered procurement to include public-private partnerships (PPP) and 
build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects, although Malaysia, Mexico, and Vietnam 
are excluded from this provision; and 
 prohibit offsets.  
Countries have made incremental changes in the schedules of covered commitments to provide 
additional access to TPP partners. Yet, several countries have taken exceptions to their schedules. 
The United States and four other countries (Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, and Vietnam) 
exclude sub-central (state and local) procurement. Countries that do make sub-national 
commitments (Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, and Peru), extend those concessions reciprocally 
only among themselves. 
Thresholds, Transitions and Exemptions. When fully effective, most countries will adopt a 
baseline threshold of SDR130,000 (about $180,000).130 However, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam 
will apply transitional thresholds that shrink over time: 4 years for Brunei, 7 years for Malaysia, 
and 25 years for Vietnam. Thresholds for sub-federal procurement and construction projects are 
higher. In addition, Malaysia is allowed to retain its Bumiputera preferences to support the native 
Malay population, and Malaysia, Mexico, and Vietnam may continue to impose offsets, set-asides 
and price preferences for varying periods or permanently. For example, Vietnam will be able to 
set aside 100% of the value of pharmaceutical procurements for the first 3 years, transitioning in 
installments to 50% in year 16. In addition, Malaysia can exempt any procurements that will 
“affect Malaysia’s essential security interests.” 
 
                                                 
130 SDR (special drawing right) refers to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) international reserve asset. Its value is 
based on the U.S. dollar, euro, yen, and pound sterling, and will be expanded to include the Chinese Renminbi (RMB) 
in October 2016. 
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Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)131  
Background 
Intellectual property (IP) is a creation of the mind embodied in physical and digital objects. IPR 
are legal, private, enforceable rights that governments grant to inventors and artists that generally 
provide time-limited monopolies to right holders to use, commercialize, and market their 
creations and to prevent others from doing the 
same without their permission. 
The use of trade policy to advance IPR 
internationally emerged with NAFTA and the 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). These 
agreements build on international treaties 
administered by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO). U.S. trade 
negotiating objectives in TPA-2015 call for 
U.S. FTAs to “reflect a standard of protection 
similar to that found in U.S. law” (“TRIPS-
plus”) and to apply existing IPR protection to 
digital media through adherence to the WIPO 
“Internet Treaties.” TPA-2015 also includes 
new objectives to address cybertheft and 
protect trade secrets and proprietary 
information.  
IP is a source of U.S. comparative advantage, 
and the Asia-Pacific region is a fast-growing 
market for U.S. IP-based exports. TPP 
countries represent more than one-fifth of the 
approximately $130 billion in IP royalties, 
license fees, and payments that U.S. exporters 
received in 2014.132 According to USITC 
modeling estimates, improvements in TPP 
countries’ patent protections to meet TRIPS 
obligations, led to an 11% or $2.9 billion 
increase in U.S. IP receipts from these 
countries in 2010, which could have been even 
higher with greater levels of patent protection 
(17% or $5.0 billion higher in 2010).133 
                                                 
131 Written by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar (x7-9253) and Ian F. Fergusson (x7-4997), Specialists in International Trade and 
Finance. See CRS Report RL34292, Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and 
Ian F. Fergusson, and CRS In Focus IF10033, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and International Trade, by Shayerah 
Ilias Akhtar and Ian F. Fergusson.  
132 CRS calculation based on data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), U.S. Trade in Services; U.S. trade in 
IP services data available for selected TPP countries (Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and 
Singapore).  
133 For a description of the econometric model and assumptions made, see USITC, TPP Agreement: Likely Impact on 
(continued...) 
IPR Highlights in TPP 
Provisions on IPR protection and enforcement in TPP 
that are new or modified compared to KORUS include 
the following:  
Biologics. Requires for biologics a data exclusivity 
period of eight years or, alternatively, five years coupled 
with “other measures... to deliver a comparable outcome 
in the market.” 
Digital enforcement. Extends IPR enforcement, 
including for copyrights, to the digital environment. 
Trade secrets. Requires criminal procedures and 
penalties for trade secret theft, including cybertheft; also 
clarifies that SOEs are subject to trade secret protection 
requirements. 
Copyright balance. Obligates Parties to “endeavor to 
achieve an appropriate balance” between users and rights 
holders in their copyright systems, including digitally, 
through exceptions for legitimate purposes (e.g., “fair 
use”). 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Requires “notice 
and takedown” to address ISP liability while allowing 
alternative systems to remain for certain countries (e.g., 
“notice and notice”). 
Trademarks. Extends trademark protection to 
“collective marks” and removes administrative 
requirements to enable easier protection and 
enforcement of trademarks. 
Geographical indications (GIs). Requires 
administrative procedures for recognizing and opposing 
GIs, including guidelines for determining when a name is 
common. Also, for GIs that a Party protects through 
international agreements, includes requirements on 
transparency and opportunity to comment or oppose GI 
recognition. (See “Agriculture” section for more on GIs.) 
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At the same time, the TPP region poses significant counterfeiting and piracy challenges, including 
in the digital environment. The USTR continued to designate five TPP parties (among 34 U.S. 
trading partners) as having IPR regimes of concern to the United States in the 2016 “Special 301” 
report (pursuant to Sec. 182 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended). The report reviews the global 
state of IPR protection and enforcement and designated Chile on the “Priority Watch List” for 
significant IPR concerns; and Canada, Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam on the “Watch List” for lesser 
but still notable IPR concerns (see text box).134 
IPR Protection and Enforcement Issues in TPP Countries  
Examples of U.S. IPR concerns with the TPP countries designated in the USTR’s 2016 Special 301 Report include the 
following. 
Priority Watch List 
 Chile: Need for implementation against unlawful circumvention of technological protection measures 
(TPMs) and changes to Internet Service Provider (ISP) liability regime to permit effective action against 
Internet piracy. 
Watch List 
 Canada: Impact of heightened patent utility requirements applied by Canadian courts on U.S. 
pharmaceutical patents.  
 Mexico: Limitations in enforcement against transshipment of counterfeit and pirated goods.  
 Peru: Prevalence of pirated and counterfeit goods, including increasingly online.  
 Vietnam: IPR enforcement challenges, including lack of resources and lack of deterrence in enforcement 
actions.  
The 2016 Special 301 Report states that, under TPP, these countries have committed to strengthening their IPR 
regimes in many of the areas of concern highlighted in the report, as well as other areas. It also states that the United 
States will work closely with these countries on TPP implementation, which may include bilateral engagement, 
technical assistance, and trade capacity building.  
Source: USTR, 2016 Special 301 Report, April 2016.   
In its FTA negotiations, the United States generally seeks IP commitments that exceed the WTO 
TRIPS Agreement’s minimum standards of IPR protection and enforcement. TRIPS includes 
provisions on a balance of rights and obligations between protecting private rights holders and 
securing broader public benefits. Debate persists in U.S. trade policy and more broadly, among 
developed countries (historically IP generators and exporters) and developing countries 
(historically IP importers), about this balance. 
Debate and Stakeholder Views 
Among the more controversial aspects of the TPP negotiations were protections for 
pharmaceuticals through patents and data exclusivity, which raise questions about the balance 
between supporting innovation and supporting affordable access to medicines. One view is that 
patents and data exclusivity provide incentives for innovation by enabling right holders to 
generate profits to recoup R&D and regulatory costs and invest in future innovations. Another 
view is that patents may raise the costs of drugs and delay the entry of generic competitors into 
the market, thereby impeding affordable access to medicines. Some observers argue that a narrow 
                                                                
(...continued) 
the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors, Publication 4607, May 2016, pp. 475-478.  
134 USTR, 2015 Special 301 Report, April 2015, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2015-Special-301-Report-
FINAL.pdf. 
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focus on patents and data exclusivity masks the other factors that can affect public health, such as 
the efficiency of health care delivery systems or infrastructure, while others emphasize the 
significant role of patents and data exclusivity. Such debates have come to a head in terms of 
TPP’s treatment of biologics, a major U.S. innovation sector that can produce life-saving 
medicines, but for consumers, affordability is a concern both in the United States and abroad.135  
With copyrights, a longstanding debate concerns the balance between granting copyright holders 
exclusive rights to control their works and providing certain limitations on that right for “fair use” 
(e.g., criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research). Stakeholders also 
debate the balance between allowing Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to operate their businesses 
and providing enforcement procedures to address copyright theft through their networks.  
During the negotiations, different stakeholders expressed concern over how TPP’s IP chapter 
compared to other FTAs, chiefly the KORUS and the “May 10th” FTAs, i.e., those then-pending 
FTAs revised to reflect the May 10, 2007, Bipartisan Trade Understanding (May 10th addressed 
four different aspects of U.S. FTA provisions, see text box preceding this section for more). Some 
business groups, especially in the pharmaceutical sector, while broadly supportive of the IPR 
chapter, express concern that certain aspects of it may be less robust compared to KORUS, while 
others say that vigilant enforcement of TPP will not lead to any substantive differences from the 
level in KORUS.136 Some express concern about the length of transition periods for implementing 
IPR commitments for certain countries, while others argue that these transition periods reflect 
TPP countries’ development levels and enforcement capacity.  
Some groups, particularly those concerned about the impact of strong IP provisions on affordable 
access to medicines in developing countries, favored maintaining the May 10th approach to 
patents. Others argued that this approach was specifically tailored to certain FTAs and not 
intended to be the template for the U.S. approach to patent protections in FTAs going forward. In 
the end, TPP includes some provisions favorable to both sets of stakeholders, extending some 
patent and data protections beyond those of the May 10th Agreement, while providing phase-in 
periods for those new commitments for developing countries. 
IP is addressed primarily in a separate chapter in TPP, though other chapters also have some 
relevance (e.g., investment). The patent section reflects some May 10th elements, but departs in 
other areas. The IP chapter also contains some new provisions that go beyond existing U.S. FTAs, 
such as KORUS. IP provisions, including key changes, are discussed below.  
Patents 
Patents protect new innovations and inventions, such as pharmaceutical products, chemical 
processes, new business technologies, and computer software. Patent protection in the TPP builds 
on the TRIPS provisions of the WTO and adapts provisions from previous U.S. FTAs. It broadly 
seeks to establish consistent and harmonized patent regimes throughout the TPP region. Some of 
                                                 
135 For an overview of this discussion, see WTO, WIPO, and WHO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and 
Innovation: Intersections Between Public Health, Intellectual Property, and Trade, 2013, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf. See also, TPP Issues Analysis: Access to 
Medicines, Ways and Means Democrats Forum on Access to Medicine, December 8, 2015, testimonies of Joe Damond 
Biotechnology Industry Assocciation; Rohit Malpani, Médecins Sans Frontières; Stephen Ezell, Information 
Technology and Innovation (ITIF) Foundation; and Peter Maybarduk, Global Citizen, available at 
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/trading-views-real-debates-key-issues-tpp. 
136 “The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Report of the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Intellectual 
Property Rights (ITAC-15)”, December 3, 2015. 
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these provisions are specific to pharmaceutical products and are designed, according to recently 
enacted U.S. trade negotiating objectives, to “encourage innovation and access to medicine.”  
Patent Subject Matter. TPP reaffirms the familiar language of TRIPS requiring countries to 
provide a system of patents available for an invention, product or process “if the invention is new, 
involves an inventive step and is capable of industrial application.” In addition to making patents 
available for “new uses or new methods of using a known product”—the language found in 
KORUS—TPP also provides for “new processes of a known product.”  
TPP reaffirms the TRIPS language that a party may exclude from patents diagnostic, therapeutic 
and surgical methods, and animals other than microorganisms. While it allows parties to exclude 
plants other than microorganisms from patentability, it does provide for patents for inventions 
derived from plants.  
Access to Medicines. TPP provides that the chapter’s obligations “do not and should not prevent 
a Party from taking measures to protect public health...and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all.” TPP affirms that the chapter should be interpreted as consistent with the WTO 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (TRIPS Declaration). Parties also may take 
measures consistent with the TRIPS Declaration in matters regarding protecting test data for 
pharmaceuticals and biologics.  
Patent Term Adjustment. TPP provides that for unreasonable delays (defined as more than five 
years from the date of filing, or three years from a request for examination) in the patent 
examination process, applicants may request an extension of the patent term.137 For 
pharmaceutical products subject to marketing approval by a regulatory authority, TPP also 
provides adjustment for a patent term to account for unreasonable delays, although in this case, 
“unreasonable” is not defined. These provisions follow the KORUS text, but allow Brunei, 
Malaysia, and Vietnam a five-year transition period. Patent term extension was optional under the 
May 10th agreement for developing countries. 
Protection for Undisclosed Test Data (Data Exclusivity). Often referred to as data exclusivity, 
this practice provides a period of protection for test data that prevents a generic company from 
relying on the test data submitted by the originator company in order to gain marketing approval 
for a generic version of the brand name drug. TPP provides at least five years of data exclusivity 
for small molecule pharmaceuticals, following the KORUS standard. The May 10th FTAs also 
provided for five years of data exclusivity; however, they allowed, for countries relying on 
marketing approval granted in the United States, that period to run concurrently if the country 
grants marketing approval within six months of receiving an application. The purpose of 
concurrent period is to encourage the marketing of innovative drugs in developing countries. TPP 
does not provide for a concurrent exclusivity period. TPP also provides an additional three years 
of data exclusivity for clinical information supporting a new indication, formulation, or method of 
administration of an existing approved drug. Under the May 10 agreement, this type of extension 
was optional. In addition, under TPP, the expiration of the patent cannot limit the period of 
protection for test data. 
Biologics. The issue of data exclusivity for biologics138 has been especially contentious in TPP. 
The United States currently provides a 12-year exclusivity period for marketing data submitted 
with biologics for marketing approval, and sought that standard in the TPP negotiations in line 
                                                 
137 KORUS provided 4 years from filing. 
138 Biologics are drugs made from living organisms. 
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with U.S. negotiating objectives. 139 Other countries have had a range of exclusivity periods, from 
no period of exclusivity (Brunei) to five years (Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and 
Vietnam) to eight years (Japan and Canada). Chile, Mexico, and Peru do not differentiate between 
data exclusivity for biologics and small-molecule pharmaceuticals, but have 5-year periods for 
the latter.140 TPP provides either eight years of data exclusivity, or five years coupled with “other 
measures” and “recognizing that market circumstances also contribute to effective market 
protection” to “deliver a comparable outcome in the market.” Some Members of Congress have 
objected to this shortened period of exclusivity, and may seek side letters or other measures to 
clarify how this provision will be implemented.141 Australia and New Zealand have indicated that 
they would not have to make changes to their laws to be compliant with this language.142 The TPP 
is the first FTA specifically to include protections for biologics as an obligation. 
Patent Linkage. Under this practice, a national regulatory authority (e.g., U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration) cannot grant marketing approval to a generic version of a drug without the 
permission of the patent holder. If marketing approval is sought for a generic prior to the 
expiration of a patent, this patent could delay the access of generic medicines. Previous U.S. 
FTAs, such as KORUS, mandated the notification of the patent holder and obligated the 
marketing authority to prevent a generic manufacturer from seeking market approval without the 
rights holder’s consent. TPP continues the notification requirement, but provides more flexibility 
on the notification system and the procedures (e.g., judicial or administrative proceedings, and 
remedies, such as preliminary injunctions) for a patent holder to assert his rights, as well as for a 
party to challenge the patent’s validity. While the May 10 agreement required this flexibility only 
for developing countries, TPP extends it to all countries. U.S. law does not mandate patent 
linkage for biologics, and this may have been a motivating factor for flexibility concerning patent 
linkage in the TPP.  
Copyright and Related Rights 
Copyrights protect artistic and literary works, such as books, music, and movies. The TPP 
copyright section, broadly speaking, includes copyright protections similar to those in KORUS 
for literary and artistic works, performances, and phonograms (collectively referred to here as 
“creative works” and distinguished as needed), and some new features, such as for “fair use” and 
enforcement.  
International Agreements. TPP, like KORUS, requires each party to ratify or accede to several 
international agreements by the TPP’s entry into force. These include the 1996 WIPO “Internet 
Treaties,” which set forth international norms regarding copyright protection in the digital 
environment.143 To date, the WIPO Internet Treaties are in force for nine TPP countries, most 
                                                 
139 For more information on biologics, see CRS Report R44032, Patents and Regulatory Exclusivities: Issues in 
Pharmaceutical Innovation and Competition, by John R. Thomas; and CRS Report R44173, Follow-On Biologics: 
Intellectual Property Issues, by John R. Thomas.  
140 “Trade Talks Stumble Over Biologics Data Exclusivity,” Regulatory Focus, February 11, 2015, 
http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2015/02/11/21309/Trade-Talks-Stumble-over-Biologics-Data-
Exclusivity/#sthash.QopagH5c.dpuf. 
141 “White House Must Fix Biologics to Move TPP, Hatch Says,” International Trade Reporter, April 7, 2016. 
Meanwhile, the Administration in its 2017 budget request maintains its preference for a 7-year exclusivity period in 
calculating budget costs. 
142 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Outcomes: Biologics,” fact sheet, 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/outcomes-documents/Pages/outcomes-biologics.aspx. 
143 The WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty are known as the WIPO “Internet 
Treaties.”  
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recently Canada in 2014, although full implementation of the treaties remains a U.S. concern for 
some countries. Brunei, New Zealand, and Vietnam have yet to ratify or accede to these 
agreements.  
Length of Protection. TPP, like KORUS, increases copyright terms to life plus 70 years, or 70 
years from publication for most works. This is higher than the TRIPS Agreement baseline (life 
plus 50 years). TPP includes phase-in periods for countries currently providing life plus 50 years 
of protection, which include Brunei, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam.144 
Exclusive Rights. TPP carries forward KORUS’ core copyright protections. Each party must 
provide right holders the exclusive right to authorize or prohibit the reproduction, 
communication, and distribution of their works. 
Limitations, Exceptions, and “Fair Use.” TPP, like KORUS, requires each party to confine 
limitations or exceptions to copyrights subject to certain conditions. New in TPP is a provision 
that parties “shall endeavor to achieve an appropriate balance” between users and rights holders 
in their copyright systems, including digitally, through exceptions for legitimate purposes, such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research—known as “fair use” in 
the United States.  
Technological Protection Measures (TPMs). TPMs are measures such as encryption to limit 
unauthorized reproduction, transmission, and use of products. TPP, like KORUS, requires civil, 
administrative, and criminal penalties for circumventing TPMs or selling devices and services for 
breaking TPMs, subject to certain exceptions for noninfringing uses. While KORUS appears to 
confine exceptions and limitations to specified measures, TPP appears to set out broader 
parameters for providing exceptions and limitations regarding circumventing TPMs. According to 
USTR, “TPP’s anti-circumvention of [TPMs] provisions do not preclude new exceptions, like 
cellphone unlocking, while still protecting new online services that engage in legitimate digital 
trade.”145  
Enforcement. The IP chapter’s enforcement section includes a number of copyright-related 
provisions. New provisions in TPP compared to KORUS include extending copyright 
enforcement commitments to the digital environment and requiring criminal penalties and 
procedures for camcording in movie theaters. Similar to KORUS is a TPP provision requiring 
criminalization of the theft of encrypted satellite and cable signals. 
Collective Management Societies. TPP includes a new provision that recognizes the importance 
of collective management societies146 for copyrights in collecting and distributing royalties based 
on “fair, efficient, transparency and accountable” practices.” 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). ISPs generally are defined as providers of online services for 
transmitting, routing, or providing connections for digital online communications. Key provisions 
related to ISPs include:  
 ISP Liability. TPP requires parties to establish or maintain a legal framework and 
“safe harbors” to allow legitimate ISPs to develop their business while also 
providing effective enforcement procedures against digital copyright 
infringement. These include legal incentives for ISPs to cooperate with copyright 
                                                 
144 In 2015, Canada extended copyright protection to 70 years to rights of performers (singers and musicians) and 
makers of sound recordings (record companies). 
145 USTR, TPP—“Promoting Digital Trade,” https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Promoting-Digital-Trade-Fact-
Sheet.pdf. 
146 for example, the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), or Broadcast Music Inc. 
(BMI). 
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owners to deter unauthorized storage and transmission of copyrighted materials, 
as well as limitations in law that preclude monetary relief against ISPs for 
copyright infringement that, generally speaking, the ISPs do not control but that 
takes place through their systems or networks. KORUS also contains provisions 
on liability for service providers and limitations.  
 Notice and Takedown. TPP requires parties to adopt “notice and takedown” 
provisions to address ISP liability, i.e., a requirement for the ISP to remove or 
disable access to infringing materials on their networks or systems when they 
receive notice or become aware of the infringement and a liability exemption for 
an ISP that has taken proper action. It also contains safeguards to protect against 
abuse of notice and takedown systems. Some find TPP’s “notice and takedown” 
approach similar to that in the U.S. law while others have questioned its 
consistency. TPP allows certain existing alternative systems for specific 
countries, such as Canada’s “notice and notice” system.  
Trademarks 
Trademarks protect distinctive commercial names, marks, and symbols. TPP includes provisions 
on trademark protection and enforcement. Key features are discussed below.  
Term of Protection. Under TPP, like KORUS, the term of protection for the initial registration of 
a trademark and each renewal is no less than 10 years.  
Scope of Protection. TPP includes several provisions regarding the scope of trademark 
protection: 
 Sound and Scent Marks. TPP, like KORUS, extends trademark protections to 
sounds (stating that marks do not have to be “visually perceptible” in order to be 
registered). Unlike KORUS, TPP does not extend trademark protections to 
scents, instead requiring “best efforts” to do so. Some stakeholders may value the 
“best efforts” language as a positive development, but would prefer mandatory 
protection for scents.  
 Certification and Collection Marks. TPP, like KORUS, extends trademark 
protections to “certification marks” (e.g., such as the Underwriters’ Laboratory or 
Good Housekeeping Seal) New in TPP is protection for “collective marks,” 
which is not in KORUS. Certification marks are usually given for “compliance 
with defined standards,” while collective marks are usually defined as “signs 
which distinguish the geographical origin, material, mode of manufacture or 
other common characteristics of goods or services of different enterprises using 
the collective mark.”147  
 Well-known Trademarks. TPP, like KORUS, extends protection for “well-known 
marks” to dissimilar goods and services, whether or not registered, so long as the 
use of the mark would indicate a connection between the goods or services and 
the owner of the well-known mark and the trademark owner’s interests are likely 
to be damaged by the use. TPP, similar to KORUS, require “appropriate 
measures” to refuse applications or cancel registrations and prohibit using 
                                                 
147 For more information on these marks, see WIPO, “Certification Marks,” 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/collective_marks/certification_marks.htm; and WIPO, “Collective Marks,” 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/collective_marks/collective_marks.htm. 
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trademarks that are identical or similar to well-known trademarks for identical or 
similar goods or services if doing so is likely to cause confusion with the prior 
well-known trademark. 
 GI Protection. Geographical indications (GIs) protect distinctive products from a 
certain region, applying primarily to agricultural products (e.g., feta cheese, 
Parma ham).TPP, like KORUS, requires geographical indications (GIs) to be 
eligible for protection as trademarks. This provision may be viewed as consistent 
with the U.S. approach which affords GIs protection through the trademark 
system. (See Agriculture, above, for more information.) 
Exceptions. TPP, like KORUS, allows parties to provide limited exceptions to trademark rights, 
such as “fair use of descriptive terms,” subject to certain conditions. 
Trademark System. TPP, like KORUS, includes provisions to enhance efficiency and 
transparency in parties’ trademark systems, such as requiring a system for examining and 
registering trademarks, the ability to challenge a refusal of a mark, and an electronic system for 
application and maintenance of trademarks. 
TPP expands on KORUS to also prohibit parties from requiring that a mark be recorded as a 
condition for a trademark owner to be able to pursue certain legal proceedings relating to the 
acquisition, maintenance, or enforcement of trademarks. The removal of this administrative 
requirement is intended to enable easier protection and enforcement of trademarks.  
Domain Names. Similar to KORUS, TPP requires each party to have a system for managing its 
country-code top level domains (ccTLDs) and to make available online public access to a 
database of contact information for domain-name registrants. Going beyond KORUS, TPP 
requires parties to make available appropriate remedies in which a person registers or holds, with 
“bad faith intent to profit,” a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark. 
This provision is intended to protect against what is often referred to as “cybersquatting.”  
Trade Secrets  
Trade secrets are confidential business information that is commercially valuable because it is 
secret, including formulas, manufacturing techniques, and customer lists. TPP is the first FTA to 
require criminal procedures and penalties for trade secret theft, including through cyber means, 
and including such theft by State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). While some stakeholders view these 
new commitments on trade secrets as a good first step and a good precedent, others express 
concern that the provisions lack clarity and do not go far enough. 
Industrial Designs 
Industrial designs constitute the ornamental or aesthetic aspects of a product. The section on 
industrial designs is a new provision in TPP. It adds protections beyond the TRIPS Agreement for 
designs embodied in a part of an article, or a part of an article “in the context of the article as a 
whole.” TPP also contains hortatory language on parties improving their system of design 
registration. 
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Investment148 
Background 
The United States, a major source of and 
destination for foreign direct investment 
(FDI), negotiates investment rules in its trade 
agreements to reduce restrictions on 
investment, protect investors, and advance 
other U.S. interests. The TPA-2015 includes a 
principal U.S. trade negotiating objective to 
reduce or eliminate discriminatory barriers to 
foreign investment while ensuring that, in the 
United States, foreign investors are not 
accorded “greater substantive rights” than 
domestic investors. The U.S. Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT) also forms the basis 
of U.S. investment negotiations and contains 
“core” protections for investors (see text box). 
In 2014, TPP countries represented more than 
20% of U.S. global FDI (stock and flow), and 
TPP would cover more FDI than any U.S. FTA 
(save the potential T-TIP). The United States 
has bilateral FTAs in force with six TPP 
countries, all with investment obligations.149 
Still, U.S. investors express concern about 
investment barriers in the TPP region, 
including restrictions on investing in certain 
sectors, discriminatory treatment, and local 
content requirements. 
Debate and Stakeholder Views 
Investment negotiations reportedly were among the most difficult in TPP. One issue is the 
relationship between protecting investors and TPP countries’ national sovereignty. Supporters 
argue that investor protections are central to removing investment barriers and protecting 
investors from discriminatory treatment. Supporters also argue that U.S. investment agreements 
do not prevent governments from regulating in the public interest in a nondiscriminatory manner, 
and that ISDS remedies are limited to monetary penalties and cannot require governments to 
change their laws or regulations. Critics counter that companies use ISDS to restrict governments’ 
ability to regulate in the public interest (such as for environmental or health reasons), leading to 
“regulatory chilling” even if an ISDS outcome is not in a company’s favor. The United States, to 
date, has never lost a claim brought against it under ISDS in a U.S. investment agreement. Some 
                                                 
148 Written by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Ian F. Fergusson. See CRS Report R44015, International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs): Frequently Asked Questions, coordinated by Martin A. Weiss; and CRS In Focus IF10052, U.S. 
International Investment Agreements (IIAs), by Martin A. Weiss and Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.  
149 The investment chapter of the U.S. FTA with Australia, however, does not contain investor-state dispute settlement. 
Protections Common to TPP and U.S. 
Investment Agreements  
Market access for investments.  
Nondiscriminatory treatment of foreign investors 
and investments compared to domestic investors and 
investments (national treatment) and to those of another 
country (most-favored-nation treatment). 
Minimum standard of treatment (MST) in 
accordance with customary international law, including 
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security. 
Prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for 
expropriation, both direct and indirect, recognizing that, 
except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory 
regulation is not an indirect expropriation. 
Timely transfer of funds into and out of the host 
country without delay using a market rate of exchange. 
Limits on performance requirements that, for 
example, condition approval of an investment on using 
local content.  
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) for 
binding international arbitration of private investors’ 
claims against host country governments for violation of 
protections in Investment Chapter, along with 
requirements for transparency of ISDS proceedings. 
Exceptions are included, TPP-wide, for essential 
security interests and prudential reasons, among others.  
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opponents express concern that ISDS in TPP could open the United States to more litigation 
because of the presence in the United States of affiliates of companies from TPP countries like 
Japan. An ISDS claim brought in 2011 by a Philip Morris subsidiary against Australia under the 
Australia-Hong Kong BIT challenging its plain packaging requirement for tobacco as an 
uncompensated expropriation and a violation of minimum standard of treatment (MST) 
obligations heightened the TPP debate. In December 2015, a tribunal ruled that it lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the claim.150 Separately, TransCanada’s notice in January 2016 of its 
intent to challenge the Obama Administration’s Keystone XL pipeline decision under NAFTA 
Chapter 11’s ISDS mechanism may further complicate the debate.151  
Another issue is whether investment rules treat U.S. and foreign investors equally. Supporters 
stress that ISDS and other protections are reciprocal (i.e., a U.S. investor could use ISDS to 
resolve a dispute over its investment in a TPP country) and modeled after U.S. law, and, thus, do 
not afford foreign investors any greater substantive rights than U.S. investors domestically. Critics 
argue that the use of ISDS implies greater procedural rights by providing foreign investors in the 
United States with an additional choice of venue.  
The fairness and transparency of ISDS procedures have also been a focal point. In general, under 
U.S. investment agreements, the ISDS tribunal is to be composed of three arbitrators—one 
appointed by the investor claimant, one by the party, and one by agreement of the disputing sides. 
Most cases are conducted under rules of the World Bank-affiliated International Centre for 
Settlement for Investment Disputes (ICSID), or under comparable rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Both sets of rules include procedures for 
disqualifying arbitrators for bias.152 The actual record on ISDS also suggests that tribunal 
outcomes favor states more often than investors.153 Critics nevertheless express concern about 
bias, noting that lawyers can rotate between acting as arbitrators in one case and representing 
investors in other cases. While transparency in ISDS proceedings has been a common part of U.S. 
investment agreements, some stakeholders argue that the proceedings are not transparent enough. 
Limited opportunity for third-parties to express their views in ISDS proceedings also has been an 
issue.  
Also debated is the creation of an appellate mechanism to review ISDS outcomes; such a 
mechanism is a TPA negotiating objective, but is not included in the TPP. Some argue that this 
kind of review mechanism could bring some coherence to inconsistent tribunal decisions, 
                                                 
150 Australian Government, Attorney-General’s Department, “Tobacco Plain Packaging—Investor-State Arbitration,” 
https://www.ag.gov.au/tobaccoplainpackaging; and Philip Morris International, “Philip Morris Asia Limited Comments 
on Tribunal’s Decision to Decline Jurisdiction in Arbitration Against Commonwealth of Australia over Plain 
Packaging,” December 17, 2015, http://investors.pmi.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=146476&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=2123843.  
151 TransCanada, “Trans-Canada Commences Legal Action Following Keystone XL Denial,” press release, January 6, 
2016, http://www.transcanada.com/announcements-article.html?id=2014960. 
152 CRS Report R43988, Issues in International Trade: A Legal Overview of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, by 
Brandon J. Murrill and Daniel T. Shedd.  
153 Based on its available data, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that, at 
the end of 2014, the overall (cumulative) number of concluded ISDS cases reached 356, of which about 37% were 
decided in favor of the state (all claims dismissed either on jurisdictional grounds or on the merits), 25% were decided 
in favor of the investor (monetary compensation awarded), 28% were settled, 8% were discontinued, and 2% where a 
treaty breach was found but no monetary compensation was awarded to the investor. See UNCTAD, Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2014, IIA Issues Note No. 2, May 2015, p. 5, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/UNCTAD_WEB_DIAE_PCB_2015_%202%20IIA%20ISS
UES%20NOTES%2013MAY%20.pdf.  
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resulting in greater certainty about obligations under investment agreements, while others argue 
that it would lead to additional costs and delays in resolving disputes.  
Other ISDS reforms advanced may affect consideration of TPP. For example, in the T-TIP 
negotiations, the EU submitted a proposal for a new Investment Court System to replace ISDS; 
the proposal includes an appellate mechanism.154 U.S. government officials have questioned the 
proposal, favoring ISDS to protect investors while balancing other public policy interests. Some 
businesses argue that it would erode investor protections, while some civil society groups say it 
does not resolve their concerns. The United States may closely monitor how the EU pursues its 
new proposal in its other trade negotiations, including with TPP partners. For example, the EU-
Vietnam trade agreement includes the main provisions of the EU’s proposal,155 and the EU and 
Canada have agreed to include the proposal’s main elements in the finalized text of their 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA).156  
Examples of Investment Barriers in TPP Countries 
Examples of investment barriers identified by USTR in selected TPP countries include:  
 Japan: Uneven implementation of regulatory reforms to attract FDI, and attitudes toward foreign investors.  
 Malaysia: Restrictions—such as foreign equity limits and requirements to enter into joint ventures with 
local firms—in sectors such as retail, telecommunications, financial services, professional services, oil and 
gas, and mining. 
 Mexico: In the hydrocarbon sector (opened up to greater private investment by 2013 energy reform 
legislation), local content requirements and restrictions on using international arbitration to resolve certain 
investor-state disputes.  
 Peru: Limits on number of foreign employees in local companies.  
 Vietnam: Continued land use restrictions for foreigners.  
Source: USTR, 2016 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, March 2016.  
Key Provisions 
The investment chapter largely reflects the 2012 Model BIT’s core investor protections and 
exceptions (see text box above). It also notes that such obligations apply to SOEs. Like other 
U.S. FTAs, TPP does not have an appellate mechanism. TPP also contains some new provisions 
that go somewhat beyond KORUS and the model BIT and significantly beyond WTO 
agreements, which address investment issues in a limited manner. Certain new provisions are 
highlighted below. 
Minimum Standard of Treatment (MST). TPP requires parties to provide MST to investments 
in accordance with applicable customary international law. New in TPP is clarification that a 
party’s action (or inaction) that may be inconsistent with investor expectations is not, on its own, 
a breach of the MST, even if loss or damage to the investment follows. Some stakeholders oppose 
the change as weakening investor protections; they view it as departing from the longstanding 
approach of linking the MST obligation with an investor’s reasonable, investment-backed 
expectations. Others assert that TPP should clarify that investor expectations remain a criteria that 
                                                 
154 See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf. 
155 European Commission, “EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement Now Available Online,” press release, February 1, 
2016. 
156 European Commission, “CETA: EU and Canada Agree on New Approach on Investment in Trade Agreements,” 
press release, February 29, 2016. 
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may be considered.157 Others express concern that the MST obligation is ambiguous and could be 
used to expand investor protections unduly.158 
Performance Requirements. Like prior approaches, TPP prohibits parties from imposing 
specific “performance requirements” in connection with an investment or related to the receipt of 
an advantage in connection with it. These include prohibitions on performance requirements such 
as to export a given level or percentage of goods, achieve a given level or percentage of domestic 
content, or transfer a particular technology. New features of TPP compared to KORUS include 
prohibitions on performance requirements related to the purchase, use, or according of a 
preference to a technology of the party (or of a person of the party), and related to certain 
royalties and license contracts. In addition to addressing concerns in TPP markets, these new 
features may be geared toward addressing “indigenous innovation” measures such as in China. 
Denial of Benefits. TPP’s denial of benefits article, among other things, permits a party to deny 
the investment chapter’s benefits to an investor that is an enterprise of another party (and to the 
investments of that investor) if that enterprise does not have “substantial business activities” in 
the territory of any party other than the party denying benefits, provided that the enterprise is 
owned or controlled by a person of a nonparty or the denying party. According to USTR, the 
denial of benefits article allows a party to deny benefits to “shell companies.”159 The article 
presumably is intended to address some stakeholders’ concerns for instance, regarding the ISDS 
claim filed by Philip Morris (PM) under the Australia-Hong Kong BIT to challenge Australia’s 
plain packaging requirement for tobacco, though PM has stated that its restructuring of PM 
Australia’s ownership to PM Asia in Hong Kong was for legitimate business reasons. KORUS 
also contains a denial of benefits article, but with some variation. 
Government’s Right to Regulate. Like KORUS, TPP contains a provision stating that, except in 
rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory action by a party to protect legitimate public 
welfare objectives (e.g., in public health, safety, and the environment) do not constitute indirect 
expropriation. Debate exists about what exactly are “rare circumstances.” New in TPP is a 
statement that nothing in the Investment Chapter “shall be construed as preventing a government 
from regulating in a manner sensitive to “health, environmental, and other regulatory objectives,” 
as long as the action taken is otherwise consistent with the chapter. In contrast, KORUS limited 
the affirmation of a government’s right to regulate due to “environmental concerns.” USTR 
contends that the “right to regulate” provision is a stronger safeguard that addresses prior ISDS 
criticism.160 Skeptics argue that the new provision does not adequately protect a government’s 
right to regulate because the measures a government may take must be “otherwise consistent” 
with an Investment Chapter which, from their perspective, has vague provisions (such as for 
minimum standard of treatment) that can be interpreted in an overly broad manner.161 
ISDS Proceedings. TPP, like most other U.S. FTAs, includes ISDS. It also contains new 
provisions on ISDS proceedings, including a:  
                                                 
157 For example, see Letter from Committee of Chairs, Industry Trade Advisory Committee (ITAC) to Penny Pritzker, 
Secretary of Commerce, and Michael Froman, U.S. Trade Representative, November 20, 2015. 
158 For example, see testimony of Matthew C. Porterfield, “The Investment Chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” 
for House Ways & Means Committee Democrats’ “Trading Views: Real Debate on Key Issues in TPP” Hearing on 
Investment, December 2, 2015. 
159 USTR, TPP Investment Chapter Summary, p. 3, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-
Investment.pdf. 
160 USTR, “TPP: Upgrading & Improving Investor-State Dispute Settlement,” https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-
Upgrading-and-Improving-Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Fact-Sheet.pdf. 
161 For example, see Porterfield testimony. 
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 requirement that appointments of ISDS arbitrators take into account candidates’ 
expertise or relevant experience with respect to the relevant governing law; 
 requirement for parties to establish a code of conduct for arbitrators to provide 
additional guidance on issues of arbitrator independence, impartiality, and 
conflict of interest; 
 provision allowing tribunals to accept and consider amicus curiae (third-party) 
submissions regarding a matter of fact or law within the scope of the dispute that 
may assist the tribunal in evaluating submissions and arguments of the disputing 
parties;162  
 expanded rules for dismissing “frivolous claims;” and 
 clarification that a claimant has the burden of proving all elements of a claim. 
Supporters assert that these provisions appropriately balance investor protections and safeguards 
to protect the public interest.163 Some, including in the business community, argue that these new 
provisions weaken investor protections and may delay what can already be a lengthy arbitration 
process, although other civil society groups argue that the safeguards do not go far enough in 
protecting the public interest.164 While some support the clarifying language as reaffirming 
existing obligations, others express concern that it may be interpreted to change substantive 
obligations. For example, the clarifying statement on burden of proof potentially could be 
interpreted to require a different burden of proof for the investor.165  
Tobacco “Carve-out” from ISDS. TPP gives parties the option to deny ISDS to investors’ 
claims challenging tobacco control measures against manufactured products, for example, 
relating to the labeling or packaging of tobacco products. Some stakeholders support the carve-
out as a way to protect public health interests and to protect tobacco control measures obligated 
by the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control from 
challenge.166 Others question its need because the investment chapter elsewhere affirms a party’s 
right to regulate to protect legitimate welfare objectives and are concerned about the possible 
precedent it may set for other products or sectors. Still others, particularly in the tobacco industry, 
oppose the carve-out as discriminatory against a legally-traded product.167  
Breach of “Investment Agreement” and ISDS. In addition to permitting an investor to seek 
ISDS for alleged violations of TPP’s core investor protections, TPP also allows an investor to 
pursue ISDS for a breach of an “investment agreement” (commonly called a “breach of contract”) 
between an investor and a government.168 At the same time, TPP imposes limits on the use of 
                                                 
162 KORUS had this provision, but gave the tribunal greater deference as to whether to accept them. 
163 For discussion of the view that TPP’s ISDS improves upon previous agreements, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer, 
“Investor-State Dispute Settlement,” in Peterson Institute for International Economics, Assessing the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, Volume 1: Market Access and Sectoral Issues, PIIE Briefing 16-1, February 2016.  
164 Inside U.S. Trade, USTR Claims Variety of Upgrades to ISDS in TPP, But Details Still Unclear, October 14, 2015.  
165 See, for instance, testimony of Theodore R. Posner, for House Ways and Means Committee Democrats, “Trading 
Views: Real Debates on Key Issues in TPP - Investment Chapter,” December 2, 2015.  
166 The FCTC entered into force on February 27, 2005. The United States is one of the 168 signatories, but has not 
ratified it. 
167 For example, see “Tobacco Opponents, Advocates Fight for USTR’s Favor on TPP Carveout,” Inside U.S. Trade, 
August 7, 2015, which discusses various letters sent by Members of Congress to USTR on the issue of the tobacco 
carveout from TPP. See also Thomas J. Bollyky, “The War on Tobacco Makes it into the TPP Free Trade Deal,” 
Newsweek, February 13, 2016, http://www.newsweek.com/war-tobacco-makes-it-tpp-free-trade-deal-426206.  
168 Drawing from TPP’s “investment agreement” definition (Art 9.1), an example of an investment agreement could be 
(continued...) 
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ISDS to challenge investment agreement breaches, including, broadly speaking, allowing its use 
only if the investment agreement was signed after TPP’s entry into force and the underlying 
agreement does not include an international arbitration clause. Mexico, Peru, and Canada include 
additional limitations on the use of ISDS for breaches of investment agreements. For instance, 
Mexico exempts from ISDS breaches of investment agreements if doing so would be inconsistent 
with certain sector-specific Mexican laws, such as its hydrocarbon sector.169  
Financial Services. The Financial Services Chapter provides access to ISDS to resolve certain 
disputes concerning covered financial services investments. In contrast to prior U.S. FTAs, it 
allows investors to challenge certain actions by parties for alleged breaches of the MST 
obligation. Like some other U.S. investment agreements, TPP has a “prudential exception” 
allowing a party to employ measures for prudential reasons or to ensure the financial system’s 
integrity and stability. The prudential exception in TPP appears to be broader than KORUS 
because it may be invoked with respect to obligations under the entire agreement except for those 
in goods and goods-related chapters, whereas the prudential exception in KORUS appears to be 
restricted to a few select chapters of that agreement (financial services, investment, 
telecommunications, cross-border trade in services concerning the supply of financial services by 
an investment). TPP also includes a state-to-state arbitration mechanism constituted under its 
general dispute settlement provisions that may be used when a party invokes a prudential 
exception as a defense to an ISDS claim and absent a joint determination by both parties that the 
regulation is exempt. KORUS also includes a state-to-state arbitration mechanism when a 
prudential exception is invoked as a defense, but it does not appear to be constituted under 
KORUS’s general dispute settlement provisions. 
Exceptions. As with past FTAs, the TPP Investment Chapter has a number of country-specific 
exemptions. Some of these highlighted by U.S. business groups, include 
 Foreign Investment Reviews. Under TPP, Australia, Canada, Mexico, and New 
Zealand are exempt from ISDS claims stemming from decisions by these 
countries under specified laws to reject certain types of investment. 
 Claims Already Filed in Court or Administrative Tribunal. TPP exempts Chile, 
Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam from ISDS claims that investors have already 
submitted before a court or administrative tribunal in those countries.  
These exemptions illustrate the multiple interests with which investor protections may intersect. 
For example, in terms of claims exemptions, on the one hand, governments may have an interest 
in reducing duplicative actions. On the other hand, some business groups are concerned that such 
a prohibition may cause some investors (particularly small investors with limited experience) to 
lose access to ISDS by raising such issues in local proceedings.  
Nonconforming Measures (NCMs). Parties agreed to apply TPP’s core investor protections on a 
“negative-list basis” to all sectors and activities except where they specifically took an exception 
(known as an NCM). Annex I lists each party’s current measures that would otherwise violate the 
                                                                
(...continued) 
a written agreement concluded and signed after TPP’s entry into force between the central government authority of one 
TPP party with the investor of another TPP party that is binding, on which the investor relies to establish or acquire an 
investment, and that grants right related to: natural resources that the authority controls, supplying services, or 
infrastructure projects.  
169 For further discussion, see Letter from Committee of Chairs, Industry Trade Advisory Committee (ITAC) to Penny 
Pritzker, Secretary of Commerce, and Michael Froman, U.S. Trade Representative, November 20, 2015. For details on 
Mexico, see USTR, National Trade Estimate (NTE) Report, March 2016, p. 305. 
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Investment Chapter, but which a party has deemed necessary to maintain. For these, the party 
agreed to a “standstill,” (to not to make the measure more restrictive in the future); and also 
agreed to a “ratchet” (to use any future liberalization of a measure as the new benchmark for the 
standstill). TPP includes certain limits (exceptions) on the ratchet mechanism for Vietnam for the 
first three years after TPP’s entry into force under specified conditions. In addition, New Zealand 
raised the monetary threshold for screening investments from TPP countries and the threshold 
will increase if New Zealand negotiates higher thresholds in other agreements.170  
Annex II contains measures and policies on which a party retains full discretion in the future. 
NCMs vary by party and include restrictions on foreign ownership limitations and operation and 
on branch numbers, asset requirements, and residency or nationality requirements, for specified 
investments. On one hand, NCMs may allow parties the flexibility to undertake obligations in a 
manner sensitive to their needs and interests, while on the other hand, expansive NCMs may limit 
the extent to which TPP liberalizes investment in TPP countries. In Annex III, Malaysia has also 
exempted its “best interest to Malaysia” test for approving foreign investment in financial 
services. 
Labor171 
Background 
One of the more controversial issues of the TPP pertains to the scope and depth of provisions on 
worker rights. Supporters of strong worker rights, such as labor unions and certain 
nongovernment organizations (NGOs), are concerned that failure to promote and implement these 
rights, including protection of the right to organize and bargain collectively, could adversely 
affect wages and working conditions in other countries. This, in turn, could further increase 
competitive pressures on U.S. workers.  
Worker rights provisions in U.S. trade agreements have evolved over time.172 NAFTA included 
labor provisions in a side agreement that required all parties to enforce their own labor laws. The 
side agreement includes a consultation mechanism for addressing labor disputes and a special 
labor dispute settlement procedure. The enforcement mechanism applies mainly to a party’s 
failure to enforce its own labor laws. Under provisions of the 2002 TPA, seven subsequent FTAs 
included a similar provision within the main text of the agreement.  
More recently, internationally recognized labor principles were included in FTAs with Peru, 
Colombia, Panama, and South Korea consistent with the May 10th Agreement (see text box 
above). These four FTAs require parties to adopt and maintain in their statutes and regulations 
core labor principles of the International Labor Organization (ILO) (ILO Declaration). They also 
required countries to enforce their labor laws and not to waive or derogate from those laws to 
attract trade and investment. These provisions are enforceable under the same dispute settlement 
procedures that apply to other provisions of the FTA, and violations are subject to the same 
potential trade sanctions. These provisions are continued in the TPP. 
                                                 
170 NTE Report, p.284. 
171 Written by M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson. 
172 For more information, see CRS Report RS22823, Overview of Labor Enforcement Issues in Free Trade Agreements, 
by Mary Jane Bolle; and CRS In Focus IF10046, Worker Rights Provisions in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), by Mary 
Jane Bolle and Ian F. Fergusson. 
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ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998) 
 the freedom of association;  
 the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;  
 the elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labor;  
 the effective abolition of child labor; and 
 the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
Labor and civil rights groups have raised concerns about the effects of the TPP on workers. Some 
labor leaders contend that the TPP’s labor provisions are weak and that the agreement would 
provide incentives for businesses to move U.S. jobs to countries with poor protections for worker 
rights, such as Brunei, Malaysia, Mexico, and Vietnam.173 Some Members of Congress are 
particularly concerned about Vietnam. In order to comply with TPP labor obligations, Vietnam 
would have to make significant reforms to its labor regime. Some policymakers question whether 
this is possible. Others are concerned about labor conditions in Brunei, Malaysia, and Mexico and 
whether these countries would be able to meet TPP labor obligations.174 Proponents of the 
agreement contend that the TPP would help these countries build their capacity to support labor 
protections, enhance economic growth, and support thousands of high-paying U.S. jobs, 
particularly in the high tech and electronics sectors.175 The Obama Administration asserts that the 
TPP includes the strongest labor standards of any existing U.S. FTA and that it would allow the 
United States to “write the rules of the road in the 21st century,” especially in the Asia-Pacific 
region.176 
Key Provisions 
TPP labor provisions are in the main text of the agreement and subject to the same dispute 
settlement mechanism, including potential trade “sanctions,” that applies to other chapters of the 
TPP. TPP parties agreed:  
 to adopt and maintain laws and practices consistent with the ILO Declaration (see 
box above); 
 to adopt and maintain laws and practices governing acceptable conditions of 
work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety 
and health; 
 not to waive or derogate from labor laws and practices mentioned above in a 
manner affecting trade or investment; and 
 not to fail to effectively enforce their labor laws through a sustained or recurring 
course of action or action in a manner affecting trade or investment. 
                                                 
173 Richard Trumka, "TPP: A New Low," The Hill, February 2, 2016. 
174 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, TPP Issue Analysis: Worker Rights, 114th Cong., February 
1, 2016. 
175 Office of the United States Trade Representative, "U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman Promotes Trans-
Pacific Partnership at Consumer Electronics Show," press release, January 2016, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/january/us-trade-representative-michael. 
176 The White House, Office of the press Secretary, "Statement by the President on the Signing of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership," press release, February 3, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/03/statement-
president-signing-trans-pacific-partnership. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for Congress 
 
Congressional Research Service 62 
For the first time in a U.S. FTA, the parties also agreed to protect against degradation of 
fundamental worker rights or working conditions in export processing zones. If a party believes 
that another TPP country is not meeting its labor commitments, the agreement establishes a 
means for the public to raise concerns with TPP governments. The agreement also provides for 
transparency and access to fair and equitable administrative and judicial proceedings, as well as 
for a mechanism for cooperation and coordination on labor issues, including opportunities for 
stakeholder input in identifying areas of cooperation. 
In addition, and new to the TPP, the United States negotiated separate labor consistency 
agreements with Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei, countries of particular concern for the United 
States in terms of labor protections. The consistency plans commit Vietnam, Malaysia, and 
Brunei to undertake specific legal reforms and implement other measures related to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, forced labor, child labor, employment discrimination, 
acceptable conditions of work, institutional reforms and capacity building, transparency and 
sharing of information, and a review mechanism for implementation of the plan. Most of the 
commitments must take place before the TPP can enter into force with these countries.  
All three plans are subject to labor consultations under the Labor Chapter and to the dispute 
settlement provisions of the TPP agreement. A previous labor consistency plan was negotiated 
with Colombia in conjunction with the U.S.-Colombia FTA, but it was not part of the FTA itself, 
nor subject to the dispute settlement provisions of that agreement. In addition, the United States 
can suspend additional tariff reductions on Vietnamese products five years after entry-into-force 
on a U.S. determination that Vietnam has not implemented the plan’s provision on the 
establishment of grassroots labor unions. 
Environment 
Background 
Like the chapter on worker rights, the scope and depth of the TPP’s environmental provisions are 
the subject of ongoing debate.177 Supporters of environmental provisions seek to ensure minimum 
standards of environmental protection in partner countries to stem a perceived “race to the 
bottom,” in which countries reduce protection or do not enforce existing standards to attract trade 
or investment. Supporters of strong environmental provisions in FTAs also note that while many 
of the provisions in the environmental chapter are covered by multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs), those agreements do not have effective enforcement mechanisms, whereas 
FTAs contain a dispute settlement mechanism that could result in penalties (i.e., withdrawal of 
trade concessions). 
Other stakeholders, however, contend that environmental provisions are not germane to, and 
should not be included in FTAs. Several countries in the TPP negotiations reportedly sought 
weaker disciplines, and sought to remove those commitments from being subject to dispute 
settlement.178 Others claim that the enforcement of environmental provisions in existing FTAs is 
lacking. They point to continued disputes over illegal logging in Peru, despite commitments to 
protect against such acts in the U.S.-Peru FTA.  
                                                 
177 CRS In Focus IF10166, Environmental Provisions in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), by Richard K. Lattanzio and 
Ian F. Fergusson.  
178 In the end, the U.S. position supporting recourse to dispute settlement prevailed. 
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As with the U.S. position on worker rights, environmental provisions in U.S. FTAs have evolved 
over time. Environmental provisions were originally placed in side-letters in the NAFTA 
agreement containing “enforce your own laws” provisions and a special consultation mechanism 
and dispute settlement procedure. Under TPA provisions of the 2002 Trade Act, seven subsequent 
FTAs included a similar enforce your own laws provision within the main text of the agreement. 
The May 10th Agreement provisions (see text box in appendix) added an affirmative obligation 
for FTA partner countries to adhere to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and 
allowed for environmental disputes under the FTAs to access the full dispute settlement 
provisions of the agreements. These provisions generally were followed in the TPA-2015. The 
TPP environmental chapter reflects some aspects of recent U.S. FTAs, differs in some aspects, 
and addresses additional topics not previously considered.  
Key Provisions 
The chapter obligates each party: 
 not to fail to effectively enforce its environmental laws through a sustained or 
recurring course of action or inaction to attract trade and investment; 
 not to waive or derogate from such laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the 
protections afforded in those law to encourage trade or investment; and 
 to ensure that its environmental laws and policies provide for and encourage high 
levels of protection, and also strive to improve its levels of environmental 
protection. 
The agreement also: 
 recognizes the sovereign right of each party to establish its own levels of 
domestic environmental protection, its own regulatory priorities, and to adopt or 
modify its priorities accordingly; 
 acknowledges a party’s right to exercise discretion with regard to enforcement 
resources; and 
 provides for the resolution of disputes; a party may seek recourse to the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the agreement, following the exhaustion of 
consultations. 
Recent U.S. FTAs have required the parties to “adopt, maintain, and implement” seven 
enumerated MEAs.179 TPP requires parties to affirm their commitment to implement the 
multilateral environmental agreements to which they are a party. However, TPP only requires the 
“adopt, maintain, and implement” language with regard to CITES (see below), but variously 
addresses protections contained in other MEAs. Parties “shall maintain” measures consistent with 
the Montreal Protocol, which is referenced by footnote. 
To comply with the MARPOL agreement, each party “shall take measures” to prevent the 
protection of the marine environment from ships and maintains statutes in compliance with 
                                                 
179 The seven MEAS are: the Conventional on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES), the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar 
convention), Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CAMLR); International 
Convention on the Regulation of Whaling, Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission. 
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MARPOL, also referenced by footnote. The other MEAs are not referenced, but some provisions 
address the subject matter of those accords. One reason for this difference in treatment of the 
MEAs may be that all TPP parties are not signatories to each of the 7 accords. 
Fisheries and Fishing Subsidies. For the first time in an FTA, the TPP contains measures to 
combat overfishing and unsustainable utilization of fisheries, combats illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing activities, and promotes conservation of marine mammals. 
Negotiations to restrict fishing subsidies occurred as part of the WTO Doha Round, but 
agreement remained elusive. The TPP requires the countries “to seek to operate” a fishing 
management system to prevent overfishing and overcapacity, reduce by-catch of nontarget 
species and juveniles, and promote the recovery of overfished stocks. It also prohibits specific180 
subsidies that negatively affect stocks in an over-fished condition and prohibits subsidies to 
vessels engaged in IUU fishing. Subsidies negatively affecting fish stocks must be brought into 
conformity within three years, although Vietnam may request a two-year extension while it 
completes its stock assessment. TPP parties shall “promote the long term conservation of sharks, 
marine turtles, seabirds, and marine mammals.” While measures concerning sharks “should 
include, as appropriate,” collection of species data, fisheries by-catch mitigation, and finning 
prohibitions, these provisions have not been interpreted as not actually banning shark finning.  
Conservation. As noted above, TPP commits the parties to adopt, maintain, and implement laws 
and regulations to achieve compliance with the CITES treaty. The parties commit to combat the 
illegal take and trade in wild flora and fauna, including to prevent the trade of wild flora and 
fauna in violation of the laws of other countries. While TPP does not implement the Ramsar 
Convention protecting wetlands, it “commits” the parties to take measures to protect “specially 
protected natural areas, for example, wetlands.” The chapter mentions illegal logging in the 
context of “exchanging information and practices” for protecting wild flora and fauna, and 
promoting government capacity for sustainable forest management. 
The parties also recognize the importance of cooperative measures—while not making any 
affirmative commitments—pertaining to trade and biodiversity, invasive alien species, transition 
to a low emissions economy, and the promotion of environmental goods and services. 
                                                 
180 As defined by the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
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E-Commerce, Data Flows, and Digital Trade181 
Background 
The volume of data transmitted across 
borders is growing (Figure 7). With 43.4% of 
the world’s population online today, cross-
border data flows have increased 45 times 
since 2005.182 Digital trade includes not only 
end-products such as movies or video games, 
but also the means or “lifeblood” of the rest 
of the economy, enhancing productivity and 
overall competitiveness of an economy. 
Examples include transmitting information a 
manufacturer needs to manage global value 
chains, communication channels such as 
email and Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP), and financial services used in e-
commerce or electronic trading. 
In 2014, the United States exported $399.7 billion in digitally-deliverable services, and imported 
$240.8 billion, creating a surplus of $158.9 billion. Digitally-delivered services were half of all 
U.S. services imports and 56% of services exports.183 Furthermore, the United States is the largest 
producer of digital content that Internet users consume worldwide. 
Congress established principal negotiating objectives in TPA-2015 on digital trade in goods and 
services, as well as on cross-border data flows. The objectives include equal treatment of 
electronically delivered goods and services, as compared to physical products, protection of 
cross-border data flows, and prevention of data localization regulations, as well as duties on 
electronic transmissions. The Industry Trade Advisory Council on Information and 
Communication Technologies Services and Electronic Commerce (ITAC 8), in its report to 
USTR, endorsed the TPP, finding that the agreement meets the objectives, promotes the economic 
interests of the United States, and provides equity and reciprocity for the sectors represented by 
the ITAC.184 While most industry stakeholders support the digital trade provisions as breaking 
new ground in this emerging area,185 some have raised concerns over certain exceptions, 
particularly the exclusion of financial services from the data localization provisions (see Financial 
                                                 
181 This section written by Rachel Fefer. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10390, TPP: Digital Trade 
Provisions, by Rachel F. Fefer.  
182 James Manyika, et al, Digital globalization: The new era of global flows, February 2016, p. 30, 
http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/digital-globalization-the-new-era-of-
global-flows?cid=other-eml-alt-mgi-mck-oth-1602. 
183 Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration, Digitally Deliverable Services Remain an 
Important Component of U.S. Trade, May 28, 2015, http://www.esa.doc.gov/economic-briefings/digitally-deliverable-
services-remain-important-component-us-trade. 
184 Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Information and Communication Technologies, Services, and Electronic 
Commerce (ITAC 8), Advisory Committee Report to the President, the Congress and the USTR on the TPP Trade 
Agreement, December 3, 2015, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ITAC-8-Information-and-Communication-
Technologies-Services-and-Electronic-Commerce.pdf. 
185 Steve Wilhelm, "Microsoft: TPP trade pact puts 'line in the sand' against digital protectionism," Puget Sound 
Business Journal, November 9, 2015. 
Figure 7. Growth in Global Data Flows 
 
Source: McKinsey Global Institute, Digital 
Globalization: The New Era of Global Flows, March 2016. 
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Services section).186 Other stakeholder groups have argued that the provisions go too far and may 
limit a government’s flexibility to adopt strict privacy laws.187 
Key Provisions 
The electronic commerce chapter broadly covers all industries but explicitly excludes government 
procurement and financial services, which each have separate chapters. Overall, the chapter aims 
to promote digital trade and the free flow of information, and to ensure an open internet. While 
the majority of the obligations related to digital trade are found in the E-commerce chapter, there 
are relevant provisions in other chapters, including the Financial Services, IPR, Technical Barriers 
to Trade, and Telecommunications. 
Some of the innovations in TPP on digital trade include provisions to:  
 prohibit cross-border data flows restrictions and data localization requirements, 
except for financial services and government procurement; 
 prohibit requirements for source code disclosure or transfer as a condition for 
market access, with exceptions;  
 require parties to have online consumer protection and anti-spam laws, and a 
legal framework on privacy; 
 prohibit requiring technology transfer or access to proprietary information for 
products using cryptography; 
 clarify IPR enforcement rules to provide criminal penalties for trade secret 
cybertheft; 
 encourage cooperation between parties on e-commerce to assist Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs), and on privacy and consumer protection;  
 promote cooperation on cybersecurity; 
 safeguard cross-border electronic card payment services; and 
 cover mobile service providers and promotes cooperation for international 
roaming charges. 
State-Owned Enterprises 
Background 
U.S. government and business stakeholders have raised concerns over competition with 
companies linked to the state through ownership or influence. As a result, they supported new 
specific TPP disciplines to address such competition. According to analysis by the OECD, state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), which traditionally have focused primarily on domestic markets, 
increasingly compete with international private sector actors.188 Governments may provide these 
state-owned or -supported businesses with preferential treatment—such as subsidies, low cost 
credit, preferential access to government procurement, and a different regulatory environment—
compared to private sector competitors, thereby distorting competition and market access. Such 
                                                 
186 ITAC 10, op cit. 
187 See for example, https://www.eff.org/issues/tpp. 
188 Przemyslaw Kowalski et al., State-Owned Enterprises Trade Effects and Policy Implications, OECD, OECD Trade 
Policy Papers No. 147, 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en. 
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advantages may also be directed toward companies not owned but significantly favored or 
supported by a government. In the context of the TPP, the SOE presence in Vietnam, which 
accounted for over 40% of all Vietnamese enterprise pre-tax profits in 2013, has been a particular 
focus, although Malaysia and Singapore also have important SOE sectors.189 In addition, as the 
TPP could become a template for a larger Asia-Pacific FTA or future WTO negotiations, wider 
applicability of these provisions to SOEs in other countries, particularly China, may be 
envisioned. 
In TPA-2015, Congress supported new rules and disciplines on SOEs in U.S. trade agreements as 
a principal negotiating objective. It directs the Administration to eliminate or prevent unfair trade 
advantages by state-owned or state-controlled enterprises and to ensure they act on the basis of 
commercial considerations. 
Reaction to the SOE provisions in TPP is mixed. Most groups argue that these disciplines 
represent a positive first step in establishing international commitments on SOEs and their 
competition with private firms.190 Given the potential impact of these provisions on a range of 
industries, several private sector Industry Trade Advisory Committees (ITAC) generally express 
support for the SOE commitments. Many of these reports, however, also acknowledge that there 
are a number of exceptions to these disciplines (nonconforming measures), including all sub-
federal SOE activity, and they express concern about the effectiveness and enforceability of the 
commitments in practice.191 Other observers are more critical of the provisions, viewing their 
broad exemptions as a negative precedent. These analysts take particular issue with what they 
view as a limited definition of SOEs in the agreement, and argue that TPP negotiators should 
have directly restricted the presence of SOEs in certain sectors rather than attempt to address their 
potential harm to private sector actors.192 
Key Provisions 
Chapter 17 of the TPP includes the most substantive disciplines on SOEs of any U.S. FTA. 
NAFTA and subsequent U.S. FTAs with Australia, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and South Korea have 
minimal disciplines on what they term “state enterprises.” Though the specific details vary among 
these agreements, they are generally limited to two commitments: nondiscriminatory treatment in 
the sale of goods or services by state enterprises, and clarification that other commitments in the 
agreement also apply to such enterprises, whenever the state delegates some type of regulatory or 
administrative authority to the state enterprise. The U.S.-Singapore FTA includes somewhat more 
extensive provisions on SOEs.193 Related multilateral commitments under the WTO include 
                                                 
189 General Statistics Office, Statistical Handbook of Vietnam, 2014, p. 88, 
https://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=515&idmid=5&ItemID=14278. 
190 For example, see Linda M. Dempsey, Pre-Hearing Statement before the USITC Hearing on Investigation No. TPA-
105-001, National Association of Manufacturers, January 8, 2016, p. 9. 
191 For example, see the ITAC 12 report. Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Steel, Advisory Committee Report to 
the President, the Congress and the USTR on the TPP, ITAC-12 Report, December 3, 2015, p. 11, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ITAC-12-Steel.pdf. 
192 Derek Scissors, Grading the Trans-Pacific Partnership on Trade, American Enterprise Institute, December 2015, p. 
6, https://www.aei.org/publication/grading-the-trans-pacific-partnership-on-trade/. 
193 For instance, the agreement states that Singapore’s government must ensure that any government enterprise “acts 
solely in accordance with commercial considerations in its purchase or sale of goods or services” and that Singapore 
must make public a listing of organizations that satisfy the agreement’s definition of a “covered entity,” essentially any 
company organized in Singapore above a certain size and with a sufficient level of government influence. This list is 
also to include the ownership structure of the organization, members of government that serve on the board of directors, 
and total revenue or assets; USTR, United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, May 2003, pp. 133-140, 
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Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), but this provision 
focuses narrowly on state-trading enterprises, entities understood to have some influence on the 
exports and imports of a particular good.  
The provisions in TPP go beyond these existing commitments to address potential commercial 
disadvantages to private sector firms from state-supported foreign competitors receiving 
preferential treatment. Like previous U.S. FTAs, most TPP provisions on SOEs also apply to 
designated monopolies. TPP also includes an agreement to conduct further negotiations on SOEs 
after 5 years with the intent to reduce nonconforming measures, and extend SOE disciplines to 
cover competition in the services sector in a non-TPP market. Key provisions include: 
 SOE Definition. Refers to an enterprise principally engaged in commercial 
activities if the government owns more than 50% of capital share, controls more 
than 50% of voting rights, or selects a majority of board members. 
 Delegated Authority. Would require, like previous U.S. FTAs, that SOEs and 
designated monopolies adhere to all provisions of the agreement when 
governments delegate to them regulatory or administrative authority. 
 Nondiscriminatory Treatment/Commercial Considerations. Would require 
SOEs and designated monopolies of a party to make their purchase and sale 
decisions based on commercial considerations and in a nondiscriminatory 
manner with respect to goods and services bought or sold by other TPP country 
firms.194  
 Noncommercial Assistance/Adverse Effects/Injury. Would prohibit 
noncommercial assistance (i.e., funds, loans, or goods and services at more 
favorable rates than commercially available) provided by or to SOEs, if it 
adversely affects the interests of other TPP parties or causes injury to another 
TPP country’s domestic industry. Domestic supply of services by SOEs would 
generally be excluded from these provisions. 
 Transparency. Would require each TPP country to provide a list of all SOEs 
within six months of entry into force. Also would require countries to respond to 
requests for information regarding ownership, revenue, and management of 
SOEs and noncommercial assistance received. Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam 
are generally exempt from the chapter’s transparency commitments for five 
years, though certain country-specific transparency commitments would apply. 
 Exceptions. Generally excluded from these provisions are: SOEs with revenue 
below a certain threshold that adjusts for price level changes in three year 
intervals (starting at 200 million SDR generally and 500 million SDR for Brunei, 
Malaysia, and Vietnam for 5 years);195 a party’s supply of goods and services for 
its own government functions; sub-central SOEs and designated monopolies for 
nearly all commitments; government actions in economic emergencies; 
                                                                
(...continued) 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset_upload_file708_4036.pdf. 
194 A similar provision has been included in previous FTAs, but in most cases, except the Singapore FTA, focused only 
on SOE sales to covered investments within that party’s territory, excluding cross-border transactions and SOE 
purchases. 
195 SDR (special drawing right) refers to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) international reserve asset. Its value is 
based on the U.S. dollar, euro, yen, and pound sterling, and will be expanded to include the Chinese Renminbi (RMB) 
in October 2016. 
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government procurement; sovereign wealth funds; pension funds; and trade and 
investment financing provided it is not intended to displace commercially 
available financing or offered on terms more favorable than available through the 
market. In addition to these general exclusions there are a number of country-
specific exemptions to some or all of the disciplines. Many of these exclusions 
relate to SOEs owned by sovereign wealth funds, as well as those dealing with 
natural resources, development financing, including housing finance, and 
national broadcasting associations. Most countries have also exempted 
government actions to support indigenous peoples. 
Examples of SOE Nonconforming Measures 
 Canada—would exempt noncommercial assistance to the Canadian Dairy Commission regarding the sales, 
production, and cross-border trade of dairy products; 
 Chile—would retain ability for its national television station to provide preferential treatment to Chilean 
content and receive noncommercial assistance; 
 Malaysia—would exempt all Malaysian SOEs from commitments affecting preferential purchase 
arrangements benefitting bumiputera, SMEs, or certain regions, but all Malaysia’s SOE exemptions cannot 
account for more than 40% of an SOE’s budget for purchase of goods and services; 
 Mexico—would retain ability for the national petroleum company to make purchases on a preferential 
basis from national firms in its exploration and production activities; 
 United States—would exempt the Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation, and the Government National Mortgage Association from nondiscriminatory treatment 
obligations, allowing them to restrict certain loan repayment guarantees to loans by U.S. enterprises; and  
 Vietnam—would exempt all Vietnamese SOEs from obligations regarding nondiscriminatory treatment in 
their purchasing activities, allowing them to accord preferential treatment to Vietnamese SMEs. 
Currency196 
Background 
For some Members of Congress, a key issue in the TPP debate has been how to combat the 
“unfair” exchange rate policies of other countries. Some Members of Congress and policy experts 
argue that U.S. companies and jobs have been adversely affected by the exchange rate policies 
adopted by China, Japan, and a number of other countries. They allege that these countries use 
policies to “manipulate” the value of their currency in order to gain an unfair trade advantage 
against other countries, including the United States. Given the impact exchange rate values can 
have on trade flows, some Members have advocated that currency manipulation be addressed in 
trade agreements, including the TPP.  
Other Members and policy experts have questioned whether currency manipulation is a 
significant problem, how it can be measured, and whether it can be addressed effectively in trade 
agreements. They raise questions about whether government policies have long-term effects on 
exchange rates, whether it is possible to differentiate between “manipulation” and legitimate 
central bank activities, and the net effect of currency manipulation on the U.S. economy. They 
have also raised concerns that more aggressive measures to combat currency manipulation could 
lead to a tariff war or put restrictions on U.S. monetary policy. 
                                                 
196 This section prepared by Rebecca M. Nelson. For more information about current debates over exchange rates, see 
CRS Report R43242, Current Debates over Exchange Rates: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Rebecca M. 
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The June TPA-2015 included, for the first time, a principal negotiating objective addressing 
currency manipulation, calling on negotiators to seek related provisions. The principal negotiating 
objective outlined a number of possible remedies to prevent and combat unfair currency practices, 
including enforceable rules, transparency, reporting, monitoring, and cooperative mechanisms.  
Joint Declaration 
Largely in response to the TPA-2015, monetary authorities from the 12 TPP countries initiated 
negotiations and in November 2015 released a declaration to address unfair currency practices. 197 
While the declaration was released concurrently with the text of the TPP, it is a separate 
agreement from the TPP. The declaration has three major parts: 
 Commitment to Avoid Manipulation. Reaffirms IMF commitments to avoid 
manipulating exchange rates to gain an unfair competitive advantage, and 
commits countries to pursue exchange rate policies that reflect underlying 
economic fundamentals, avoid persistent exchange rate misalignments, and 
refrain from competitive devaluations and exchange rate targeting for 
competitive purposes.  
 Transparency and Reporting. Requires public release of relevant data, 
including interventions in foreign exchange markets and foreign reserve 
holdings, as well as IMF’s annual assessment of their exchange rate.  
 Multilateral Dialogue. Establishes a group of TPP macroeconomic officials, 
with possible IMF participation, to meet at least annually to discuss 
macroeconomic and exchange rate policy issues, including transparency or 
reporting, and policy responses to address imbalances.  
The joint declaration would take effect when TPP enters into force and would apply to countries 
that accede to the TPP in the future, subject to additional transparency or other conditions 
determined by the existing TPP countries. The Treasury Department emphasizes that this 
declaration, for the first time in the context of a free trade agreement, addresses unfair currency 
practices by promoting transparency and accountability. However, the declaration does not 
include any enforcement mechanism on currency manipulation, the inclusion of which some 
Members advocated. 
Nontariff Barriers 
Technical Barriers to Trade 
Background 
Technical barriers to trade (TBT) are standards and regulations that are intended ostensibly to 
protect the health and safety of consumers or other legitimate purposes, but through design or 
implementation, may discriminate against imports. In order to minimize trade distortion, WTO 
members must adhere to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. The WTO TBT 
Agreement and subsequent U.S. FTA TBT chapters cover voluntary standards that industries 
apply, technical regulations that governments impose for health and safety purposes, and 
assessment procedures that governments employ to determine that a product meets required 
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standards. FTA provisions establish rules and procedures for member countries to follow, 
including making sure that standards, technical regulations, and conforming assessment 
procedures are applied without discrimination and in a manner not more trade restrictive than 
necessary. It addition, they require that members practice transparency as regulations are 
developed and applied, that international standards are used where appropriate, and that the 
domestic technical regulations of trading partners are recognized as equivalent to domestic 
regulations when possible. A key provision of the WTO TBT Agreement is that members have a 
central point of inquiry from which firms can ask for information on standards and regulations.  
Key Provisions 
The TPP builds on the TBT agreement and prior U.S. FTAs in several ways. It would: 
 provide opportunities for partner countries to comment on proposed standards 
and regulations and the implementation of regulations; 
 require nondiscriminatory treatment for conformity assessment bodies, including 
nongovernmental bodies; 
 extend transparency obligations to include placing new TBT proposals and rules 
on a single website, broadening the range of TBT measures notified to the WTO; 
 allow interested stakeholders from others parties to participate in the 
development of technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment 
procedures by central government bodies, and adopt U.S. style notice and 
comment periods; 
 mandate a “reasonable interval”—generally defined as no less than 6 months—
between adoption and implementation of new standards, as well as business 
compliance with new standards; 
 establish a Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade to promote and monitor the 
implementation and administration of the agreement and strengthen cooperation. 
The TBT chapter includes seven sectoral annexes: wine and distilled spirits, pharmaceuticals, 
medical devices, cosmetics, proprietary formulas for prepackaged food and food additives, 
information and communications technology products, and organic products. These include 
sector-specific obligations aimed at reducing unnecessary barriers to trade in these products. 
Regulatory Coherence 
With average tariffs already low in many countries throughout the Asia-Pacific, nontariff barriers, 
including inefficient and unpredictable regulatory processes, can be a significant impediment to 
market access for U.S. goods and services exports. While nontariff and regulatory barriers are 
addressed in provisions throughout the agreement, the TPP includes a new stand-alone chapter 
specifically on regulatory coherence. The goal of this new chapter, according to the USTR, is to 
ensure a regulatory environment throughout the Asia-Pacific that includes hallmarks of the U.S. 
regulatory system, such as transparency, impartiality, due process, and coordination across 
government, while affirming the rights of TPP countries to regulate their economies to promote 
legitimate public policy objectives.198 To achieve these dual goals the chapter focuses on 
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recognized best practices and good governance frameworks, rather than proscribing specific 
regulatory actions or outcomes. 
The regulatory coherence chapter recommends that TPP partner countries “endeavor” to establish 
domestic regulatory structures similar to the U.S. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in 
the Office of Management and Budget, a venue to vet proposed regulations and their compliance 
with domestic law and policy, as well as with trade agreements and other international 
obligations. Aside from seeking to assure regulatory consistency among various domestic 
agencies, TPP countries would also be encouraged to conduct regulatory impact assessments that 
would assess the need for a given regulation, conduct cost-benefit analysis, and assess 
alternatives to the proposed regulation, as well as seek to assure transparency and openness in the 
rule-making process. TPP would establish a regulatory coherence committee among TPP 
members to review implementation of the chapter’s commitments and consider future priorities 
related to regulatory coherence. In addition, TPP would encourage cooperation among the 
countries on regulatory coherence activities, and would require notification to the committee of 
steps taken to implement the chapter. 
While the agreement establishes new commitments related to regulatory process, the 
commitments appear largely to require self-enforcement among the 12 countries. Each TPP party 
would make its own determination of what regulations are covered under the agreement. Nothing 
in the chapter is subject to TPP’s dispute settlement mechanism.  
Transparency and Pricing of Health Care Technology and Pharmaceuticals 
Annex 
The debate over access to medicines encompasses other issues beyond pharmaceutical patent 
protections. Several TPP negotiating partners administer a national formulary for medicines 
purchased by the government for their national health services.199 These formularies often rely on 
generic drugs to the extent possible to maintain availability and contain costs. The U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry has expressed concern that the practices and procedures in national 
healthcare programs, including New Zealand’s Pharmaceutical Management Agency 
(PHARMAC), which maintains the New Zealand formulary, put “innovative pharmaceutical 
products,” often made in the United States, at a disadvantage. They contend that access to the 
country’s health care technology markets can be blocked by government’s use of nontransparent 
procedures that do not provide due process.200 The annex on “Transparency and Procedural 
Fairness for Pharmaceutical Products and Medical Devices” (Annex 26-A) is located in the 
chapter on Transparency and Anti-corruption (Chapter 26). As its name suggests, it is dedicated to 
promoting transparent and fair procedures to parties, concerning the listing of new 
pharmaceutical products or medical devices for reimbursement purposes. The key provision of 
the annex requires countries to make available to an applicant either (1) an independent review 
procedure, or (2) an internal review process, to reconsider a determination not to list a 
pharmaceutical or medical device for reimbursement. The addition of an internal review process 
differentiates the TPP from KORUS, which required the establishment of an independent review 
process. In addition, the parties agreed to consider reimbursement funding in a specified time 
frame. The annex does not apply to government procurement of pharmaceuticals or medicals, nor 
does it “modify a Party’s system of health care in any other respect.” The provisions are not 
subject either to state-to-state or investor-state dispute settlement. 
                                                 
199 A formulary is a list of medicines approved for prescription under a medical plan. 
200 USTR, 2015 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, p. 281. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for Congress 
 
Congressional Research Service 73 
Customs and Trade Facilitation 
Background 
Customs valuation and trade facilitation have been long-standing, if unheralded, provisions in 
U.S. FTAs that aim to ease and expedite the passage of goods over borders through streamlined, 
transparent, and more accountable customs procedures, and reduce associated transaction costs. 
OECD research has shown that addressing these issues, which provide the basic framework for 
how goods move from country to country, can reduce overall trade costs by 10-15%, with the 
greatest reduction in costs in lower income countries.201 Because of the potential benefits to the 
global trading system, improvements in customs and logistical procedures have figured 
prominently in WTO negotiations and form the core of the 2013 WTO Trade Facilitation 
Agreement (TFA). Such provisions have taken on new significance as global supply chains have 
increased the number of times intermediate goods cross borders and, hence, the cost of customs 
bottlenecks to the world economy. 
Industry stakeholders generally support the commitments achieved on customs and trade 
facilitation in the TPP. On the whole, the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Customs Issues 
(ITAC 14) found the agreement “fair and balanced” with similar but expanded provisions to 
recent agreements.202 ITAC 14 and other advisory committees, including those representing the 
services industries, have expressed concerns over the lack of a fixed de minimis threshold for 
customs duties given the importance of this provision in streamlining trade. They note that the 
parties have agreed to review this issue periodically and encourage the U.S. government to pursue 
a commercially relevant value.  
Key Provisions 
The TPP chapter on customs and trade facilitation would generally seek to ensure an efficient, 
timely, and transparent customs process, with relevant information readily available and easily 
accessible to businesses.203 Issues addressed include publication and sharing among TPP parties 
of customs information, the release of goods and issuance of advance rulings by customs 
authorities, treatment of express delivery shipments, nature of penalties for violation of customs 
laws, and risk management techniques for targeting inspection efforts on high-risk shipments. 
Given the magnitude and frequency of U.S. trade with TPP partners, changes in customs 
procedures could have a significant impact on companies engaged in trade throughout the region. 
Some commitments in TPP are similar to those in previous U.S. trade agreements and are already 
in force between the United States and its current FTA partners.  
On some customs issues, the TPP has more extensive commitments than previous FTAs. In other 
aspects, TPP commitments are less stringent. Generally, the TPP would go beyond the 
commitments included in the WTO TFA. Differences with existing agreements include: 
                                                 
201 Evdokia Moise and Silvia Sorescu, Trade Facilitation Indicators: The Potential Impact of Trade Facilitation on 
Developing Countries' Trade, OECD, OECD Trade Policy Papers No. 144, 2013, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4bw6kg6ws2-en. 
202 Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Customs Matters and Trade Facilitation (ITAC 14), Advisory Committee 
Report to the President, the Congress and the U.S. Trade Representative on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade 
Agreement, December 3, 2015. 
203 For the full text, see https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Customs-Administration-and-Trade-
Facilitation.pdf. 
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 Automation. A new provision would encourage creation of a single-access 
window whereby importers and exporters can electronically complete any 
requirements in one entry point. 
 Advance Rulings. TPP would require advance rulings to be issued within 150 
days of receipt by the customs authority, an increase over the 90 days allowed in 
the KORUS FTA. There is no deadline in the WTO TFA. 
 Advice/Information. A new provision would require parties to provide an 
expeditious response to requests for information regarding issues such as quotas, 
country of origin markings, and eligibility requirements for repaired and altered 
goods.  
 Express Shipments. TPP would require special customs procedures for express 
shipments, including release within six hours, and a de minimis threshold—no 
specific amount is required—below which goods are not subject to customs 
duties. The KORUS FTA required release within four hours for express shipment 
and fixed the de minimis threshold at $200 or more. 
 Penalties. A new provision would place parameters on penalties imposed by a 
customs administration that go beyond previous U.S. FTAs. Such penalties may 
be imposed only to the person legally responsible for the breach of law, must be 
commensurate with the degree and severity of the breach, must be accompanied 
by an explanation in writing, and proceedings must be initiated within a fixed and 
finite time period. 
 Release of Goods. TPP would require general release of goods no longer than the 
time required to comply with laws and within 48 hours of arrival, where possible. 
New provisions would provide some protections to importers when customs 
authorities release goods while holding some type of financial collateral. 
Other Provisions 
Competition Policies 
National competition laws and regulations are intended to protect consumers by ensuring that one 
firm does not so dominate a sector of the economy as to inhibit market entry and stifle 
competition. Some U.S. FTAs have included provisions to limit the trade-distorting effects of 
such laws. Among other things, U.S. FTAs require that the United States and the partner 
country(ies) inform persons from a partner country, who may be subject to administrative actions 
under domestic antitrust laws, of related hearings and provide them the opportunity to make their 
case. Under these FTAs, the partner countries agree to cooperate in enforcing competition laws 
through the exchange of information and consultation. 
The TPP includes commitments on competition policy similar to previous U.S. FTAs, including 
that such commitments are not subject to dispute settlement. Previously, the limited U.S. FTA 
commitments on SOEs and designated monopolies were included in the competition policy 
chapter. In TPP, these issues are addressed in a separate and more extensive chapter (see “State-
Owned Enterprises”). TPP includes some commitments that go beyond the recent KORUS FTA. 
These include provisions related to: protection of confidential business information, private rights 
of action in pursuing enforcement of national competition laws, and laws protecting consumers 
from fraudulent or deceptive commercial practices. In addition to the general carve out from 
dispute settlement, the competition provisions largely will not apply to Brunei until after either 10 
years or its establishment of a national competition authority and laws.  
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Transparency and Anti-Corruption 
Transparency. Like the commitments on regulatory coherence, the TPP provisions on 
transparency relate to the broader governance framework within which each TPP party will 
administer its laws, rules, and regulations that may affect TPP commitments. These provisions 
largely follow those included in previous U.S. FTAs, including KORUS. Such provisions would 
require the publication of all TPP-relevant measures a country may take, with time allowed for 
comments before such measures take effect. TPP would require countries to “endeavor to 
publish” proposed regulations no less than 60 days prior to the date on which comments are due, 
whereas KORUS requires that parties “should in most cases” publish not less than 40 days before 
comments are due. The agreement would also require due process with respect to administrative 
proceedings, including a review and appeal of such determinations. 
Anti-Corruption. TPP also includes commitments that would require measures to fight 
corruption, a number of which are not included in the KORUS FTA. Like KORUS, the TPP 
would require laws or measures making corruption and bribery criminal offenses, substantive 
penalties for such offenses, and protections for parties that report bribery. TPP includes additional 
commitments, not found in KORUS, such as requiring monetary sanctions for bribery offences 
and disallowing the deduction of those sanctions from tax liabilities, prohibiting specific corrupt 
acts relating to financial reporting and accounting standards, and requiring that no party fail to 
effectively enforce its anti-corruption commitments as a means to encourage trade and 
investment, subject to discretion on domestic allocation of resources. TPP also includes language 
that would require parties to endeavor to adopt a number of measures to prevent corruption 
among public officials and the private sector such as training, transparency, and disciplinary 
actions. The agreement would also require Japan to ratify the U.N. Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC). As of December 1, 2015, Japan is the only TPP country that has not yet 
ratified UNCAC.204 
Dispute settlement applies both to the transparency and anti-corruption commitments with some 
limitations with respect to enforcement of anti-corruption laws. Additional commitments related 
to transparency and procedural fairness for pharmaceuticals and medical devices are included in 
an annex to this chapter. For more on these commitments, see “Transparency and Pricing of 
Health Care Technology and Pharmaceuticals.” 
In its chapter on transparency, the KORUS FTA also includes a provision that prohibits the 
United States and South Korea from discouraging their residents’ purchase of goods and services 
from one another. A similar clause is not found in TPP. 
Trade Remedies  
Trade remedies are measures designed to provide relief to domestic industries that have been 
injured or threatened with injury by imports. They are regarded by many in Congress as an 
important trade policy tool to mitigate the adverse effects of unfairly traded imports and import 
surges on U.S. industries and workers. 
The three most commonly used trade remedies are: (1) antidumping (AD) remedies, which are 
designed to provide relief from the adverse price effects of imports sold at less than fair-market 
value; (2) countervailing duty (CVD) remedies, which are used to counter the adverse effects on 
domestic industry of foreign government subsidies that lower the cost of imports; and (3) 
                                                 
204 “United Nations Convention against Corruption: Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 December 2015,” United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html. 
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safeguard actions, which are employed to permit temporary relief so that domestic industries can 
adjust to the adverse effects of surges in fairly-traded imports. These actions are sanctioned by the 
WTO as long as they are undertaken in a nondiscriminatory and transparent manner and are 
consistent with rules specified in WTO agreements. 
Congress has repeatedly insisted, including most recently through the TPA-2015, that the United 
States retain the right to use trade remedies to counter unfair trade practices and import surges 
and rigorously enforce its trade laws. This objective is reflected in existing U.S. FTAs. 
TPP would preserve each party’s rights and obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) regarding global safeguard and AD/CVD measures, as previous U.S. trade 
agreements have done. TPP includes additional provisions on transparency and due process in 
pursuing AD/CVD remedies. With regard to safeguard actions, TPP, like previous U.S. FTAs, also 
describes the precise terms of their use in the context of injury due to increased imports under the 
agreement, including guidelines on addressing import injury from multiple parties. Following an 
investigation and affirmative determination of injury by relevant domestic authorities, TPP would 
allow for a withdrawal of trade concessions for affected products (i.e., returning duties to their 
pre-agreement levels). The agreement also stipulates certain standards regarding safeguard 
measures such as their duration (generally no more than two years) and would require notification 
among the TPP parties of any safeguard actions. If one party implements a safeguard measure, 
TPP would provide that other affected parties be afforded additional liberalization or may 
suspend tariff concessions of an equivalent nature. 
Development and Capacity Building 
A notable aspect of the TPP is the variation among partners in terms of economic development. 
TPP does not have a distinct set of provisions applicable only to developed or developing 
countries. Some of the countries, however, particularly Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam, have 
longer phase-in periods before several of their commitments take full effect, and many have 
extensive nonconforming measures excluding certain sectors, industries, and practices from 
various TPP provisions. 
The agreement includes two related chapters (development, and cooperation and capacity 
building) addressing issues dealing with this variation in economic status among the countries. 
Neither chapter is subject to dispute settlement and the commitments in both are largely hortatory, 
with the exception of establishing committees to exchange information and discuss further 
possible actions. The chapter on development would require TPP countries to recognize the 
importance of broad-based economic growth, consider activities to help women take advantage of 
the agreement, and encourage developing skills in science and technology. The chapter on 
cooperation and capacity building would require the TPP countries to establish a contact person 
for coordination on capacity building, and would commit the countries to work to provide the 
resources necessary to implement the agreement.  
As in previous trade agreements, the TPP would not commit the United States to a particular level 
of funding for trade capacity building (TCB). The U.S. government, however, provides ongoing 
assistance to a number of FTA partners relating to implementation of trade agreement 
commitments. For example, a 2008-2011 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
project provided $6.2 million to support efforts by the Dominican Republic to implement the DR-
CAFTA, including assistance related to customs, SPS, environmental standards, labor standards, 
and other provisions. TCB is a major component of U.S. foreign assistance—the United States 
committed $594 million to TCB in FY2014, with major categories including trade-related 
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agriculture ($109.5 million), competition policy, business environment and governance ($69.4 
million), trade-related labor ($56.9 million), and customs operations ($54.3 million). 205 
Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (firms with less than 500 employees by the U.S. definition, 
or SMEs) account for the majority of firms involved in international trade (about 97%), but they 
account for a relatively small share of the value of direct U.S. trade (about 30%). In fact, in 2013, 
eight firms alone accounted for more than 10% of all U.S. exports and imports.206 SMEs, 
however, also participate in trade indirectly as suppliers, providing parts and components into the 
supply chain of larger, finished products that can be exported. That contribution may not always 
be reflected in U.S. trade data. Though SMEs represent a relatively small share of U.S. trade by 
value, they employ approximately half of the U.S. workforce in the nonfarm private sector.207 In 
addition, academic studies have shown that small businesses are important for job growth, but 
this appears to be due more to their age than their size—small firms are typically also young 
firms—suggesting policies aimed at job growth may be better targeted toward young firms than 
small firms.208 
The characteristics of SMEs and their relatively small presence in U.S. trade have led to 
government efforts to improve SME access to international markets. The USTR commissioned a 
series of reports from the USITC regarding the role of SMEs in U.S. exporting activities.209 Those 
reports identified barriers limiting SME access to foreign markets, and surveyed SMEs for 
suggestions on policy changes that could ease SME exporting activities. An increased focus on 
FTAs and other trade agreements was among the top three most frequent responses provided.210 
Seeking to enhance SME engagement in international trade, the TPP negotiators agreed to a 
stand-alone SME chapter. Although this goes beyond previous U.S. FTAs, the chapter includes 
few commitments. Disciplines would require TPP countries to make the agreement and some 
analysis of its SME-relevant provisions available on a website. In addition, TPP would establish a 
committee to consider further efforts to assist SMEs in trade matters. Nothing in the chapter 
would be subject to the agreement’s dispute settlement mechanism. Negotiators originally 
described SME’s ability to engage in trade as a “cross-cutting” issue in the TPP, noting that 
disciplines throughout the agreement could impact SMEs. For example, new provisions on digital 
trade could be salient for SMEs in allowing them to reach new markets. While stakeholders 
generally support the transparency measures in TPP for SMEs, some have argued that negotiators 
missed an opportunity to facilitate trade for SMEs by failing to establish a fixed de minimis 
                                                 
205 USAID, Trade Capacity Building Database, February 17, 2016, https://eads.usaid.gov/tcb/. 
206 The trade statistics in this section come from: U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Commerce, A Profile of U.S. 
Importing and Exporting Companies, 2012-2013, CB15-51, April 7, 2015, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-
Release/edb/2013/edbrel.pdf. Percentages reflect share of total “identified” trade. Not all U.S. exports and imports can 
be matched to specific companies. In 2009, this “unidentified” trade accounted for 11% of exports and 12% of imports. 
207 Firm and employment share data from U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Commerce, Statistics of U.S. Businesses: 
Statistics about Business Size, http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html#RcptSize.  
208 David Neumark, Brandon Wall, and Junfu Zhang, “Do Small Businesses Create More Jobs? New Evidence for the 
United States from the National Establishment Time Series,” Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 93, no. 1 
(February 2011), pp. 16-29; John C. Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, and Javier Miranda, “Who Creates Jobs? Small vs. 
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209 These reports can be found at http://www.usitc.gov/research_and_analysis/small_med_enterprises.htm. 
210 USITC, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: U.S. and EU Export Activities, and Barriers and Opportunities 
Experienced by U.S. Firms, Investigation No. 332-509, USITC Publication 4169, July 2010, pp. 3-27. 
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threshold on customs shipments, the value beneath which imports receive expedited and duty-free 
customs treatment.211 They argue this would have been particularly beneficial for SMEs as a way 
to minimize burdensome customs procedures for small-value shipments. 
Institutional Issues 
The TPP contains provisions related to dispute settlement and governance of the agreement. 
Given that the TPP is viewed as a “living agreement,” it contains procedures for the accession of 
new members, the negotiation of new provisions, and the creation of a Free Trade Commission to 
oversee the agreement.  
Secretariat 
Generally, U.S. FTAs have minimal structures; they do not have free-standing secretariats and 
TPP is no exception. From NAFTA onward, they have included a commission co-chaired by 
USTR and trade ministers of the respective parties to the agreement. In keeping with this practice, 
the TPP provides for the establishment of a Free Trade Commission (Commission). The 
Commission is tasked with: (1) supervising the implementation and operation of the agreement; 
(2) considering any proposals to amend or modify the agreement; (3) supervising work of 
committees established under the agreement; and (4) seeking to resolve disputes arising from its 
interpretation or application (also see dispute settlement, below). Examples of modifications 
could, for example, be agreements to accelerate tariff elimination, modify rules of origin, or 
amend the list of covered goods and services in the government procurement chapter. The 
Commission would meet within one year of the entry into force of the agreement and periodically 
as the parties decide thereafter. All decisions would be taken by consensus. Any changes to the 
agreement made by the Commission that require changes to U.S. law would need congressional 
approval. 
Dispute Settlement (DS) 
The TPP, as well as previous U.S. FTAs, provide options to resolve disputes arising under the 
agreement. These are in addition to procedures with regard to investor-state dispute resolution 
(discussed above). In general, TPP is designed to resolve disputes in a cooperative manner. A 
party first seeks redress of a grievance through a request for consultation with the other party. 
These steps include: 
 initial consultations between the parties; 
 good offices, conciliation, or mediation; and (if no resolution); and 
 establishment of a dispute settlement panel. 
Panels would be composed of three arbiters, of whom each side appoints one and the third is 
appointed by mutual consent. Failing that, the third is selected from a list of individuals who are 
not nationals of either side. After the panel makes its decision, the unsuccessful party would be 
expected to remedy the measure or practice under dispute. If it does not, compensation, 
suspension of benefits, or fines have been traditional remedies. In cases in which a dispute is 
common to both WTO and FTA rules, a party can choose the forum in which to bring the dispute, 
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and the United States Trade Representative on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), December 3, 2015. 
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but cannot bring the dispute to multiple fora. Although State-State dispute settlement use has been 
infrequent under U.S. FTAs, the size of the potential TPP, the inclusion of new members, and the 
negotiation of new provisions may cause increased utilization of the dispute settlement forum 
among the parties. 
The applicability of DS for certain provisions was an issue in the negotiations. For example, the 
labor consistency plans for Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei are subject to DS, whereas Colombia’s 
separate labor action plan was not subject to DS. As noted above, the applicability of DS to the 
environmental provisions was a subject of contention in the negotiations. Some provisions not 
subject to dispute settlement include:  
 the regulatory coherence chapter; 
 the competition chapter; 
 the SME, development, and cooperation and capacity building chapters;  
 certain commitments by Malaysia in the SOE chapter for two years after entry 
into force; and 
 the Annex on pharmaceutical and medical device reimbursement.  
A “Living Agreement” 
The TPP is envisaged as a “living agreement,” one that is open to new members willing to sign up 
to its commitments and to addressing new issues as they evolve. The TPP provides that countries 
can amend the agreement by consensus, through consideration by the TPP Commission. Such an 
amendment, however, could only take effect after each party’s legal process is completed. Any 
amendment requiring changes to U.S. law would need passage of implementing legislation to 
take effect.  
The TPP provides for accession by “any State or separate customs territory that is a member of 
APEC,” or other state by consensus of the parties, that is prepared to meet the standards of the 
agreement. Following a request to join addressed to the depository of the agreement (New 
Zealand), the TPP Commission would establish a working group to negotiate the proposed terms 
and conditions. All parties must agree to the terms and conditions negotiated by the working 
group through their domestic ratification process. For the United States, that would mean the 
introduction and passage of implementing legislation by Congress. 
While the expansion of the TPP’s membership beyond Asia-Pacific countries has been 
contemplated, as a trans-Pacific agreement, to date, it has focused on APEC countries. Of these, 
there are many potential candidates, from relatively advanced economies such as South Korea 
and Taiwan, to middle-income states with dynamic economies and youthful populations like 
Thailand or the Philippines. Other countries beyond APEC, such as Colombia and Costa Rica, 
have expressed interest, and it is conceivable that additional countries or trade blocs beyond the 
Pacific shores could link up to the agreement in the future. Policymakers in TPP countries have 
ventured that China may seek to join at some point, provided that it could adhere to the standards 
of the agreement. 
The accession process raises the question of whether a country, especially one with political or 
economic heft, can be expected simply to join an agreement already negotiated or whether it 
would or should have input on the existing agreement, especially if the goal is to produce a free 
trade area for the Asia-Pacific, or beyond. Yet, reopening the agreement’s substantive provisions 
with each new entrant—as opposed to its market access provisions which presumably would need 
to be negotiated with each existing member regardless—offers up its own difficulties. The WTO 
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accession process, whereby countries agree to the established WTO rules, but negotiate on market 
access, could serve as a template. 
Relationship to Existing Agreements 
Each party to the TPP previously has concluded FTAs with multiple TPP members. This 
circumstance has raised the issue of the relationship of the TPP to previous agreements. Article 
1.2 of TPP declares the intention of the parties for it to “coexist” with their international 
agreements, and in a situation of inconsistency, for the relevant parties to work toward a mutually 
agreeable solution. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also provides guidance on the 
interpretation of precedence between agreements: 
When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier 
treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation .... the earlier treaty applies only to the 
extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty. (Article 30.3) 
This provision can be interpreted to mean that the latter treaty applies when there is a conflict, but 
that an earlier provision could apply in situations where the subject matter of a provision of the 
earlier treaty is not addressed in the later agreement. In cases where the market access provisions 
differ between a previous agreement and a later one, it could be up to the exporter as to whether 
to seek the benefits under the old agreement or the new. Given that the new agreement is likely to 
achieve further liberalization, the new agreement would most likely be used by the exporter. 
However, in some cases, such as the phased elimination of tariffs or cases of more favorable 
ROO, exporters may continue to invoke the provisions of the old agreement, at least until the 
transition periods of the new agreement are completed.  
Issues for Congress 
Congress has taken a strong interest in the TPP since the negotiations were launched in 2008. 
Hearings have been held, and many Members have expressed views on the negotiations through 
letters and consultations with the Administration and with stakeholder groups. Congress may 
consider the agreement from several perspectives if it considers implementing legislation.  
Comprehensive, High-Standard Agreement 
As the largest FTA negotiated by the United States, the TPP brings together a large and expanding 
group of countries representing various levels of development. Likewise, with 30 chapters in the 
agreement, it is the most comprehensive FTA in terms of breadth of commitments undertaken by 
the United States. On one hand, the TPP would incorporate provisions on new trade barriers, such 
as digital trade and additional intellectual property rights. On the other hand, certain aspects of 
the agreement differ from previous U.S. FTAs, and are considered by some stakeholders as less 
ambitious. For example, the agreement includes the longest U.S. tariff phase-out (30 years) ever 
in an FTA and excludes more agricultural product lines from complete liberalization than many 
previous FTAs. Some industry stakeholders have raised concerns over such issues as: less than 12 
years of data exclusivity for biologic drugs, as found in U.S. law; the exclusion of tobacco control 
measures from the ISDS procedures of the investment chapter, unlike any prior FTA; the 
exclusion of financial services from disciplines on data localization, one of the TPP’s innovative 
provisions; and the more flexible rules of origin for autos and auto parts than those prescribed in 
NAFTA, among other issues. Meanwhile, some NGO stakeholders were disappointed in certain 
provisions in the environmental chapter, as compared with previous U.S. FTAs. The negotiators 
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and other stakeholders, however, would argue that these provisions were the result of compromise 
in order to achieve a final agreement among such a diverse membership. 
Key questions for Congress include:  
 Did the United States achieve its objective of creating a “comprehensive, high-
standard” agreement, including in comparison with previous FTAs and 
commitments in the WTO? 
 Has the TPP set the appropriate framework and precedent for future trade 
negotiations, particularly on new issues? 
Role and Timing of TPA and Negotiating Objectives 
TPA-2015 sets forth U.S. negotiating objectives for future U.S. trade agreements as a condition 
for their expedited legislative consideration, and provides a method to remove expedited 
treatment if an agreement does not make sufficient progress toward those goals. TPA objectives 
include traditional goals such as reducing barriers to various types of trade (e.g., goods, services, 
agriculture, electronic commerce); protecting foreign investment and intellectual property rights; 
encouraging transparency, fair regulatory practices, and anti-corruption measures; ensuring that 
countries protect the environment and worker rights; providing for an effective dispute settlement 
process; and protecting the U.S. right to enforce its trade remedy laws. They also include goals 
reflecting recent developments and emerging issues, such as objectives on state-owned 
enterprises, regulatory coherence, trade in the digital environment, and trade in green 
technologies. In practice, negotiating objectives are written to be flexible enough to allow the 
Administration to negotiate agreements with other countries, as well as keep current with an 
evolving international trading system. This flexibility, however, leaves open to interpretation 
what constitutes “progress in achieving the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives” of TPA: 
the standard an agreement must meet in order for its implementing legislation to receive 
expedited congressional consideration. 
Key questions for Congress include: 
 Does the TPP make progress in achieving the trade negotiating objectives of 
TPA?  
 Under what circumstances could the expedited procedures of TPA be removed 
for TPP? 
Potential Economic Impact 
The current debate over the TPP and its potential impact on the U.S. economy is one component 
of a larger national conversation on employment opportunities, income and wealth distribution, 
and the general economic well-being of the U.S. middle class. Economic theory and empirical 
evidence during the post-war period support the lowering of international trade barriers as a tool 
for economic growth as a result of increased efficiency, productivity, cost savings, and consumer 
choice due to greater competition. At the same time, increased trade can lead to job loss and 
economic dislocation in importing-competing sectors. Jobs with expanding firms may require 
new skills or relocation, potentially making it difficult for dislocated workers to find new 
employment.  
Estimates of the economic impact of the TPP will likely form an important part of the 
congressional debate. Deriving these estimates, however, is a difficult and imprecise task. Beyond 
changes in tariffs and quotas, which form only a portion of the TPP commitments, economic 
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modeling efforts are limited by difficulties in accurately measuring existing trade barriers and 
their potential changes. In addition, the choice of modeling techniques and assumptions necessary 
to generate estimates can alter outcomes. Already a number of studies on the TPP have been 
released, some with very different conclusions. In May, the USITC released the official USG 
nonpartisan and objective analysis of the agreement’s potential economic impact, estimating a 
small positive benefit to the U.S. economy from the TPP. Key questions for Congress include: 
 Do U.S. worker dislocation and retraining programs provide adequate adjustment 
support for workers disadvantaged by trade, including the retraining and 
relocation assistance that may be necessary to find alternate employment in 
competitive industries? 
 Do U.S. workers have the skills needed to take advantage of opportunities in a 
globalized world? If not, who should provide those skills? 
 What criteria should be used to evaluate the reliability of the various estimates of 
TPP’s economic impact? 
The TPP and U.S. Trade Policy  
The U.S. pursuit of the TPP and the outcome of the negotiations raise questions regarding its 
possible impact on the status and shape of current and future U.S. trade policy. With the Doha 
Round in abeyance, the United States has turned to the negotiation of ‘mega-regional’ FTAs such 
as the TPP and T-TIP as alternative venues for negotiating trade liberalization. These negotiations 
offer some advantages, namely the potential for deeper liberalization than that achievable through 
the consensus-based multilateral trading system. These agreements also have the potential to 
guide and encourage further liberalization through other venues both multilateral and regional. 
However, as with previous FTAs, the TPP may create trade diversion (i.e., trade patterns that 
reflect preferential tariff treatment rather than comparative advantage), undermining the broader 
economic goals of U.S. trade policy. In addition, they could create a two tier global economy, 
where the rules of the multilateral trading system are different from these mega-regional 
agreements and potentially impeding trade between the two tiers.  
Key questions for Congress include: 
 Does the TPP signal the beginning of the end of WTO trade negotiations or could 
it serve as a building block for a more viable multilateral trade system through 
the WTO that responds to trade challenges of the 21st century?  
 What impact will the TPP have on the WTO as an institution, including on some 
of its most effective functions, such as the resolution of international trade 
disputes? 
Strategic Considerations 
Supporters also frame the TPP in terms of its potential strategic value for the United States, 
relating to U.S. influence in geo-political and economic spheres in the Asia-Pacific region. China 
is not a signatory to the TPP agreement, but, in some ways, the debate over the accord includes 
China. During a time when China's rise and North Korea's growing nuclear and missile 
capabilities are testing the U.S.-based status quo, TPP proponents argue that the TPP is part of a 
broad foreign policy strategy to promote greater respect for, and ensure a primary U.S. role in 
establishing, the next generation of international trade rules and norms in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The Administration has touted the importance of writing these rules, warning that if the United 
States does not, China will. The implication is that the rules and disciplines China would seek to 
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impose would be less robust and, perhaps, would be counter to U.S. economic and geo-political 
interests. 
Key questions for Congress include: 
 How do the potential strategic effects of the TPP compare to its economic value, 
and how should one weigh such considerations in an overall assessment of the 
agreement?  
 Are U.S. and Chinese visions of international trading norms fundamentally 
different or do initiatives by both regional powers advance the same underlying 
goals? 
Potential Consequences of Not Ratifying the TPP 
Some analysts have asserted that failure to pass the TPP could have significant implications for 
the United States both economically and strategically. Given the recent flurry of concluded or 
implemented trade agreements between major U.S. trading partners (e.g., Australia-Japan, China-
South Korea, EU-Vietnam), and the progress in the RCEP negotiations, it is clear that the regional 
and international trade architecture will continue to evolve with or without U.S. participation. 
Economically, this means that without the TPP, U.S. goods and services could be at a further 
disadvantage in foreign markets in which other countries, but not the United States, have 
negotiated trade agreements. Strategically, they argue that ratification of the TPP may be tied to 
perceptions of U.S. credibility as a negotiating partner and that countries could interpret a failure 
of TPP in the United States as a symbol of the United States' declining interest in the region and 
its inability to assert leadership. 
Key questions for Congress include: 
 What would be the impact on U.S. trade policy and perceptions of U.S. 
leadership in the Asia-Pacific region if the TPP is rejected by Congress or is 
delayed indefinitely? 
 How will congressional consideration of TPP affect U.S. credibility in future 
bilateral, regional, and international trade negotiations? 
Implementation, Future Expansion, and Institutional Issues 
Congress may look forward as it debates the TPP, considering issues relating to the agreement’s 
potential implementation and expansion. FTA implementing legislation typically requires that the 
Administration certify the partner countries are prepared to meet their obligations before an 
agreement can enter into force for the United States. A number of commitments, however, will 
continue to be phased in over time. Some Members have questioned the commitment of future 
administrations to ensure that TPP provisions are adequately and equally enforced. Specific issues 
have been raised with regards to the implementation of IPR commitments, labor and environment 
provisions, and the removal of nontariff barriers, among other matters. Congress may also 
consider the institutional structure of the TPP agreement—potentially the largest U.S. FTA—
including the congressional role in any expansion of TPP, both in terms of members and content. 
The accession of new members likely would require implementing legislation, thus requiring 
congressional approval, if only to amend the U.S. tariff code and impose requisite rules of origin. 
Implementing legislation would also be required for changes to the agreement that would alter 
U.S. law. While TPA requires congressional notification for beginning trade negotiations, 
Congress may also consider whether to require prior congressional approval to negotiate with 
potential new participants due to the expandable nature of the TPP.  
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 Has the United States adequately funded implementation and enforcement efforts 
for past FTAs? How should the U.S. government ensure that TPP commitments 
are fully implemented, and subsequently enforced? 
 What factors should be considered in assessing the suitability of a country for 
membership? Would amendments or changes to the agreement not requiring 
changes to U.S. law be subject to congressional approval?  
Conclusion 
The potential Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement has both economic and broader strategic policy 
implications for the United States. The TPP is ambitious in at least four ways: (1) its size—it 
would be the largest U.S. FTA by trade flows and could expand in a region that represents over 
half of all U.S. trade; (2) the scope and scale of its liberalization—the parties, while not always at 
the desired level of ambition, have agreed to reduce barriers to goods, services, and agricultural 
trade and to establish rules and disciplines on a wide range of topics, including new policy issues 
that neither the WTO nor existing FTAs yet cover; (3) its potential evolution as a “living 
agreement”—it may continue to be expanded in terms of its membership and its rules and 
disciplines, and a number of countries officially have expressed an interest in joining TPP if it 
goes into effect; and (4) its geo-political significance—it has become, for some observers in the 
United States and Asia, a symbol of U.S. commitment to and influence in the Asia-Pacific, a 
region of growing economic and military importance where U.S. leadership increasingly is being 
challenged. As Congress debates potential implementing legislation, it has a wide and complex 
set of issues to consider. 
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Appendix.   
CRS Products Related to the TPP 
TPP Negotiations and Policy Implications – Reports 
CRS Report R44278, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): In Brief, by Ian F. Fergusson, Mark A. McMinimy, and Brock 
R. Williams. 
CRS Report R42344, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries: Comparative Trade and Economic Analysis, by Brock R. 
Williams. 
CRS Report R44361, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Strategic Implications, coordinated by Ben Dolven and Brock 
R. Williams. 
CRS Report R44337, American Agriculture and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, by Mark A. McMinimy, 
TPP Negotiations and Policy Implications – In Focus 
CRS In Focus IF10000, TPP: An Overview, by Brock R. Williams and Ian F. Fergusson.  
CRS In Focus IF10412, TPP: Taking the Measure of the Agreement for U.S. Agriculture, by Mark A. McMinimy  
CRS In Focus IF10390, TPP: Digital Trade Provisions, by Rachel F. Fefer  
CRS In Focus IF10393, TPP: Rules of Origin, by Vivian C. Jones, Bill Canis, and Michaela D. Platzer  
TPA and Congressional Consideration 
CRS In Focus IF10297, TPP-Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Timeline, by Ian F. Fergusson.  
CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson 
CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy, by Ian F. Fergusson  
CRS Report R43491, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions, by Ian F. Fergusson and Richard S. 
Beth. 
Trade Agreement-Related In Focus Products 
CRS In Focus IF10166, Environmental Provisions in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), by Richard K. Lattanzio and Ian F. 
Fergusson. 
CRS In Focus IF10033, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and International Trade, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Ian F. 
Fergusson.  
CRS In Focus IF10161, International Trade Agreements and Job Estimates, by James K. Jackson  
CRS In Focus IF10052, U.S. International Investment Agreements (IIAs), by Martin A. Weiss and Shayerah Ilias Akhtar 
CRS In Focus IF10046, Worker Rights Provisions in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), by Mary Jane Bolle and Ian F. 
Fergusson. 
Table A-1. U.S. Goods Trade with TPP Countries, 2015 
(in millions of U.S. dollars, ordered by total trade) 
Country Exports Imports Balance Total Trade 
Canada 280,017 295,190 -15,173 575,207 
Mexico 236,377 294,741 -58,364 531,118 
Japan 62,472 131,120 -68,648 193,592 
Singapore 28,657 18,235 10,422 46,892 
Malaysia 12,293 33,828 -21,535 46,121 
Vietnam 7,072 37,993 -30,921 45,065 
Australia 25,038 10,862 14,176 35,900 
Chile 15,587 8,880 6,707 24,467 
Peru 8,811 5,069 3,742 13,880 
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Country Exports Imports Balance Total Trade 
New Zealand 3,634 4,282 -648 7,916 
Brunei 133 19 114 152 
Total 680,091 840,219 -160,128 1,520,310 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission. 
Notes: U.S. general imports, U.S. total exports. 
Table A-2. U.S. Private Services Trade with TPP Countries, 2014 
(in millions of U.S. dollars, ordered by total trade) 
Country Exports Imports Balance Total Trade 
Canada 61,353 30,074 31,279 91,427 
Japan 46,698 31,237 15,461 77,935 
Mexico 30,000 19,487 10,513 49,487 
Australia 19,394 6,747 12,647 26,141 
Singapore 11,941 5,964 5,977 17,905 
Chile 3,813 1,227 2,586 5,040 
Malaysia 2,859 1,789 1,070 4,648 
New Zealand 2,216 1,457 759 3,673 
Total 178,274 97,982 80,292 276,256 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Interactive Tables for International Data. 
Notes: BEA does not collect services trade data for every partner country. 
Table A-3. U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) with TPP Countries, 2014 
(in millions of U.S. dollars, ordered U.S. FDI Flow Abroad) 
Country U.S. FDI Abroad 
(Annual Flow) 
U.S. FDI Abroad 
(Stock) 
FDI in U.S. 
(Annual Flow) 
FDI in U.S. 
(Stock) 
Canada 19,847 386,121 21,116 261,247 
Singapore 19,435 179,764 1,184 20,609 
Australia 16,594 180,315 94 47,340 
Mexico  9,311 107,825 2,421 17,710 
Malaysia 1,719 14,357 239 809 
Peru 1,215 6,486 -45 123 
Chile 292 27,560 124 730 
Vietnam 118 1,473 -104 -126 
Brunei -36 -6 (D) (D) 
New Zealand -39 7,760 68 1,011 
Japan -7,303 108,068 33,765 372,800 
Total 61,153 1,019,723 58,862 722,253 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Interactive Tables for International Data. 
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Notes: Stock refers to the accumulated value of FDI, whereas flow refers to the value of incoming or outgoing 
FDI in a particular year. (D) denotes information suppressed to protect individual company data. 
 
“The May 10th Agreement” 
On May 10, 2007, a bipartisan group of congressional leaders and the Bush Administration released a statement on 
agreed principles in four policy areas: worker rights, environment protection, intellectual property rights, and foreign 
investment. The principles were to be reflected in provisions in four U.S. FTAs—with Colombia, Panama, Peru, and 
South Korea. Regarding worker rights, the May 10th Agreement (the Agreement) required the United States and FTA 
partners to commit to enforcing the five international labor principles enshrined in the International Labour 
Organization’s (ILO’s) 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights At Work and that the commitment be 
enforceable under the FTA. These rights are the freedom of association, the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labor, the effective abolition of child labor, 
and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
The Agreement also required FTAs to adhere to seven major multilateral environmental agreements: The seven 
agreements are the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species; the Montreal Protocol on Ozone 
Depleting Substances; the Convention on Marine Pollution; the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention; the 
Ramsar Convention on the Wetlands; the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling; and the 
Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. 
Furthermore, the parties are not to waive or otherwise derogate from their labor or environmental protection laws 
in a manner that would affect trade or investment with the FTA partner(s). In addition, the labor and environment 
provisions must be enforceable, if consultation and other avenues fail, through the same dispute settlement 
procedures that apply to the other provisions in the FTA.  
The Agreement also required the FTAs to include provisions related to patents and approval of pharmaceuticals for 
marketing exclusivity with different requirements for developed and developing countries. Specifically, the Agreement 
required provisions dealing with the effective period of data exclusivity—the restrictions on the use of test data 
produced for market approval by generic drug producers; patent extensions; linkage of marketing approval of generic 
drugs to determination of possible patent infringement; and reaffirmation of adherence to Doha Declaration on 
compulsory licensing of drugs to respond to public health crises. 
Regarding foreign investment, the Agreement required each of the FTAs to state that none of its provisions would 
accord foreign investors greater substantive rights in terms of foreign investment protection than are accorded U.S. 
investors in the United States.  
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